



The Misregulation of Person-to-
Person Lending 
Andrew Verstein* 
Amid a financial crisis and credit crunch, retail investors are lending a 
billion dollars over the Internet, on an unsecured basis, to total strangers. 
Technological and financial innovation allows person-to-person (“P2P”) 
lending to connect lenders and borrowers in inspiring ways never before 
imagined. However, all is not well with P2P lending. The SEC threatens 
the entire industry by asserting jurisdiction with a fundamental 
misunderstanding of P2P lending. This Article illustrates how the SEC has 
transformed this industry, making P2P lending less safe and more costly, 
threatening its very existence. The SEC’s misregulation of P2P lending 
provides an opportunity to theorize about regulation in a rapidly 
disintermediating world. The Article then proposes a preferable regulatory 
scheme designed to preserve and discipline P2P lending’s innovative mix of 
social finance, microlending, and disintermediation. This proposal consists 
of regulation by the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Amid a financial crisis and credit crunch, retail investors have lent 
over $1.5 billion through the Internet, on an unsecured basis, to 
complete strangers.1 Technological and financial innovation allows 
person-to-person (“P2P”) lending to connect lenders and borrowers in 
inspiring ways never before imagined. Industry analysts project that 
P2P lending could exceed $5 billion annually by 2013,2 with some 
even suggesting figures of greater than $30 billion.3 This blossoming 
of P2P lending brings with it both new risks and new regulatory 
concerns. For example, lenders may not be repaid in full, borrowers 
risk their privacy, and Internet platforms extend questionable 
 
 1 Rachel Gotbaum, Avoiding the Pitfalls of Family Borrowing, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Oct. 6, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
6208227 (stating that Circle Lending, later Virgin Money USA, lended over 
$100,000,000); About Us: Statistics, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/facts (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2011) ($244,323,625); Lending Club Statistics, LENDING CLUB, 
https://www.lendingclub.com/info/statistics.action (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) 
($366,103,025); Performance Data, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/invest/ 
performance.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) ($258,229,901); The Largest P2P Lending 
Service Is . . ., P2P-BANKING.COM (Feb. 20, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.wiseclerk.com/ 
group-news/countries/china-the-largest-p2p-lending-service-is/ (CreditEase: about 
$300,000,000 annually); Zopa Sees Surge in Demand as Banks Fail to Meet Consumer 
Interests, FINEXTRA (Mar. 9, 2011, 10:09 AM), http://www.finextra.com/ 
News/Fullstory.aspx?newsitemid=22342 (£125,000,000, or about $200,000,000).  
 2 Press Release, Gartner Newsroom, Gartner Says 50 Per Cent of Banks Will Still 
Lack an Innovation Programme and Budget by 2013 (Jan. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1272313 (“By 2013, P2P lending will soar at 
least 66 per cent to $5 billion of outstanding loans.”).  
 3 $30 billion would represent a modest 1% of the U.S. consumer credit market. 
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, SECOND QUARTER 2011, at 100 tbl.L.222 ( 2011), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf (indicating total 
consumer credit liabilities of households and nonprofit organizations is about $2.4 
trillion); see David. G. Blanchflower & David S. Evans, The Role of Credit Cards in 
Providing Financing for Small Businesses, 2 PAYMENT CARD ECON. REV. 77, 79 n.4 
(2004) (“Other estimates place the amount of [consumer] credit available at over $4 
trillion.”); see also Alan Farnham, New Ways to Get a Loan Without Going to a Bank, 
ABC NEWS, (Jan. 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/online-peer-peer-loans-
benefit-borrowers-lenders/story?id=12547398 (quoting LendingClub CEO and co-
founder Renaud Laplanche’s explanation that “[i]f you compound [Lending Club’s] 
growth rate, [they]’ll be the size of Citibank in three years”); Press Release, Zopa, 
Zopa Lending Passes £100 Million Milestone (Sept. 30, 2010) (available at 
http://uk.zopa.com/ApplicationResources/press/2010/Zopa%20lending%20passes%201
00%20million%20milestone.pdf) (stating that one UK P2P firm currently accounts for 
more than 1% of all UK consumer credit transactions). 
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promises to transacting parties.4 Who will police this burgeoning 
market and under what regulatory scheme? 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) currently 
asserts itself as the chief regulator over P2P lending and requires P2P 
lending firms to register as issuers under the Securities Acts.5 This 
Article argues that the SEC fundamentally misunderstands this 
innovative industry of P2P lending. As a result of the SEC’s inability to 
grasp the true nature of P2P finance, the SEC overreaches its authority 
and threatens the very existence of P2P marketplaces. Thus, SEC 
oversight increases both risk for P2P lenders and cost for P2P 
borrowers.6 
This Article begins in Part I by introducing P2P lending and 
demonstrating that P2P transactions provide a core economic function 
worth preserving. Consumers, and the financial system, as a whole, 
benefit from P2P lending. Part I also presents risks associated with 
P2P lending, such as fraud and identity theft, that require sensible 
regulation.7 
Part II traces the SEC’s involvement in the P2P lending market. The 
SEC approached P2P regulation under the ill-fit vocabulary and logic 
of the traditional investor and issuer.8 This misapplication led the SEC 
to conclude that P2P transactions must register under the Securities 
Acts.9 Operating under the wrong assumptions and the wrong regime, 
the SEC forced P2P online lending firms to offer even riskier assets. 
Imposing the securities regime on the P2P lending market also 
discourages competition by raising costs, and leaves consumer 
complaints unanswered.10 Part II also analyzes the SEC’s response to 
P2P lending,11 assesses the SEC’s role in the twenty-first century, and 
questions why the SEC was unable or unwilling to fashion a nuanced 
response to P2P lending. The analysis suggests that the SEC’s failure 
 
 4 By “platform,” I refer to the various internet sites providing access to P2P 
lending services.  
 5 The securities laws require issuers of securities to disclose certain information 
to investors through the prospectus, a legal offering document, and through periodic 
filing with the SEC. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 6, 7, 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77(f)-(g), (j) 
(2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12-13, 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)-(m) (2006).  
 6 See infra Part II.B. 
 7 See infra Part I.  
 8 It is not wrong to refer to P2P lenders as “investors,” a term this article, too, 
uses. Rather, the language of investment led the SEC to apply the wrong regulatory 
framework to the putative issuer. See infra Part II. 
 9 See infra Part II.A. 
 10 See infra Part II.B. 
 11 See infra Part II.C. 
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may be part of a general trend of regulatory discomfort with a rising 
trend of disintermediation.12 
Part III recommends naming the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau as the primary regulator of P2P lending. Efficient and effective 
regulation must fit the industry and its users.13 Thus, a newly formed 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau would be well-suited 
to preserve and discipline the innovative mix of social finance, micro-
lending and disintermediation that the P2P marketplace offers to 
consumers. 
This Article is especially timely. Through the Dodd-Frank Act, 
Congress mandated the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) to 
study P2P lending and suggest its optimal regulatory regime.14 The 
GAO released its proposal on July 7, 2011,15 which analyzes the P2P 
market and evaluates two rival regulatory approaches for Congress to 
consider: a modified version of the status quo, or a transition to a new 
regulatory regime parallel to the recommendations in Part III.16 Given 
the sometimes lumbering nature of our legislative system, Congress’s 
response to the GAO report represents its last P2P lending 
examination for a long time. Accordingly, it is important to evaluate 
and critique P2P lending while policy change remains eminently 
possible.17 
 
 12 For many scholars, disintermediation no doubt calls to mind the capital flights 
from traditional intermediaries in previous decades due to statutory caps on 
depository interest rates. E.g., Samuel B. Chase, Jr., Financial Structure and Regulation: 
Some Knotty Problems, 26 J. FIN. 585, 587-88 (1971). Instead, I use the term more 
generally. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200 (2008) 
(“[D]isintermediation – or enabling companies to access the ultimate source of funds, 
the capital markets, without going through banks or other financial 
intermediaries . . . .”). 
 13 See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance 
and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 90-91, 131-40 (2010) 
(arguing that mutual funds should be regulated through product regulation rather 
than disclosure and litigation regime). 
 14 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 989F(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1947 (2010) (“The Comptroller General of the 
United States shall conduct a study of person to person lending to determine the 
optimal Federal regulatory structure.”). 
 15 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-613, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING: 
NEW REGULATORY CHALLENGES COULD EMERGE AS THE INDUSTRY GROWS (2011) 
[hereinafter GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING], available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d11613.pdf. 
 16 Id. at 42-56.  
 17 Indeed, a bill has just been introduced to Congress that would seem to respond 
to inefficiencies in P2P lending. See, e.g., Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 
2930, 112th Cong. (2011). Though a step in the right direction, I argue in a 
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In addition to the GAO study, the government’s treatment of P2P 
lending will serve as a model around the world as a dozen of other 
nations examine their P2P lending policy. New Zealand is currently 
debating how to adapt its P2P lending laws to render the industry 
viable.18 England is abolishing its primary financial regulator, and its 
P2P lending industry is clamoring to have a voice in the next 
regulatory structure.19 Even China is home to a wild new P2P lending 
industry that will eventually require more thorough legal 
authorization.20 Moreover, a rational regulatory landscape in the 
United States will substantially impact microfinance institution 
(“MFI”) partner organizations of international P2P firms.21 
Increasingly, scholars have turned their attention to P2P lending. 22 
By providing a focused analytic treatment of the economics of P2P 
 
forthcoming article that this bill is anadequate.  
 18 See MINISTRY OF ECON. DEV., REVIEW OF SECURITIES LAW 19, 25-26 (2010), 
available at http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/73375/discussion-document.pdf. 
 19 See Sean Farrell, Zopa Calls on Government and FSA to Regulate Social Lending 
Sector, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 20, 2010, 7:00 AM GMT), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8012269/Zopa-calls-on-Government-and-FSA-
to-regulate-social-lending-sector.html; Gonzalo Vina, U.K. Scraps FSA in Biggest Bank 
Overhaul Since 1997, BLOOMBERG (June 17, 2010, 4:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2010-06-16/u-k-scraps-fsa-in-biggest-bank-regulation-overhaul-since-1997.html.  
 20 Though fast-growing, Chinese P2P platforms operate with tenuous legality. One 
P2P CEO in China admitted that Chinese lending law, which restricts lending to 
financial institutions, probably disallows P2P companies. However, he had received 
assurances from Chinese officials that his business would be tolerated as long as it served 
a socially valuable end. Interview with anonymous CEO (Nov. 27, 2009). How long 
platforms can operate without specific legal authorization is not clear. Until then, the 
market is hot: among the world’s largest P2P by volume is CreditEase, a young company 
in China. Shen Hu, China’s Brave New World of P2P Credit: Online, Offline Lending 
Platforms Skirt Rules, Raising New Questions, CAIXIN ONLINE (Sept. 18, 2011, 8:09 PM 
EDT), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinas-brave-new-world-of-p2p-credit-2011-
09-18; cf. Fairplace Faces Investigation by Federal Police, P2P-BANKING.COM (Dec. 27, 
2010, 6:50 AM), http://www.wiseclerk.com/group-news/countries/latinamerica-fairplace-
faces-investigation-by-federal-police/ (describing Brazil’s shutdown and investigation of 
its first P2P platform because law only permits financial institutions to make loans).  
 21 See Raj. M. Desai & Homi Kharas, Democratizing Foreign Aid: Online 
Philanthropy and International Development Assistance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
1111, 1142 (2010) (discussing problems MFI partners face in interfacing with donor 
P2P and using money on ground); Anna Gelpern & Kevin E. Davis, Peer-to-Peer 
Financing for Development: Regulating the Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
1209, 1216-17 (2010).  
 22 See generally Desai & Kharas, supra note 21 (addressing concerns with current 
regulation of peer-to-peer intermediaries engaged in cross-border transactions); 
Gelpern & Davis, supra note 21 (identifying problems MFI partners face in interfacing 
with donor P2P and using money on ground); Sarah B. Lawsky, Money for Nothing: 
Charitable Deductions for Microfinance Lenders, 61 SMU L. REV. 1525 (2008) 
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firms and federal regulation of P2P, this Article joins and redirects the 
conversation toward current policy issues.23 Building on prior 
scholarship, and informed by policy considerations in the United 
States and abroad, this Article suggests concrete strategies for policy 
makers and provokes further question for dialogue among scholars. 
I. PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING 
A. The Heartland of Person-to-Person Lending 
Financial intermediaries, such as banks, help bridge the gap 
between suppliers and users of capital.24 All lending faces certain 
challenges and transaction costs. Borrowers often require money for a 
longer period of time than that for which ordinary lenders wish to 
lend.25 Moreover, it is expensive for each lender to vet and monitor 
each borrower, unless the lender dedicates a particularly large amount 
of capital to that borrower. Lending such a large amount, however, 
provides too little diversification — particularly for risk-averse 
lenders.26 Intermediaries help solve these problems. 
 
(discussing tax treament of P2P loans from lenders’ perspectives).  
 23 Chaffee and Rapp have responded to this Article in their own very fine article, 
which critiques some of my conclusions and provides sustained analysis of state P2P 
regulation — a matter receiving less attention in this Article. Eric C. Chaffee & 
Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating On-line Peer-to-Peer Lending in the Aftermath of Dodd-
Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 25-30, 35). For both space and 
publication timing reasons, is not feasible for me to respond to their argument in this 
Article. Suffice it to say that, notwithstanding their lucid discussion, from which I 
have benefited, I have not been persuaded. See also C. Stephen Bradford, Crowdfunding 
and the Federal Securities Laws, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript 
at 7, 14-15, 22-24, 26, 28, 34, 67, 84), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916184 (citing this Article to respond to its analysis). 
 24 See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 8 
(2010) (“In a frictionless world, the financial markets would allocate the kinds and 
amounts of capital that businesses require, without the assistance (or cost) of an 
intermediary.”).  
 25 See Bruce D. Smith, Taking Intermediation Seriously, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING, 1319, 1321-22 (2003) (stating that a bank’s primary role is providing 
liquidity); Richard J. Herring & Anthony M. Santomero, What is Optimal Financial 
Regulation?, 13-14 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 00-34, 1999), 
available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/00/0034.pdf (addressing bank’s 
roles and vulnerabilities in relation to asset and maturity transformation).  
 26 See Bert Scholtens & Dick van Wensveen, A Critique on the Theory of Financial 
Intermediation, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 1243, 1247-48 (2000) (explaining that managing 
risk is “the bread and butter of financial intermediaries”).  
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P2P financial companies assist borrowers and lenders to effect 
financial transactions without employing a traditional intermediary.27 
While users must rely on a P2P platform to facilitate lender-borrower 
connections, lenders ultimately finance borrowers without banks 
interposing their own credit risks and guarantees. Thus, P2P lending 
hints at a world with the benefits of intermediation but none of the 
costs. 
This Article focuses on the dominant form of P2P lending: 
unsecured consumer loans brokered between strangers by an Internet 
platform. This “heartland” of P2P lending remains the most developed 
P2P market and the largest form of P2P lending by transaction 
volume.28 It is also the form of P2P lending under the most immediate 
scrutiny as well as the primary subject of the 2011 GAO study.29 
This Article specifically considers two P2P lending companies, 
Prosper Marketplace, Inc. (“Prosper”) and LendingClub Corporation 
(“Lending Club”), that dominate the heartland of P2P lending in 
America.30 These platforms currently offer very similar services, so this 
Article discusses them together, comparing and contrasting their 
operations. 
In P2P lending, individual borrowers may request loan amounts up 
to $25,000, while individual lenders may acquire interests in a loan of 
as little as $25. The typical P2P borrower will, thus, borrow from 
many lenders, and the typical P2P lender will hold interests in 
hundreds of borrowers. In other words, P2P lenders have a wide 
portfolio of loans. Most P2P loans include three-year terms with no 
 
 27 In emphasizing disintermediation, this Article addresses social lending and 
microfinance only indirectly. Readers who come to this paper with special interest in 
these issues should examine Appendix A, which treats these issues in detail.  
 28 Prosper and Lending Club, in the heartland as I have defined it, have loaned 
substantially more money than Kiva, which is not in the heartland. See sources cited 
supra note 1. Virgin Money, a large platform outside of the heartland, is no longer 
doing business. Sara Lepro, Virgin Money Closes Shop in the U.S., Victim of Bad Timing, 
U.S. BANKER (Dec. 2010), http://www.americanbanker.com/bulletins/-1029613-1.html. 
 29 Although shining the spotlight on Kiva, too, the study clearly follows the for-
profit platforms in greater detail. GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 
15, at 7-14 (beginning platform discussion with Lending Club and Prosper and 
discussing them more than all other platforms combined). 
 30 Company Overview, PROSPER, www.prosper.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 25, 
2011) (advertising personal loans and online investing through “the world’s largest 
peer-to-peer lending marketplace”); Earn Steady Returns, LENDING CLUB, 
http://www.lendingclub.com/public/steady-returns.action (last visited Oct. 26, 2011) 
(stating one can “[e]arn [s]teady [r]eturns” through “a consumer loan origination and 
investment platform” that has “originated nearly $360,000,000 loans to prime credit 
borrowers”). 
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prepayment penalty, but some loans have terms as short as one year or 
as long as five years.31 
P2P borrowers are vetted twice before receiving P2P loans: first by 
the platform, and then by the lenders. The platforms perform 
traditional underwriting activities, such as evaluating credit history 
and ability to repay, to determine which borrowers may request loans. 
Lending Club traditionally accepts fewer than 10% of all loan 
applicants.32 Prosper, on the contrary, initially allowed most potential 
borrowers to request funds, trusting lenders to reject most of the risky 
borrowers.33 Now, Prosper’s culling is essentially as selective as 
Lending Club. Today the minimum FICO score for new borrowers on 
Prosper and Lending Club is 640 and 660, respectively, evidencing 
Prosper’s increasingly stringent lending criteria.34 
Once a platform accepts a borrower, it uses its own underwriting 
algorithm to assign a credit classification to borrowers based on 
available credit and employment information. Then, the platform 
attempts to estimate for lenders the losses due to default for a given 
class of borrowers. The borrowers then are permitted to provide 
 
 31 Since June, 2007, Lending Club has facilitated 28,575 three-year loans and 9,365 
five-year loans. Lending Club Statistics, LENDING CLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com/ 
info/download-data.action?file=LoanStats.csv (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).  
 32 Lending Club Statistics, LENDING CLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com/info/ 
statistics.action (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (showing over $366 million, or 35,333 
loans, accepted and over $4 billion, or 352,374 loans, rejected). 
 33 See Kirk Inglis, Quality Loan Listings on Prosper.com, PROSPER BLOG (Aug. 11, 2009), 
http://blog.prosper.com/2009/08/11/quality-loan-listings-on-prospercom/ (explaining that 
Prosper’s prior minimum FICO score was 520). Compare JOE RYAN, KATYA REUK & CHARLES 
WANG, STANFORD GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS., TO FUND OR NOT TO FUND: DETERMINANTS OF 
LOAN FUNDABILITY IN THE PROSPER.COM MARKETPLACE 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.prosper.com/Downloads/Research/Prosper_Regression_Project-Fundability_ 
Study.pdf (finding in an early study of Prosper that only 9% of loans are fully funded, 
meaning that full 91% of loans accepted by the platform are rejected by its lenders), with 
Prosper Listing Summary: September 2011, LENDINGSTATS.COM, http://www.lendstats.com/ 
loansum/loansum.php?mo=09&yr=11 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (indicating more than 
half of Prosper loans funded in September of 2011). 
 34 See Inglis, supra note 33; Peer-to-Peer Lending — How It Works, LENDING CLUB 
BLOG, http://blog.lendingclub.com/how-peer-to-peer-lending-works/ (last visited Sept. 
25, 2011). See generally Credit Basics, MYFICO, http://www.myfico.com/ 
CreditEducation/WhatsInYourScore.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (explaining 
factors considered when determining FICO score). These are, essentially, prime 
borrowers. Although there is no authoritative definition of subprime, scores below 
640 are often taken to indicate “subprime” borrowers. See, e.g., Fair Isaac Defines 
Subprime As, Generally, Less Than 640 FICO Score, THE CREDIT SCORING SITE, available 
at http://www.creditscoring.com/influence/industry/fairisaac/subprime-FICO-640.htm 
(citing Fair Isaac CEO Mark Greene in a CNBC interview on February 26, 2009, as 
defining subprime population as “generally, a FICO score of less than 640. . .”). 
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unverified, narrative information to accompany their loan requests. 
They may even include information intended to make them more 
sympathetic.35 Loans no longer include a photo of borrowers, but 
borrowers may still personalize a “member page” if they wish to 
provide more personal information to lenders.36 
Selecting among these potential borrowers, lenders can browse loan 
requests individually, or they can purchase from a bundle of loans 
selected by the platform on the basis of the lenders’ expressed 
selection criteria.37 While lenders decide where to invest, they may 
keep cash in accounts that the platforms provide through a partner 
bank. These platform-provided accounts are also where borrower 
payments to lenders are deposited. Although FDIC insured, these 
accounts pay no interest on the balance. Thus, lenders who neglect to 
timely reinvest or who withdraw from their accounts can receive 
substantially lower real returns.38 
Borrowers pay an average of 20.6% interest rates using Prosper and 
11.4% using Lending Club.39 Lenders receive that interest as profit, 
less the platform’s fee. Platforms generate revenue by charging fees to 
both borrowers and lenders. First, platforms charge the borrower an 
origination fee for each loan executed. Second, platforms charge the 
lender an annual servicing fee as a percentage of principal 
outstanding. Currently, Prosper charges borrowers a 0.5–4.5% 
 
 35 Prosper Marketplace Inc., Prospectus (Form 424/b/3) (Dec. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000141626510000576/listing_201012
29-0921.htm (“I returned to the US in July after finishing 2 years of volunteer service.”).  
 36 Borrower photos and narrative information led to substantial interest — 
voyeuristic, or otherwise — in online lender communities. See, e.g., Photos That Make 
You Bid (or Cry, or Barf), PROSPERS.ORG, http://www.prospers.org/forum/photos_that_ 
make_you_bid_or_cry_or_barf-t1139.1845.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2011) 
(discussing and sharing photos of Prosper borrowers).  
 37 Building a Portfolio, LENDINGCLUB, http://www.lendingclub.com/public/build-
portfolio.action (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (stating that LendingClub has three default 
investment allocation plans); Quick Invest, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/ 
invest/quick-invest.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (explaining Prosper’s “Quick 
Invest” option, which invests based on features such as credit risk or loan duration).  
 38 A simplified example may clarify: $1000 invested for three years at 9% interest 
and compounded annually with reinvestment of the interest at the same rate will yield 
a nominal gain of $295.03. The same investment without reinvestment of interest 
payments will pay $270. This is equivalent to investing at only 8.3% with 
reinvestment. In other words, failure to invest the interest payments has cost this user 
almost 10% of her nominal gain from investing. The difference would be even greater 
for a fully amortized loan, as P2P loans are, because principal would also need to be 
reinvested.  
 39 GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 9. Different rates 
may reflect Prosper’s lower FICO score requirement.  
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origination fee (increasing with credit risk) and lenders an annual fee 
based on 1% of principal.40 Similarly, Lending Club charges 1.11–
5.00% at origination and 1% of all amounts borrowers pay.41 This 
spread between what borrowers pay and what lenders receive is 
relatively narrow, underscoring the potential cost savings implicit in 
P2P lending. Both sites are proud to point out their low fees as they 
ask customers to compare the implicit spread between what banks pay 
on certificates of deposit and what banks receive in mortgage and 
credit card payments.42 
Such comparisons can be misleading, however. Bank deposits are far 
more liquid than P2P assets. P2P notes may only be sold to other 
lenders through one specific broker-dealer, FOLIOfn. Further, the 
notes may sell for a discount or premium and the sales incur a fee. If 
buyers are not available at an appropriate price, P2P lenders have no 
alternative but to wait out the duration of the loan. P2P loans are also 
less safe than bank deposits or CDs. Because P2P lenders’ interests are 
unsecured and uninsured, lenders rely on borrowers to repay loan 
amounts. Borrowers’ incentives to repay P2P loans are similar to 
incentives for other unsecured credit sources. For example, people 
repay their credit card company to avoid unpleasant debt collection, 
preserve their credit rating, quell a general sense of obligation, and 
perhaps for other reasons as well. 
If P2P borrowers default, platforms may attempt to collect payments 
directly from borrowers or may assign unpaid obligations to collection 
agencies. Platforms are motivated to pursue borrower payments by 
contractual obligations, desires to preserve reputation, and interests in 
continuing to collect fees from the borrower. However, successful 
collections are rare. Lenders often do not to recover their entire 
investments.43 “Because P2P loans are relatively small sums, most 
 
 40 Fees and Charges, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/loans/rates-and-fees/ (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
 41 Rates and Fees, LENDING CLUB, http://www.lendingclub.com/public/rates-and-
fees.action (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). Note that a 1% annual fee on principal is 
different from a 1% servicing fee on all payments made. Which is bigger will depend 
on loan characteristics. 
 42 Even the GAO Report compares P2P returns to bank products, perpetuating a 
sense of similarity. GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 9 (“As 
of March 31, 2011, Prosper reported that lenders received average net annualized 
returns exceeding 11 percent . . . . Around the same time, the annual percentage yields 
for savings and money market accounts and 3-year certificates of deposit listed on 
bankrate.com were lower, ranging from 0.1 percent to 1.2 percent and 1.3 percent to 
2.2 percent respectively.”).  
 43 See e.g., LendingClub Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) F-9 to -10 (June 29, 
2011) [hereinafter LendingClub Annual Report (June 29, 2011)], available at 
  
456 University of California, Davis [Vol. 45:445 
colletion mechanisms simply are not sufficiently cost-effective to 
justify enforcement, especially because defunct borrowers rarely have 
significant assets to collect.” Therefore, lenders hope that a sufficient 
number of borrowers repay their loans to offset any losses from 
defaulting borrowers. 
The foregoing discussion concerned the operations of Prosper and 
Lending Club, but the P2P universe extends far beyond the bounds of 
these large platforms.44 It includes a diversity of other platforms, both 
foreign and domestic. Some platforms choose a specific focus, 
specializing in transactions as varied as real estate financing,45 venture 
capital,46 business-to-business,47 or consumer-to-consumer loans for 
transactions such as eBay purchases.48 Some of these other platforms 
do not pay interest to their lenders,49 or pay only small interest 
amounts.50 Kiva is the most famous zero-interest platform, providing 
 
https://www.lendingclub.com/extdata/secFilings/10-K/10-K-MAR-31-2011.pdf (stating 
that for year ending March 31, 2010, Lending Club charged off as uncollectable loans 
about $1.7 million); see also Lending Club Statistics, LENDING CLUB, 
https://www.lendingclub.com/info/statistics-performance.action (last visited Sept. 25, 
2011) (stating that of loans which had missed a payment in August 2010, 17% were 
completely unrecovered in February 2011, and 83% were fully or partially recovered).  
 44 Lately, scholars and policymakers have turned their attention to crowdfunding. 
See generally, Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding, Social Networks, and the Securities 
Laws – The Inadvisability of a Specially Tailored Exemption Without Imposing Affirmative 
Disclosure Requirements, U.N.C.L. REV. (forthcoming). Common usage suggests that 
crowdfunding refers to disintermediated financing for the benefit of enterprises, with 
compensation tending to come as either some share of profits or else some in-kind 
payment, such as the product the enterprise produces.  
 45 About Money360, MONEY360, http://www.money360.com/about-money360.aspx 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011).  
 46 MICROVENTURES, http://www.microventures.com/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
 47 About Us, FUNDING CIRCLE, http://www.fundingcircle.com/home/about-us/ (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2011) (stating that Funding Circle is “an online marketplace where 
people can lend directly to small businesses in the UK, eliminating the high cost and 
complexity of banks”); Testimonials, MYASIMIA.ORG, http://www.myazimia.org/ 
testimonials (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (selling P2P functionality software to B-2-B 
lenders, such as Peervestors).  
 48 See, e.g., About Us, DUCK9.COM, http://www.duck9.com/about-us.htm (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2011) (stating that Duck9 platform allows student peer-to-peer 
lending). 
 49 See e.g., KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (“Kiva 
does not charge interest to [its] Field Partners, who administer the loans.”). 
 50 See e.g., MICROPLACE, https://www.microplace.com/howitworks/faq (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2011) (indicating that lenders can earn interest on money invested); MYC4, 
http://www.myc4.com/Invest/AboutInvesting#DETERMINE_MY_IR (last visited Sept. 
25, 2011) (explaining that interest rate is based on Dutch Auction principle).  
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microloans to entrepreneurs in the developing world.51 At the other 
extreme, some platforms reach not across an ocean, but across the 
living room; these platforms formalize the loans that friends and 
family would make to one another anyway.52 Though P2P lending 
includes a variety of platforms, this Article focuses on the heartland of 
P2p: Prosper and Lending Club. 
B. Core Benefits and Efficiencies of P2P Lending 
Many P2P platforms market themselves on their ability to save 
money by cutting out the middleman. By eliminating the 
intermediating bank, they can offer low rates for borrowers and high 
returns for lenders.53 Eliminating a middleman can be prudent or 
imprudent, however, depending on whether the middleman provides 
services that are valuable to lenders or borrowers. Saving costs of bank 
vetting, however, is no bargain if default rates rise precipitously — the 
costs of which will be borne by lenders and borrowers. 
Further, middleman services may be useful to some borrowers, but 
not to others. P2P platforms decrease the costs of extending credit by 
unbundling any unnecessary or unwanted services that are associated 
with traditional intermediaries. For example, P2P platforms operate 
without a physical location. Not all borrowers have the same need for 
convenience that in-person physical lenders provide. Brick-and-mortar 
banks are useful to some customers, but others are happy to conduct 
most of their business electronically.54 Since P2P platforms have no 
physical location, they cut out the costs of employing a teller and 
paying overhead expenses to maintain a physical location. Conversely, 
payday-loan companies offer accessible in-person services at a physical 
location with actual business hours. Retaining a physical location and 
operating hours are costly services to provide, and those costs are 
likely to be borne largely by borrowers who use them. Though some 
 
 51 But see Leena Rao, Kiva Brings Microlending Home to U.S. Entrepreneurs in Need, 
TECHCRUNCH (June 10, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/06/10/kiva-brings-
microlending-home-to-us-entrepreneurs-in-need/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (stating 
that Kiva recently expanded its scope to include entrepreneurs in United States). 
 52 See, e.g., ZIMPLEMONEY, http://www.zimplemoney.com/Family-Friend-Loan.aspx 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (providing documentation and payment services).  
 53 ZOPA, http://uk.zopa.com/ZopaWeb/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (“This is where 
people get together to lend and borrow money directly with each other, sidestepping 
the banks for a better deal. Everyone wins except the fat cats.”).  
 54 ABA Survey: Consumers Prefer Online Banking, AM. BANKERS ASS’N (Sept. 21, 
2009), http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/092109ConsumerSurveyPBM.htm (stating 
that majority of consumers prefer to bank online, but consumers age 55 or older 
prefer going to their local branch).  
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borrowers value these features, others may primarily focus on 
obtaining a loan at the best possible price. Those borrowers who do 
not need the benefits of in-person services can enjoy substantial 
savings by choosing a web-based system like P2P lending. 
Similarly, credit card companies provide bundled transactions 
services and lines of credit to their users.55 Like maintaining physical 
bank locations, offering credit card services is costly. Credit card users 
likely bear these cost such that P2P lending may appeal to users for 
whom the costs of transactions services and credit lines outweigh the 
benefits. By contrast, P2P platforms have no physical location, provide 
no transactional services, extend no lines of credit, and therefore need 
not pass such costs on to their users. The majority of P2P borrowers 
are refinancing other, more costly, debts.56 They are signaling that they 
can do without the benefits of brick-and-mortar banks and payday 
loans, as well as the convenience of a credit card, in exchange for a 
lower rate with P2P lending.57 
There is one middleman, in particular, that lenders and borrowers 
can comfortably eliminate to ensure substantial savings in almost any 
transaction: the government regulator. Banking regulations mandate a 
ratio of a bank’s deposits that must be held as reserves.58 These 
reserves must be allocated to safe, liquid assets rather than 
reinvestment. When a bank borrows one dollar subject to reserve 
 
 55 Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Symposium: The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. 
L. REV. 79, 83 (2000) (arguing that “credit cards perform two functions” a 
transactional medium, substituting for cash or checks, and credit, substituting for 
pawn shops and the like).  
 56 LendingClub Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 31 (Jan. 4, 2011), 
available at https://www.lendingclub.com/extdata/Clean_As_Filed_20110107.pdf 
(stating that 64% of borrowers intend to refinance other debts); Prosper Marketplace, 
Inc., Prospectus (Form 424/b/3) 59 (Mar. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.prosper.com/downloads/Legal/Prosper_Prospectus_2011_03_04.pdf (stating 
that 47% of borrowers intend debt consolidation). P2P loans are not cheap. Borrowers 
pay an average of 20.6% on Prosper and 11.4% on LendingClub, respectively. See GAO-
11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 9. However, they can be cheaper 
than cash advances, payday loans, and bounced checks.  
 57 Carolyn Bigda, Peer-to-Peer Loans Gaining Interest From Regulators, CHI. TRIB., 
Feb. 18, 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-02-18/business/sc-cons-0217-
started-20110218_1_loans-borrowers-renaud-laplanche (identifying P2P interest rates 
as about two percentiles lower than credit card rates and quoting Lending Club CEO 
Renaud Laplanche: “The main reason that consumers use our platform is for debt 
replacement . . . . They’re replacing a credit card balance, a revolving debt that 
amortizes over a very long time, with an installment loan that gets paid off in three or 
five years”). 
 58 12 C.F.R. § 204.4 (2011) (stating that large banks must set aside $1,443,000 
plus 10% of demand deposits for reserves).  
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requirements, it pays interest on that full dollar, but can earn 
appreciable interest on less than that full dollar. As such, banking 
regulation requirements ultimately function as a regulatory tax. 59 P2P 
platforms, however, can avoid these costs. 
P2P finance achieves a substantial part of its cost advantage over 
other forms of lending by way of regulatory savings.60 P2P platforms 
essentially sell securitized assets to lenders, making loans and 
promptly selling them to lenders who have committed to buying them. 
The platforms make loans without deposits and are not subject to the 
capital or reserve requirements mandated for banks. Thus, P2P lenders 
can lend at a lower relative cost.61 Operating leanly, platforms can 
bring a high portion of revenue back to lenders as interest, adding to 
P2P’s appeal as an investment method. 
 
 59 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, What’s Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY & 
ECON. 29, 29 (1985) (“The banking literature treats the interests foregone on reserves 
as a tax on deposits.”); Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank 
Loans, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 221 (1987) (arguing that reserve requirement functions as 
a tax that is born by depositors). See generally Fischer Black, Bank Funds Management 
in an Efficient Market, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 334 (1975) (“The economic function of 
reserve requirements in the current system, I believe, is simply to tax demand 
deposits.”). Banks seeking relief from regulatory costs may resort to securitizing their 
assets by trimming loans from their balance sheets. This allows banks to lend large 
amounts without growing their deposits. 
 60 Many scholars have condemned regulatory arbitrage, where actors achieve 
substantively similar results but in a way that does not trigger costly regulation. See, 
e.g., Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial 
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1661-67 (2008) (arguing that 
although bank loans and standby letters of credit expose banks to similar credit risks, 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) treated standby letters of 
credit to the more favorable regulatory treatment of regular letters of credit. In this 
way, the OCC created a profitable regulatory arbitrage for banks to issue standby 
letters of credit rather than make loans). Others have praised regulatory arbitrage. See 
MERTON H. MILLER, MERTON MILLER ON DERIVATIVES 6 (1997); James C. Spindler, The 
Going-Private Phenomenon: How Private Is Private Equity, and at What Cost?, 76 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 311, 312 (2009). There is no need to resolve this debate comprehensively, as 
P2P regulation avoidance comes with risk reduction. The regulatory costs associated 
with deposit taking tracks the systemic risks of deposits. Insofar as P2P profits by 
funding without those risks and costs, it has responded to a Pigouvian tax. See 
generally William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. 
REV. 307 (1972) (arguing that Pigouvian taxes on the producers of an externality are 
all that is required to motivate efficient production ). 
 61 See Telephone Interview with Giles Andrews, CEO, Zopa (Oct. 12, 2010); see 
also James Alexander, Zopa Co-Founder, on Peer to Peer Lending, P2P-BANKING.COM 
(Aug. 27, 2007, 8:17 AM), http://intruders.tv/en-tech/james-alexander-zopa-co-
founder-on-peer-to-peer-lending/ (citing the capital cost of regulation as important 
opportunity for exchange and its clients). Of course they are subject to costly 
securities regulation. But see infra Part II.B.  
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However, investors are not solely concerned with investment 
returns. Investors also care about risk. P2P lending is a lending option 
that promises to reduce the risk in lenders’ investment portfolios.62 
Specifically, P2P lending provides access to new credit classes, 
allowing investors to reduce risk by achieving superior 
diversification.63 Investors who own a representative share of the total 
market suffer no idiosyncratic risk and should obtain returns that 
approximate only their exposure to market risk.64 Consumer credit is a 
new asset class for most investors.65 Previously, retail investors’ best 
option for accessing consumer credit involved buying securities from 
companies engaged in consumer finance transactions.66 By providing 
access to a new asset class, P2P notes bring retail investors closer to 
risk-reducing diversification. 
Lenders are not the only parties who may benefit from a competitive 
P2P market. P2P lenders often lend to borrowers who would have 
difficulty obtaining credit through traditional channels. Some 
borrowers present an attractive but unusual credit profile. As such, 
traditional lenders who intend to bundle and securitize similar loans 
may overlook certain borrowers.67 P2P lenders, however, have less 
need for uniformity and may be willing to lend to these overlooked 
borrowers. Likewise, borrowers who pose a substantial credit risk may 
be able to find philanthropic lenders through P2P platforms.68 Still 
 
 62 Note that this does not mean that P2P notes are themselves safe investments. 
See infra Part I.C.  
 63 See generally HARRY MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT 
DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959) (explaining that portfolio diversification 
reduces risk). 
 64 BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET, IN FOUNDATIONS OF 
CORPORATE LAW 35-36 (1999); see generally MARKOWITZ, supra note 63 (discussing 
how portfolio diversification reduces risk). 
 65 See GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 18 (“[Lenders 
can] diversify their portfolios by investing in consumer and commercial (i.e., small 
business) loans as an alternative asset class to stocks or mutual funds.”).  
 66 Alternatively, a consumer could obtain a lending license and enter the business 
herself. The investment in such regulatory capital would rarely be justified. However, 
more sophisticated investors, could buy securitized consumer financial assets, such as 
auto-loan backed securities. But even sophisticated investors often lacked access to 
many unconventional borrowers. See Ian Galloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending and 
Community Finance, 21 COMMUNITY INV. 18, 19 (2009). 
 67 See Galloway, supra note 66, at 19 (“Unlike commonly traded assets such as 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), community development loans tend to be 
unconventional and difficult to pool. The capital markets value standardized, 
predictable assets and community development loans tend to be neither.”). 
 68 Of course, some borrowers may lend to bad candidates and later rationalize 
their motives.  
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other borrowers have access to alternative forms of credit, but opt to 
use P2P to refinance at a better price, thereby sharing in the surplus 
created by cutting out middlemen.69 Currently a plurality of P2P 
borrowers uses loans to replace existing consumer credit at a lower 
rate.70 Overall, a competative P2P market provides opportunities for a 
variety of borrower types. 
Robust competition generally benefits consumers by lowering prices 
and encouraging innovation.71 Further, evidence suggests that 
consumer credit is an area where increased competition is particularly 
desirable.72 Many scholars argue that there are systematic failures of 
competition in mainstream consumer credit, particularly with respect 
to credit card73 and payday lenders.74 Regardless of whether borrowers 
 
 69 See infra Part I.B (discussing core benefits).  
 70 See sources cited supra note 56. 
 71 See generally JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS: A 
PRIMER 13 (4th ed. 2001) (explaining objectives of antitrust laws).  
 72 See Felix Salmon, Chart of the Day, Consumer Credit Edition, REUTERS BLOG 
(Sept. 22, 2010, 10:14 AM) http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/09/22/chart-of-
the-day-consumer-credit-edition/ (stating that consumer credit rates have not dropped 
nearly as far as other types of debt since 1981). But see Stijn Claessens, Competition in 
the Financial Sector: Overview of Competition Policies, 10 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 
83, 83 (2009) (“The view that competition in financial services is unambiguously 
good, however, is more naive than is the case in other industries: vigorous rivalry here 
may not be the best approach.”); Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, What Drives Bank 
Competition? Some International Evidence, 36 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 563, 577 
(2004) (stating that concentrated banking markets are more competitive, contrary to 
intuition); M. Peterson & R. Rajan, The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending 
Relationships, 110 Q.J. ECON. 407, 407 (1995) (arguing that market power in banking 
may be beneficial for access to financing); Xavier Vives, Competition in the Changing 
World of Banking, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 535, 538 (2001) (arguing that 
competition in financial sector is not always efficient); Daniel Indiviglio, Why is 
Consumer Credit Still So Expensive?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 23, 2010, 12:21 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/09/why-is-consumer-credit-still-so-
expensive/63442/ (arguing that federal data can be interpreted in other ways).  
 73 See Michael Simkovic, The Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and 
Prices, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 10 (2009) (stating that credit card interest rates have been 
climbing and become less transparent, notwithstanding BAPCPA); id. at 21 (arguing 
that competition stymied by difficulty of acquiring consumer information). But see 
DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL 
REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 251-56 (1999) (refuting the “Myth of 
Exorbitant Profits”); Zywicki, supra note 55, at 99-111 (arguing that credit card 
pricing is rational). 
 74 See Mark J. Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify 
the Price? 20 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005-09_ 
Flannery_Samolyk.pdf (stating that geographic competition does not seem to drive 
down price, implying monopolistic competition). 
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benefit overall from the presence of those high-interest lenders, 75 they 
certainly benefit from greater market competition.76 Innovative 
financial businesses, especially Internet-based businesses, play an 
important role in improving competition.77 Introducing retail investors 
into the consumer credit market will increase the quality of 
competition for borrowers by potentially offering them a better rate 
than comparable sources of credit. 
In addition to financial benefits for lenders and borrowers, P2P 
finance also promises admirable simplicity and transparency that may 
 
 75 Cf. Gregory Elliehausen, Consumers’ Use of High-Price Credit Products: Do They 
Know What They Are Doing? 27, 33-34 (Networks Fin. Inst. at Ind. State Univ., 
Working Paper No. 2006-WP-02, 2006), available at http://www.frbsf.org/ 
community/research/assets/DoHighPriceCreditCustomers.pdf (stating that payday 
loan users show deliberation but not problem solving). Compare Paige Marta Skiba & 
Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., 
Working Paper No. 11-13, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266215 (stating that, after two years, payday loans 
double odds of bankruptcy), and Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: 
Evidence from the Payday Lending Market 30 (Jan. 3, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Northwestern University), available at http://www.kellogg. 
northwestern.edu/~/media/Files/Faculty/Research/melzer_realcosts_01_03_09.ashx 
(arguing that payday loans worsen hardship), with Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: 
Heroes or Villians, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 28, 37-42 (2011) (stating that existence of payday 
lenders can reduce emergency-related home foreclosures by about 25% and reduce 
disaster-induced larcenies), and DONALD. P. MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT NO. 309, PAYDAY HOLIDAY: HOW HOUSEHOLDS 
FAIR AFTER PAYDAY CREDIT BANS (Nov. 2007, revised in Feb. 2008) (banning payday 
lending increases chapter seven bankruptcy, bounced checks, and unfair collections 
process). 
 76 See Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 74, at 22 (“[T]o those who would simply 
outlaw payday loans, we ask, ‘Where will the people who use the product as intended 
go to fulfill their financial needs?”); cf. William Adams, Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, 
Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 
49 (2009) (arguing that loans compete with higher interest alternatives); Thomas F. 
Cargill & Jeanne Wendel, Bank Credit Cards: Consumer Irrationality Versus Market 
Forces, 30 J. CONSUMER AFF. 373, 381 (1996) (stating that unless search for better rate 
“can be conducted quickly, easily, and with little resource cost, consumers may find it 
more cost effective to use search time to catch a good sale at a supermarket or 
discount store”). 
 77 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Brown & Austan Goolsbee, Does the Internet Make Markets 
More Competitive?: Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry, 110 J. POL. ECON. 481, 
482 (2002) (finding Internet improved competition and prices in life insurance 
market); Judith Chevalier & Austan Goolsbee, Measuring Prices and Price Competition 
Online: Amazon and BarnesandNoble.com, 1 QUANTITATIVE MARKET & ECON. 203, 203-
05 (2003) (finding high price sensitivity among online buyers); Fiona Scott Morton, 
Florian Zettelmeyer & Jorge Silva-Risso, How the Internet Lowers Prices: Evidence from 
Matched Survey and Automobile Transaction Data, 43 J. MKTG. RES. 168, 168 (2006) 
(investigating reasons why internet helps consumers pay less for automobiles).  
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reduce systemic risk. Many scholars express concern that financial 
intermediation and securitization increase complexity and opacity in 
the credit market.78 Traditional intermediaries often securitize 
consumer loans, pooling and dividing them and promising individual 
tranches to investors. Consequently, traditional consumer loans 
become opaque and complex, which hinders monitoring of assets and 
distorts incentives for servicers and originators.79 These effects are 
particularly pronounced in borrower insolvency, where complex 
assets can inhibit orderly bankruptcy proceedings and impose third 
party costs.80 In a time of financial stress, difficulties valuing or 
monitoring complex assets may spread from the assets’ owner, to their 
counterparties and beyond. 
However, P2P lending platforms promise a simpler, more 
transparent landscape. They offer only a few standardized contracts, 
varying only in principal balance, interest rate, and repayment period. 
Further, all P2P borrowers know to which particular lenders they are 
liable, and all P2P lenders know which particular borrowers make 
their payments. If P2P returns fall, lenders know immediately which 
loans defaulted and can adjust accordingly — either by modifying 
their portfolio strategy, or exercising some means of exit if ultimately 
displeased. 
P2P lending’s simplicity comes with a commitment to transparency. 
For example, all Lending Club data is available for download, 
including data from rejected applicants.81 Similarly, while Prosper’s 
 
 78 See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 443-51, 443 n.20 
(2011) (discussing definitions of systemic risk).  
 79 Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation 
Failed To Prevent The CDO Meltdown, And How To Fix It, U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1361-63 
(2009) (stating that CDO market’s “failure in transparency is a classic securities law 
problem”); Whitehead, supra note 24, at 4-6, 29 (arguing that agency costs rise in 
credit default swaps). But see Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured 
Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 910 (1986) (stating that securitization allows 
creditors to specialize in their monitoring). 
 80 See Edward Janger, The Costs of Liquidity Enhancement: Transparency Cost, Risk 
Alteration, and Coordination Problems, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 39, 50 (2010); 
see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: 
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 382-
83, 398 (2002); cf. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 
1163, 1197 (1999) (discussing fragmentation of private property into commons with 
too many users). 
 81 See Lending Club Statistics, LENDING CLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com/info/ 
download-data.action (last visited Sept. 27, 2011). However, an essential kind of 
transparency is necessarily absent: Lending Club lenders cannot see the underlying 
borrower data except as it has been obscured to protect privacy. See 
LENDINGCLUBSTATS.COM, http://www.lendingclubstats.com/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2011) 
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data is not fully downloadable,82 it is still largely available for 
developers,83 which makes it useful even for academics without 
intrinsic interest in P2P lending.84 A cottage industry of web services 
has sprouted to provide analytic tools and data analysis,85 enabling 
investors to determine useful statistics such as the median lender 
return on investment.86 
Where data is available, lenders show a remarkable propensity to 
shoulder the burden of monitoring underlying loan debts. Web forums 
and message boards are replete with the adventures of P2P lender qua 
detective, ferreting out frauds that have been overlooked by the 
platform.87 Consider the matter of Jessica Wolcott, who made national 
headlines for attempted extortion of $125,000 from Pepsi Bottling 
Group Executive Vice President, Gary Wandschneider.88 Long before 
FBI investigators discovered Wolcott’s scheme, Prosper lenders 
uncovered another of Wolcott’s plots: to obtain a P2P loan under false 
pretenses. After reviewing Wolcott’s six separate loan applications, 
lenders discovered inconsistencies that spurred further examination. 
Though Wolcott eventually obtained a fraudulent loan in her mother’s 
name, lenders quickly identified fraud in her loan application by 
 
(using LendingClub data for a variety of applications).  
 82 Among other things, data regarding secondary sales is difficult to obtain.  
 83 See e.g., ERIC’S CREDIT COMMUNITY, http://www.ericscc.com/ (last visited Oct. 25, 
2011) (using Prosper data for a variety of applications).  
 84 Christopher Crowe & Rodney Ramcharan, House Prices and Household Credit 
Access: Evidence from Prosper.Com 1-4 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Int’l Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Working Paper No. 1336579, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336579.  
 85 E.g., ERIC’S CREDIT COMMUNITY, supra note 83 (providing loan data, statistics, 
and blogging community for Prosper); LENDSTATS.COM, http://www.lendstats.com/ 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (giving lenders tools and information, including returns on 
investment data, for Prosper and Lending Club,); Stats, LENDINGCLUBSTATS.COM, 
http://www.lendingclubstats.com/stats (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (providing loan 
data, statistics, and blogging community for LendingClub).  
 86 See Lender Return Distribution, ERIC’S CREDIT COMMUNITY, http://www.ericscc.com/ 
stats/lender-return-distribution (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).  
 87 Of course, not all is well in the world of user-generated oversight. Prosper has 
closed down its once-robust forums, and it used an increasingly heavy hand in 
moderating comments prior to that point. At the same time, its explanation for the 
end of such transparency has not always been forthright. See Prosper “Poofs” User 
Forums, Explains, PROSPERS.ORG, http://www.prospers.org/forum/prosper_poofs_user_ 
forums_explains-t10196.30.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).  
 88 “Con Artist” Sentenced to Prison Term, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Dec. 15, 2007, 
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/westmoreland/s_542875.html; 
Gigi Stone, Philandering Rich Targeted for Extortion, ABC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2006), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=2694280&page=1.  
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comparing them to materials from her criminal prosecution.89 The 
Wolcott story illustrates P2p lenders going to extraordinary lengths to 
vet borrowers, either in search of community prestige or out of a sense 
of satisfaction.90 Though extensive investigation of borrowers is rarely 
rational for lenders in a narrow economic sense, spontaneous 
monitoring is common for the P2P market. 
While traditional securitization creates difficulties upon a party’s 
default, P2P borrower insolvency remains relatively orderly.91 When a 
borrower defaults on a P2P loan, all lenders hold equal priority, so a 
single trustee can represent the lenders collectively. More importantly, 
platform insolvency does not affect the lenders’ interests in the 
borrowers’ loans.92 The signature feature of disintermediated lending is 
that the intermediary does not create a credit risk.93 The platform’s 
insolvency has no legal effect on lender claims against borrowers, 
whereas creditors of a traditional lending intermediary may not have 
any direct claim against that intermediary’s borrowers. By removing 
the intermediary, P2P lending considerably reduces the complexity of 
default and insolvency. 
Finally, structural differences between P2P and intermediated 
lending lessen risk factors for P2P loans relative to those associated 
with traditional finance. First, FDIC-insured lenders may take 
excessive risks. These lenders know that they enjoy all of the gains of 
risky lending, but that the government pays much of the cost if the 
bank loses its investments. Thus, deposit insurance encourages moral 
hazard.94 P2P lenders are not insured against losses, so they do not 
 
 89 A Proper Scam: The Story of Jessica Wolcott, PROSPER LENDING REVIEW (June 25, 
2007, 12:08 PM), http://prosperlending.blogspot.com/2007/06/prosper-scam-story-of-
jessica-wolcott.html (“According to Jess’ mom, at one point she was in Australia to do 
a photo shoot yet, according to the US attorney, she never had a passport.”). 
 90 Cf. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate 
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1288-89 (1999) (discussing investing for 
social benefit).  
 91 Or, rather, it should be easier. The SEC has forced platforms to adopt formats 
that are every bit as messy in bankruptcy. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 92 To be sure, platform insolvency is inconvenient unless platforms have prepared 
a “living will.” See infra Part III.  
 93 That is the “financial alchemy” of securitization. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The 
Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 134 (1994). 
 94 Douglas W. Diamond et al., Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 24 FED. 
RES. BANK OF MINN. Q. REV. 14, 20 (2000). See generally John H. Kareken & Neil 
Wallace, Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition, 51 J. 
BUS. 413 (1978) (pricing deposit insurance); Robert C. Merton, An Analytic Derivation 
of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees: An Application of Modern Option 
Pricing Theory, 1 J. BANK. & FIN. 3 (1977) (considering costs of deposit insurance). 
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suffer from those perverse incentives. Second, traditional banks offer 
demand deposits, but lend for a period of years or decades, which 
creates a risk of maturity mismatch and interest rate risk.95 Depositors 
may demand higher interest rates for their loans or to withdraw their 
money after the bank has committed funds to long-term projects. 
Under P2P lending, however, all borrower loans mature at the same 
time, and at the same interest rate, as their paired lender entitlements, 
so there is no maturity mismatch maturity considerations do not 
create the same risk of failure experienced in traditional lending. 
Moreover, there is no risk of a traditional bank run on a P2P 
platform, because lender claims are illiquid with respect to the 
platform. Specifically, P2P lenders cannot demand their money back 
from platforms, which eliminates the risk that the platform will fail 
due to sudden inability to meet liabilities. All of these differences show 
a model for lending without many of the risks commonly associated 
with traditional lending. Importantly, traditional banking risks are 
often thought to create externalities, so containing them likely will 
have a salutary effect on system stability. Thus, simplicity and 
transparency are two additional benefits of P2P lending, enjoyed by 
lenders and borrowers, as well as third parties in the form of stability. 
C. Risks: Lender’s Money, Borrower’s Privacy 
For all of P2P lending’s merits, it also raises serious concerns. P2P 
lenders often fail to appreciate the risks associated with investment. 
P2P loans tend to be small and divided amongst many lenders. For 
example, 96% of Prosper’s active lenders invested less than $5,000, 
and 67% invested less than $500.96 While large, institutional investors 
may be able to fend for themselves, the small stakes for individual P2P 
investors makes it less likely that they have adequately researched or 
fully understand the risks inherent in P2P investments. Small 
investors are also particularly susceptible to intentionally misleading. 
As Professor Langevoort stated, “When you’re talking about loans of 
 
 95 Even solvent banks worry that their depositors might ask for deposits back 
before their borrowers repay. See John Bryant, A Model of Reserves, Bank Runs, and 
Deposit Insurance, 4 J. BANK. & FIN. 335, 339-43 (1980). See generally IRVING FISHER, 
THE PURCHASING POWER OF MONEY: ITS DETERMINATION AND RELATION TO CREDIT, INTEREST 
AND CRISES (1911) (describing effect of inflationon, among other things, banks, 
depositors, and bank runs); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867–1960 (1963) (describing how bank failure 
followed withdrawal of deposits from banking system). 
 96 Lenders Brackets by Amount Invested, ERIC’S CREDIT COMMUNITY, 
http://www.ericscc.com/stats/lender-brackets (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).  
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hundreds of dollars, that’s when the antenna goes up because it means 
you are targeting very unsophisticated people . . . [and others can] 
make money off these people, and usually it’s by not quite telling the 
truth.”97 
P2P platforms present the risk that lenders may fall victim to fraud 
by dishonest strangers. By design, P2P lending platforms allow lenders 
to connect with borrowers over matters of shared identity, which 
creates opportunity for fraud.98 Further, P2P lenders may consider 
inappropriate factors in selecting borrowers. For example, lenders 
might consider race99 or beauty100 after seeing a photo of the borrower. 
 
 97 Robert Schmidt & Jesse Westbrook, Prosper Back to Making Loans, Still Battles 
SEC, SFGATE.COM (June 11, 2010), http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-06-11/business/ 
21905016_1_prosper-peer-to-peer-lending-chris-larsen. 
 98 See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Why Affinity-Based 
Securities and Investment Fraud Constitutes a Hate Crime, 36 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 
1073-75 (2003); David E. Austin, Comment, “In God We Trust”: The Cultural And 
Social Impact Of Affinity Fraud in the African American Church, 4 MD. L.J. RACE 
RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 365, 367-71 (2004); Laura S. Unger, SEC Commissioner, 
Investing in the Internet Age: What You Should Know and What Your Computer May Not 
Tell You, Remarks at the Association of Retired Persons National Legislative Council 
Annual Meeting (Feb. 3, 2000) (transcript available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch342.htm) (“It seems likely that online communities will be an inviting venue for 
[affinity fraud] cases to migrate to the Internet.”); Affinity Fraud: How To Avoid 
Investment Scams That Target Groups, SEC., http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ 
affinity.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (defining affinity fraud); Jay Perlman, 
Securities Fraud: Affinity Fraud, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 23, 2000), 
http:www.fool.com/specials/2000/sp000223fraud4.htm (stating that “the Internet has 
made [affinity fraud] more efficient, more effective, and cheaper”). See generally Lisa 
M. Fairfax, “With Friends Like These… “: Toward a More Efficacious Response to 
Affinity-Based Securities and Investment Fraud, 36 GA. L. REV. 63 (2001) (discussing 
securing investment schemes involving affinity fraud). 
 99 See, e.g., Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, What’s in a Picture? Evidence of 
Discrimination from Prosper.com, 46 J. HUM. RESOURCES 53 (2011) (noting a tendency 
for borrowers to avoid similarly situated black borrowers, but also noting that black 
borrowers still tend to have an increased default rate, implying lenders are not 
discriminatory enough). But see Michal Herzenstein, Rick L. Andrews, Utpal M. 
Dholakia, & Evgeny Lyandres, The Democratization of Personal Consumer Loans? 
Determinants of Success in Online Peer-to-Peer Communities 30-34 (June 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.prosper.com/downloads/research/ 
democratization-consumer-loans.pdf (finding almost no discrimination except for 
African American borrowers). Note, however, that this study focused on whether 
loans received funding, not at what interest rate. See sources in prior cite at 5-6. This 
study is consistent with minorities being charged more (or less) for the same loan. See 
id. Racism also exists in the broader lending market. See, e.g., David G. Blanchflower, 
Phillip B. Levine & David J. Zimmerman, Discrimination in the Small-Business Credit 
Market, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 930 (2003) (noting that black-owned small businesses 
are twice as likely to be denied credit, even after controlling for other factors); James 
H. Carr & Isaac F. Megbolugbe, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study on Mortgage 
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Nevertheless, platforms currently vet borrowers and set interest rates 
such that lenders have only limited ability to make unwise lending 
decisions. But, in approving borrowers, lending platforms may not 
always have lenders’ best interests in mind and may take advantage of 
lenders’ lack of sophistication. This conflict of interest arises because 
platforms have an incentive to encourage lending, through origination 
fees, while lenders bear the brunt of the loss if the lending is 
imprudent. 
Today, scholars commonly acknowledge that securitization can lead 
to lax lending standards.101 For example, many scholars believe that 
widespread securitization in the housing market allowed proliferation 
of subprime loans, fraudulent applications, and general decline in loan 
quality.102 Lenders and brokers recklessly extended credit, knowing 
that someone else would ultimately bear the risk. Worse yet, servicing 
fees for defaulted assets provide an affirmative benefit for reckless 
lending by paying an attractive fee to the originator to manage a loan if 
it becomes seriously delinquent.103 
 
Lending Revisited, 4 J. HOUS. RES. 277 (1993) (noting that lenders’ subjective 
assessment of creditworthiness correlated with borrower’s race, to benefit of 
Caucasians relative to African Americans and Hispanics, even after controlling for 
credit history); Michael LaCour-Little, Discrimination in Mortgage Lending: A Critical 
Review of the Literature, 7 J. REAL EST. LIT. 15 (1999) (examining 35 articles on racism 
in the mortgage industry, finding strong evidence of racism in 16). And for gender, see 
Helen F. Ladd, Equal Credit Opportunity: Women and Mortgage Credit, 72 AM. ECON. 
REV. 166, 168 (1982) (arguing that banks in some jurisdictions are more likely to 
deny mortgage requests from single men and married or single women, relative to 
married men).  
 100 See Enrichetta Ravina, LOVE & LOANS: THE EFFECT OF BEAUTY AND PERSONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS IN CREDIT MARKETS 31-33 (July 2008) (draft), available at 
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/eravina/research.html. 
 101 Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, Did 
Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans, 125 Q.J. ECON. 
307, 310-13 (2010); Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., Nineteenth Annual Corporate 
Law Symposium: Debt as A Lever Of Control: The Promise and Perils of Credit 
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1024-25 (2007).  
 102 See, e.g., Gerard V. Comizio, Viewpoints: Eight Financial Priorities for Next 
Administration, 173 AM. BANKER 11 (2008) (“It is widely acknowledged that prudential 
standards went out the window once mortgage lenders were able to originate and sell 
loans promptly, getting the loans off their books and on to those of investors. The 
loan securitization market cannot ever again be turned into the financial version of the 
game ‘pass the trash.’ ”). 
 103 See Janger, supra note 80, at 49 (“For instance, in the case of mortgage backed 
securities, the originator/servicer may not have a real economic interest in the 
mortgage pool but may stand to make more money charging fees for foreclosing on 
the asset than by restructuring.”); see also Peter S. Goodman, Lucrative Fees May Deter 
Efforts to Alter Loans, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2009, at A1. 
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Similarly, platforms charge fees on the basis of loans originated and 
serviced. While platforms have long-term incentives to gain clientele 
through impressive returns, they profit from origination fees in the 
short term so long as lenders lend to anyone, with good credit or 
bad.104 Lending Club currently verifies only about 60% of its 
borrowers’ employment or income information.105 These verification 
efforts include little more than an investigation of paystubs, IRS Forms 
such as W-2s, or other tax records.106 Prosper verifies even fewer 
documents.107 The result of these minimal efforts has been truly 
disappointing investment returns for some P2P lenders.108 
In the early days of P2P lending, default rates were startlingly high. 
For example, about 36% of all Prosper loans originating between 
November 2005 and July 12, 2009 defaulted.109 Many high risk loans 
were funded at low interest rates by lenders who presumably did not 
appreciate the risks they undertook110 Lenders likely overestimated the 
 
 104 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (describing Prosper and Lending 
Club origination fees).  
 105 Ron Lieber, The Gamble of Lending Peer to Peer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2011, at B1 
(“From April through the end of November 2010, the [Lending Club] verified income 
or employment data on about 60 percent of borrower applications.”). To be sure, 
platforms’ low-vetting policies are partially justified by the underwriting realities of 
adverse selection. Lending Club CEO Renaud Laplanche argues that the best borrowers 
have the lowest “tolerance for a cumbersome income verification process.” See Felix 
Salmon, Lending Club’s Loss-Rate Number, REUTERS BLOG (Feb. 7, 2011, 11:30 EST), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/02/07/lending-clubs-loss-rate-numbers/. As 
a result, the loss rate is lower for unverified loans than for verified loans. Id. (“The loss 
rate for loans where Lending Club has verified the borrower’s income is 2.8%; the loss 
rate for loans where Lending Club hasn’t verified the borrower’s income is lower, at 
2.7%.”). 
 106 LendingClub Annual Report (June 29, 2011), supra note 43, at 6. 
 107 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424/b/3) 59 (Oct. 7, 2011) 
available at http://www.prosper.com/Downloads/Legal/Prosper_Prospectus_2011-10-
07.pdf.  
 108 See Mark Gimein, You Are Unlikely to Prosper, THE BIG MONEY (Jan. 18, 2010), 
http://www.thebigmoney.com/articles/money-trail/2010/01/18/you-are-unlikely-prosper? 
page=full (“[H]ow many of the loans with interest rates of 18 percent and up have gone 
into default before the three-year payment period is up[?] The answer: 54 percent. 
So more than half of these high-rate borrowers failed to fully repay their debt.”). 
 109 Performance Data, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/invest/performance.aspx 
(Oct. 30, 2011) (observing 10,569 charge-offs of 28,949 loans originated between 
Nov. 1, 2005 and July 12, 2009).  
 110 Of course, some philanthropic lenders may have wanted to take abnormal credit 
risks. Prosper prided itself on allowing questionable borrowers to make an appeal to 
lenders whose interests were not only pecuniary. Some lenders seemed to want to take 
a philanthropic leap of faith, and average returns were no doubt pulled down as a 
result. Still, some lenders may have accidentally found themselves lending 
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quality of the platform’s underwriting or overestimated their own 
ability to judge character and financial information. Ultimately, 
Prosper’s sunny estimates of credit quality and losses, however, did 
not deter lenders’ improvident choices.111 
Parallel to platform underwriting standards, P2P platforms have 
imperfect collections incentives. For example, a lender reviewing the 
status of her loans noticed that Prosper had not updated the effect of 
bankruptcy on a defaulted note. She requested that Prosper explain 
the delay, which prompted Prosper to reveal that it failed to timely file 
a claim with the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy judge rejected 
Prosper’s late claim to the borrower’s funds, while other unsecured 
creditors were paid in full.112 Because P2P lenders are creditors on the 
debt, Prosper’s late filing cost lenders the entire $15,506.20 debt 
loaned to the borrower. Almost three years after the bankruptcy, and 
after the tenacious lender’s inquiry, Prosper agreed to reimburse 
lenders for their losses. We would not expect Prosper to pursue every 
deadbeat borrower, if only because it is expensive to file bankruptcy 
claims, often incurring costs that may exceed benefits to lenders. 
However, given that Prosper decides to file a claim, there is no 
justification to filing late. This example raises the question whether 
Prosper would have missed the deadline if it knew that Prosper, rather 
than the lenders, would bear the resulting loss.113 
Similar concerns arise for identity theft and fraud in P2P lending. 
On one hand, the risk of fraudulent borrowing seems greater online, 
requiring attentive detection.114 As such, platforms promise to 
 
“philanthropically” or adopting that justification in hindsight.  
 111 Platforms learn from their mistakes, since lender losses make for difficult 
marketing. Prosper has recently modified its underwriting standard, raised interest 
rates, and eliminated competitive auctions. Loans originated in recent months have 
performed much better than the historical average: they now show about 3.5% charge-
offs for loans originated from April 13, 2010 to April 13, 2011, which is only 2.5% by 
value. See Performance Data, supra note 112 (observing charge-offs and net-charge-offs 
for loans originated between April 13, 2010 and April 13, 2011). Of course, many of 
these loans may still default in the coming days. 
 112 See Bankruptcy Update, PRO$PERS.ORG, http://www.prospers.org/forum/ 
bankruptcy_update-t22912.0.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
 113 Similar questions can be asked of bad debt sale. Although the terms of service 
promised many lenders several annual debt sales, Prosper’s last debt sale was in 2007. 
See Loan Debt Sale History, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/help/topics/lender-
debt_sale_history.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (recovering about 10¢ on the 
dollar). 
 114 See, e.g., Dan Tynan, Top Five Online Scams, PCWORLD (Mar. 8, 2005, 10:00 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/119941/top_five_online_scams.html (highlighting 
online fraud risk).  
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reimburse lenders if a debt is uncollectable due to identity theft. On 
the other hand, platforms reserve the sole right to investigate claims 
and deem loans fraudulent.115 Prosper’s prospectus correctly identifies 
that “The fact that Prosper has the exclusive right and ability to 
investigate claims of identity theft in the origination of loans creates a 
significant conflict of interest between Prosper and the lender 
members.”116 Platforms both determine whether lenders should be 
reimbursed and stand as the reimbursor. Platforms’ conflicted role 
may decrease their vigilance in detecting fraud after the fact. 
Given that platforms’ incentives may not always align with prudent 
lending practices, it is important for lenders to understand the risks 
they face. Yet P2P platforms have potential to mislead lenders 
regarding the nature of P2P lending. Platforms may understate risk 
and overstate liquidity by implying that their products are substitutes 
for banking products like CDs or savings accounts.117 
Moreover, P2P platforms overstate returns by presenting returns 
only under advantageous conditions.118 For example, Lending Club’s 
 
 115 Prosper Marketplace Inc., Prospectus (Form 424/b/3) 16 (July 14, 2011) 
[hereinafter Prosper Prospectus], available at http://www.prosper.com/Downloads/ 
Legal/Prosper_Prospectus_2011-07-14.pdf (“The determination of whether verifiable 
identity theft has occurred is in our sole discretion.”). 
 116 Id. at 25.  
 117 See, e.g., An Alternative to CDs, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/invest/about-
investing/cds/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (“You could compare a 3-year CD with one 
of Prosper’s direct peer-to-peer loans (since we offer loans that amortize over 1, 3, or 5 
years)”); How Do Money Market Accounts Measure Up Against Prosper’s Peer-to-Peer 
Lending?, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/invest/about-investing/money-market-
accounts/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (describing money markets); Mike Smith, 
Person-to-Person Loans, Laddering and Short-Term Savings, LENDING CLUB BLOG (Nov. 
29, 2007, 6:47 AM), http://blog.lendingclub.com/2007/11/29/person-to-person-loans-
laddering-for-short-term-savings/ (“When you consider the fact that Lending Club 
person-to-person loans offer lenders better rates than CDs, while still preserving the 
laddering feature of returning a portion of your investment to you each month, you 
may find that a portfolio of loans is a better fit for your financial goals than a laddered 
CD.”); see also Securities and Exchange Commission Forms List, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/secforms.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
 118 See Prosper.com – Don’t Mislead Investors, FRED93’S BLOG: A LENDER’S VIEW OF 
PROSPER.COM (Sept. 24, 2009), http://fred93blog.blogspot.com/2009/09/prospercom-
dont-mislead-investors.html (comparing Prosper CEO interview statement with his 
own research); cf. Person-to-Person Lending Online Gathers Steam, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 
27, 2007, 6:53:02 ET) available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21993720/ 
(“Prosper’s default rate hovers at about 2.7 percent, Larsen said. . . .”). Compare 
Prosper.com – Don’t Mislead Investors supra (finding 17% default rate, or 3.23% by 
unreasonably charitable assumptions), with Eileen Ambrose, Prosper.com Helps 
Regular Folks Become a Bank and Make Loans, SUN, Apr. 1, 2007, at 1C (“Larsen says 
the default rate . . . is about 0.50 percent.”).  
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home page suggests that potential lenders “[i]nvest & [e]arn 9.68% 
returns.”119 Lending Club calculates this figure by considering the 
average net annualized return for its entire loan portfolio.120 This 
presentation is likely to understate defaults and overstate returns 
because, as a growing company that issues more and more new loans, 
the loan portfolio contains a disproportionately large set of young 
loans.121 Young loans have not had time to default, but may do so in 
time.122 As such, Lending Club’s figure will probably underestimate 
the effect of defaults upon returns. This is the financial equivalent of 
counting eggs before they hatch. 
Unlike Lending Club’s figure, the headline return rate on Prosper’s 
home page excludes any loans originated less than 10 months ago, 
presumably making the figure more accurate.123 Such a time restriction 
allows Prosper to claim average returns above 9.85%.124 However, 
Prosper also excludes data for the significant portion of loans 
originated prior to its registration statement’s effective date, June 15, 
2009. This excludes a period in which 35% of loans defaulted,125 and 
investor returns were negative.126 However, Prosper’s choice to 
 
 119 LENDINGCLUB, http://www.lendingclub.com/home.action (last visited Jan. 30, 
2011). 
 120 How We Measure Net Annualized Return, LENDINGCLUB, http://www.lendingclub. 
com/public/lendersPerformanceHelpPop.action (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).  
 121 See Loan Growth, LENDINGCLUBSTATS.COM, http://lendingclubstats.com/stats/ 
loan-growth (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (showing that about half of LendingClub’s 
loans as of January 2011 were originated between March 2010 and January 2010). 
 122 See Lates By Payment, ERIC’S CREDIT COMMUNITY, http://www.ericscc.com/ 
stats/lates-by-payment (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (stating that only half of defaults 
occur within the first nine months).  
 123 PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) (“Net Annualized 
Returns represent the actual returns on Borrower Payment Dependent Notes (Notes) 
issued and sold by Prosper since July 15, 2009. To be included in the calculation of 
Net Annualized Returns, Notes must be associated with a borrower loan originated 
more than 10 months ago; this calculation uses loans originated through August 31, 
2010. To calculate Net Annualized Returns, all payments received on borrower loans 
corresponding to eligible Notes, net of principal repayment, credit losses and servicing 
costs for such loans, are aggregated then divided by the average daily amount of 
aggregate outstanding principal for such loans. To annualize this cumulative return, 
the cumulative number is divided by the dollar-weighted average age of the loans in 
days and then multiplied by 365. Net Annualized Returns are not necessarily 
indicative of the future performance of any Notes. All calculations made as of June 30, 
2011.”).  
 124 Prosper Risk Management Drives Best P2P Returns, PROSPER BLOG (Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://blog.prosper.com/2011/01/24/prosper-risk-management-drives-best-p2p-returns/ 
(comparing LendingClub returns of 5.34% during a similarly defined period). 
 125 See Bankruptcy Update, surpra note 112. 
 126 Full Q&A With Prosper Marketplace CEO Chris Larsen, AM. CONSUMER NEWS 
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exclude this data was probably not all marketing: Prosper’s lending 
methodology substantially differed during that period. Still, platforms’ 
ability to manipulate accounting methods creates potential for 
misrepresentation. 
Platforms also implicitly subsidize glowing reviews by users who 
blog.127 Both Lending Club and Prosper pay referral fees to blogs and 
webpages that recruit customers.128 As a result, these sites have an 
incentive to overstate the rewards of P2P lending, and many of them 
do.129 
Lenders are not the only consumers implicated in P2P lending. 
Borrowers also face special risks in a P2P environment. Any credit 
transaction can implicate unfair lending and collections processes. A 
bevy of laws constrain lenders, with particular emphasis on 
safeguarding privacy.130 Inherently, P2P transactions contemplate a 
 
(June 8, 2010), http://www.americanconsumernews.com/2010/06/full-qa-with-
prosper-marketplace-ceo-chris-larsen.html (“To date, the median return across all 
Prosper lenders who bid from the time we launched in February 2006 to the time we 
entered our SEC registration quiet period in October 2008 was negative 3.2%.”). 
 127 Platforms can offer to the media a technically true estimated return, and profit 
when the reporter prints the figure without explaining the methodology. Compare 
Nancy Trejos, Peer-to-Peer Lending Catches On With Borrowers, Investors, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 20, 2009 (“Prosper’s default rate is about 5 percent.”), with Prosper Marketplace, 
Inc., Prospectus (Form 424/b/3) 18 (July 13, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000141626509000033/prosper_s-1a6d7d13d2009.htm 
(“As of March 31, 2009 . . . 5,840 loans or 20.1% had defaulted.”). 
 128 See generally Ellen P. Goodman, Peer Promotions and False Advertising Law, 58 
S.C. L. REV. 683 (2007) (investigating peer promotions and advertising law).  
 129 See, e.g., Millie Kay G., Prosper Review: Top P2P Lending Site, THE DIGERATI LIFE, 
http://www.thedigeratilife.com/blog/prosper-review-top-p2p-lending-site/ (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2011) (offering positive review, nor mention of risks, as well as sponsored, 
affiliate links).  
 130 See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (2006) (restricting 
garnishment of compensation due for personal services); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) (requiring fair and accurate credit reporting determined via 
reasonable procedures); Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 502, 518 
(2006) (protecting servicemembers by temporarily suspending “judicial and 
administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights 
of servicemembers during their military service,” including terms to protect credit); 
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (resolving to 
“enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential 
framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and 
other financial service providers, and for other purposes”); Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R § 202 (2010) (requiring creditors to provide appraisal 
reports); Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R § 226.6 (2010) (requiring 
disclosure of finance charges and terms for open-end credit); GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-
PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 3-7 (discussing various state and federal regulators 
that oversee parts of P2P lending).  
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more permeable privacy. At least superficially, borrower privacy and 
lender knowledge are a zero-sum game. Whereas most credit 
transactions pit consumer privacy against an intermediary, P2P 
platforms inevitably face tradeoffs among consumer constituencies. 
In order to solicit interest from lenders, P2P borrowers share 
personal information on the platform’s website. This information is 
available to anyone who ventures online, including thousands of 
tenacious lenders. Both Lending Club and Prosper censor personally 
identifying information from member profiles and borrower listings, 
in the hopes that borrowers do not fully disclose their identities.131 
However, lenders sometimes can discern the identity of a given 
borrower from the little information they provide.132 
Moreover, privacy is in tension with P2P lending’s emphasis on 
transparency and community. Many P2P users are attracted to a social 
background for their transactions, and platforms emphasize the direct, 
rather than intermediated, contact between borrower and lender. Still, 
platforms discourage lenders and borrowers from communicating, 
except anonymously through the platform. Despite these efforts, P2P 
investors and borrowers do interact, and phone and email 
conversations are not uncommon.133 Sometimes Prosper lenders even 
coerce some degree of borrower disclosure as a condition for 
authorizing a bid. Thus, while risky, compromising the veil of 
complete privacy can help borrowers obtain a loan. 
Under relaxed privacy, lender-borrower relationships may entail 
dynamics rarely observed in modern, intermediated lending. One 
Prosper lender known as “Investar” takes a hands-on approach to his 
loans.134 He requires his potential borrowers to endure a lengthy 
interview, scrutinizing their financial records far beyond the vetting 
required for a simple loan request on Prosper. Investar views Prosper 
as an extension of a debt counseling service he used to run, which was 
 
 131 The Simpsons: Loan-a-Lisa (NBC television broadcast Oct. 3, 2010) (showing 
that Lisa decided to lend through a Kiva-like site. Although theoretically anonymous, 
she quickly realizes that her ex-boyfriend Nelson is applying for a loan. She becomes 
privy to embarrassing details about his home life and situation in lending to him. She 
is later upset by finding the effect that the loan had had on his educational goals. 
Transparency holds many risks). 
 132 See supra Part I.B (describing Wolcott investigation). 
 133 Author’s personal interaction with INVESTAR Lenders, one of several thousand 
structured sub-communities, or groups, authorized within Prosper Marketplace 
(http://www.prosper.com/connections/; http://www.prosper.com/groups/) and 
correspondence with its recognized Group Leader, Investar. 
 134 Id. 
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public spirited and intended for the borrower’s benefit.135 Investar 
helps borrowers make realistic plans to service loans within their 
means and eventually emerge from the cycle of debt. Investar’s efforts 
have earned him respectable loan returns,136 but these returns pale in 
comparison to his investment of time and emotion. 
Not all lenders are so benevolent. An unhappy investor might decide 
to take debt collection into her own hands, to the detriment of both 
herself and the borrower. State and federal statutes, however, protect 
borrowers from unreasonable debt collection.137 Some investors, 
though, may be unaware of or uninterested in these laws, causing 
them to engage in harassing or intimidating collections activities. 
Thus, P2P lending poses certain inherent risks to borrowers: by 
operating directly or socially, it exposes borrowers to the scrutiny of 
strangers for better and for worse. 
II. P2P LENDING AND PROBLEMS WITH THE SEC 
Even despite the risks and challenges discussed above, P2P lending 
potentially offers tremendous benefits, and an ideal regulator would 
strive to expand and improve the industry. Where regulation proves 
necessary, the ideal regulator would consider the costs of intervention, 
calibrating the regulation to mitigate risks without creating new 
problems for consumers or platforms. 
The SEC is not the ideal regulator. Soon after Prosper’s February 
2006 launch, it requested a no-action letter from the SEC, seeking 
confirmation of its legal structure and business model. Prosper later 
retracted the request, but the SEC was unwilling to offer assurance 
that it would not bring action against the platforms for securities 
violation. 
On November 24, 2008, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order to 
Prosper (“Order”).138 The SEC argued that Prosper was selling 
 
 135 INVESTAR, HANDBOOK FOR MEMBERS AND SUPPORTING LENDERS 10 (2010) (“For 
several years I engaged in intense one-on-one financial counseling with individuals 
plagued by poor household budgeting and negative cash flow. We sat together weekly. 
I loaned them whatever was necessary to keep them treading water and they began 
living on the severely strict budget we created together. I took possession of their 
credit cards, held their checkbook and began paying their bills on time. I pacified 
bleating creditors, negotiating on their behalf. I showed them how to effectively 
manage money even when there wasn’t enough.”). 
 136 2010 Annual Report, Investar Lenders 5 Star Watch (Dec. 31, 2010) (26.1% 
weighted annual return on investment). 
 137 See GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 32-37. 
 138 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8984, 2008 WL 4978684, 
at *1 (Nov. 24, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/33-
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securities as defined in section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, a claim 
this Article discusses below.139 The Order asserted that Prosper should 
have registered as a public company with the SEC and should only 
have sold notes through a prospectus with an effective registration 
statement.140 The SEC did not offer policy justifications for this 
position. Prosper consented to the entry of the order and began the 
road to SEC registration. 
Prior to the SEC’s Order, Prosper effected transactions in the 
following manner: when borrowers and lenders matched, Prosper 
would signal WebBank, a Utah-chartered industrial bank, to make the 
loan to the borrower.141 WebBank would assign the note to Prosper, 
which then assigned it to the lender.142 This process connected 
borrowers and lenders. 
After the Order, all P2P platforms either registered with the SEC143 
or folded.144 The major platforms currently file annual and quarterly 
 
8984.pdf.  
 139 Id. at *3. 
 140 See id. at *5.  
 141 Lending Club used the same structure with the same partner, WebBank. 
LendingClub, Prospectus (Form 424/b/3) 7 (Aug. 15, 2011), available at 
https://www.lendingclub.com/extdata/Clean_As_Filed_20110815.pdf (“From the 
launch of our platform in May 2007 until April 7, 2008, the operation of our platform 
differed from the structure described in this prospectus, and we did not offer Notes. 
Instead, our platform allowed members to purchase, and take assignment of, member 
loans directly. Under that structure, members were assigned anonymized, individual 
promissory notes corresponding in principal amount to their purchase price, subject 
to our right to service the member loans.”); id. at 8 (“Each member loan is originated 
through our website and funded by WebBank at closing. WebBank is an FDIC-
insured, Utah-chartered industrial bank that serves as the lender for all member loans 
originated through our platform.”). Platforms worked with WebBank to avoid state 
lending registration requirements and interest rate caps.  
 142 See ANDREW VERSTEIN, FILENE RESEARCH INST., PEER-TO-PEER LENDING: UPDATE 
AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS 24 (2008) (explaining the mechanics of P2P as of 
2008).  
 143 Lending Club actually began registration several months prior to the cease and 
desist order. See LendingClub Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (June 20, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000089161808000318/ 
f41480orsv1.htm.  
 144 See, e.g., John Chappell, Loanio Files Amendment to S-1 with SEC; Cedes Code for 
Cash, P2P LENDING NEWS (Aug. 23, 2009), http://www.p2plendingnews.com/ 
2009/08/loanio-files-s-1-amendment-sells-source-code (selling its source code for 
$375,000 while waiting for regulatory approval); Sara Lepro, Virgin Money Closes Shop 
in the U.S., Victim of Bad Timing, U.S. BANKER (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bulletins/-1029613-1.html (“The peer-to-peer 
lending business model also has faced its share of regulatory hurdles.”); Matthew 
Paulson, Pertuity Direct Shuts Down Unexpectedly, P2P LENDING NEWS (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://www.p2plendingnews.com/2009/08/pertuity-direct-shuts-down-suddenly/ 
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reports145 and sell their notes by prospectus. Those notes remain the 
platform’s own obligation, payable contingent upon borrower 
repayment. Accordingly, when the lender signals interest in a 
prospective borrower, and WebBank lends to the borrower, the 
platform permanently retains ownership of the borrower indebtedness. 
The platform then sells its debt instrument to the lender, who 
becomes a creditor of the platform rather than the borrower. 
This “borrower payment dependent note” obliges the platform to 
pay an amount derived from borrower payments. A lender holding an 
interest in a borrower’s loan paying 10% to the platform has a right to 
10% (less the servicing fee) from the platform. But the lender has 
privity only with the platform, rather than the borrower. Further, the 
loan is unsecured and nonrecourse to any other assets of the 
platform.146 When everything functions well, this structure is 
economically equivalent to the old P2P lending model, but there are 
many cases where this structure is substantially different.147 Most 
importantly, the lender now must consider the creditworthiness of the 
platform, too. 
The SEC predicated its involvement on defining P2P notes as 
“securities.” The Securities Act of 1933 defines a security to include 
“unless the context otherwise requires . . . any note . . . [or] 
investment contract.”148 While it is plausible that P2P notes were 
either “investment contracts” or “notes” for the purposes of the 
Securities Acts, there is a strong case that they were neither. Subpart A 
presents the case against securities characterization and shows the 
weaknesses in the SEC’s analysis. 
Because of the strong arguments presented in Subpart A against 
securities characterization, the SEC could have justified continued 
observation, declining action on the P2P lending industry as it had 
 
(shutting down after period of inactivity on site and closure of its underlying mutual 
fund to new members). 
 145 Issuers with more than $1 million in assets and more than 500 owners must 
register with the SEC. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)g(1) (2006). 
They are subject to periodic reporting requirements. 15 U.S.C § 78m(a) (subjecting 
§ 12 registrants to reporting requirements).  
 146 Note that calling the P2P a non-recourse loan to the platform actually 
understates the risks to the lender because the lender has no priority interest in the 
underlying borrower debt. See infra Part II.B.  
 147 See infra Part II.B. 
 148 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). The 1934 Act definition is 
nearly identical. In a sense, this Part argues that “the context otherwise requires.” Id. 
Subpart A shows the legal context by highlighting arguments the SEC does not seem 
to have addressed, and Subpart B shows the practical context in terms of damage done 
by securities characterization. 
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done for years, and the presense of colorable arguments on either side 
of securities characterization would allow it to do so for legal and 
policy reasons. For the SEC to have dedicated its scarce resources to 
bringing P2P lending within the securities regime, it must have 
believed that requiring P2P loans to register as securities was both 
more appropriate than explicit exclusion from the securities acts and 
better than inaction. However, SEC regulation of P2P lending was 
both unnecessary and harmful. 
Subpart B discusses the negative, foreseeable (but perhaps 
unforeseen) consequences of SEC regulation, some of which could 
have been avoided even under the securities regime. The securities 
regime decreased, rather than enhanced, the protection of lenders — 
the individuals whom the SEC intended to protect by regulating P2P 
loans. By forcing P2P lending into the machinery of the Securities 
Acts, the SEC also increased borrower risk and threatened the 
innovative potential of this young industry. 
Given the arguments against intervention, Subpart C seeks to 
understand why the SEC nevertheless asserted its authority and 
moved to regulate P2P lending. The SEC would have done better to 
exclude P2P loans from securities regulation, or to have simply done 
nothing. This Part provides an interpretive and normative argument 
that the SEC overreached by affirmatively asserting that P2P loans 
were securities. 
A. Regulatory Overreach 
The Securities Act of 1933 defines a security to include “any 
note . . . [or] investment contract.”149 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. is the 
seminal case defining an investment contract. 150 Likewise, Reves v. 
Ernst & Young is the central case defining a note.151 Using definitions 
from both Reves and Howey, the SEC argued in the Order that the P2P 
notes constituted regulated securities, with the platforms as issuers. 
The SEC, however, provided no other legal argument or policy 
considerations whatsoever in applying the securities regime to P2P 
lending. 
Under Howey, an investment contract exists if there is “an 
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others.”152 This three-part test, thus, requires: 
 
 149 § 2(1). The 1934 Act definition is nearly identical.  
 150 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-300 (1946). 
 151 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 56-58 (1990). 
 152 Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.  
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(1) investment of money with the expectation of profits, (2) 
commonality, and (3) the entrepreneurial efforts of others. In applying 
Howey to P2P notes, the SEC overstated its case in the third prong.153 
The SEC overstated its case by including past efforts and ministerial 
activities as satisfying the third prong, a point upon which courts are 
divided.154 Prior to selling notes to lenders, P2P platforms screen 
borrowers. After sale, P2P platforms also assist with ongoing low-level 
tasks, such as collecting payments from lenders. Although investors 
may rely on these efforts, they are likely insufficient to satisfy the 
entrepreneurial functions in the third Howey prong, at least in one of 
the two circuits to have looked at similar issues. In assessing Howey’s 
third prong, the D.C. Circuit determined pre-sale efforts155 and post-
sale, ministerial activities156 have little to no influence on whether an 
arrangement constitutes an investment contract.157 It is post-sale 
 
 153 The platforms also have a workable argument against the commonality prong. 
The SEC argued that lenders had a common interest because all would be harmed if 
Prosper were unable to operate the platform. But any time a party contracts with 
several parties for any service or sale, all counter-parties would all be harmed by her 
future non-performance. By analogy consider a mortgage broker who routinely assists 
many banks and borrowers meet one other. If that broker were to disappear, many 
banks and borrowers would be inconvenienced. But their legal interests remain 
distinct and unaffected. Lenders may have trouble finding future borrowers, but they 
still own their claim on prior borrowers. If horizontal commonality is to mean 
anything at all, it must involve some joint or mingled interest, and it must involve 
some common plight other than coincident inconvenience of service customers. Thus, 
the Howey Court emphasized that investors’ profits were drawn from their pro rata 
share of the pool, rather than from the sale of their own oranges.  
P2P notes do not exhibit commonality because each lender owned particular notes 
and their legal interest remained distinct. Prior to SEC intervention lending structure 
prior SEC intervention, Prosper posed no credit risk to lenders. Its success or failure 
did not affect the legal rights of the lenders. One lenders’ returns were legally 
independent of all other lenders’ notes, would survive Prosper’s disappearance, and 
varied tremendously from investor to investor.  
 154 Compare SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005) (declining 
to use pre/post test), with SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(making distinction between pre-purchase and post-purchase efforts).  
 155 Cf. Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) 
(holding that pre-purchase brokering and purchase, and post-purchase storage and 
offer to repurchase, do not satisfy Howey test). 
 156 Cf. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(noting that efforts of others are only “undeniably significant ones, those essential 
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise” (citing SEC v. 
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973))). 
 157 Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 548 (“While we doubt that pre-purchase services 
should ever count for much, for present purposes we need only agree with the district 
court that pre-purchase services cannot by themselves suffice to make the profits of an 
investment arise predominantly from the efforts of others, and that ministerial 
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entrepreneurial activity upon which investors must rely. Likewise, in 
SEC v. Life Partners Inc., the defendant engaged in extensive pre-
purchase activities158 and post-purchase159 maintenance similar to that 
which P2P platforms provide. Nevertheless, the D.C. circuit ruled that 
these interests did not implicate Howey’s third entrepreneurial efforts 
prong.160 
SEC v. Life Partners, Inc. analyzed whether brokered, fractional 
interest in soon-to-mature life insurance policies, or rights to money 
when an old or ill individual dies, constituted securities.161 The court 
explained that the length of the insured’s life is the key factor for 
profits, not the efforts of the promoters.162 As a result, Life Partners did 
not satisfy the third prong from Howey and, therefore, no investment 
contract existed. Prior to sale, the promoters worked to find and vet 
insurance policies, but after sale it was only the insured (and perhaps 
the insurance company) that influenced investor returns. Investors did 
not rely on the continued entrepreneurial activity of the promoter to 
influence their profits. 
Parallel to Life Partners, P2P lender profits almost entirely depend 
on the underlying borrower’s willingness and ability to pay. The 
borrower’s efforts — to keep their job, to save diligently, to make 
payments in a timely manner — determine the investors’ returns. P2P 
lenders do not rely on continued entrepreneurial activity of the 
platform for their profits, and therefore, P2P notes should not 
constitute investment contracts under Life Partners. 
It is not surprising that the Order to Prosper does not reflect the 
importance of Life Partners. After Life Partners, the SEC continued to 
pursue viatical settlement companies and eventually persuaded the 
11th Circuit to treat pre- and post-sale efforts as similar for the 
purposes of Howey.163 The SEC likely will emphasize the more 
 
functions should receive a good deal less weight than entrepreneurial activities….”). 
 158 Id. at 539 (vetting terminally ill individuals, soliciting interest in their policies, 
and estimating the value of these policies). 
 159 Life Partners was expected to hold the policy, monitor the insured’s health, pay 
premiums, convert group policies to individual policies, pay premiums, collect and 
distribute death benefits, assist investors who wished to resell their interest. Id at 545-
47. Life Partners appeared as the owner of record and had the power to change the 
policy beneficiary. Id. 
 160 Id. at 545-48.  
 161 Id. at 548-49. 
 162 Id. at 548. 
 163 SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 743-45 (11th Cir. 2005). Note, 
however, that Mutual Benefits often delayed medical examinations of patients until 
after sale to investors. Therefore, although the Eleventh Circuit rejects the Life 
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favorable case law as it seeks to preserve enforcement options.164 
However, Life Partners remains good law, leaving circuits split with 
respect to Howey. Becuase there was genuine uncertainty regarding the 
existence of an investment contract, the SEC was not compelled to act 
and should not have acted, given the likely results of action.165 
The SEC could have sidestepped Life Partners had it alleged that P2P 
platforms’ borrowers, rather than the platforms themselves, are 
issuers. P2P investors “solely” depend on the borrower’s willingness 
and ability to repay.166 It is a borrower’s continuing performance, and 
not that of the platform, that determines the returns for the investor. 
In that respect, the third prong of Howey would be met for a borrower-
issuer. The first two Howey prongs would be met in the same manner 
as the platform: there is investment with expectation of profit, and 
there is commonality among lenders and between lender and 
borrower. If the borrowers had been ordinary businesses, the SEC may 
have deemed them issuers and called the platforms underwriters. 
However, deeming P2P borrowers as issuers is a non-starter because 
it would impose costs and liability that no consumer-borrower would 
bear. New Zealand currently regards the borrower as the issuer, and 
that fact alone obliterates any hopes for a P2P industry there.167 Several 
U.S. states employ a similar approach, which leaves their citizens 
without access to P2P investments.168 Worse, if the SEC had 
 
Partners pre-/post- distinction, it does so in a case where it could have accepted the 
distinction and still found for the SEC.  
 164 Indeed, the SEC may have viewed P2P as an opportunity to reassert positions that 
it hopes to use in its continuing effort to reign in viatical settlements. Paula Dubberly, 
Testimony Concerning “Recent Innovations in Securitization,” SEC (Sept. 24, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts092409pd.htm#P51_20651 (discussing 
Mutual Benefits and Life Partners, and concluding that “[i]n the event that possible 
securities law violations are present in sales of securities through life settlement 
securitizations, we stand ready to pursue those case vigorously”). 
 165 See infra Part II.B. 
 166 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). Howey defines the 
third prong in terms of expectations of profits solely from the promoter or third party, 
though subsequent cases have liberalized that requirement. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot 
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) (declaring that “a close reading of 
the language employed in Howey and the authority upon which the Court relied 
suggests that, contrary to the view of the district court, we need not feel compelled to 
follow the ‘solely from the efforts of others’ test literally”). 
 167 MINISTRY OF ECON. DEV., supra note 18, at 26, available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/73375/discussion-document.pdf (“[P2P] services are 
not practical in New Zealand because the borrower is an “issuer” for the purposes of 
the Securities Act and Financial Reporting Act.”).  
 168 See e.g., MARK R. HEUERMAN, OHIO DIV. OF SEC., PEER-TO-PEER (P2P) LENDING AND 
INTERNET PLATFORMS: OHIO SECURITIES ACT IMPLICATIONS (2008), available at 
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concluded that borrowers were issuers, it would have exposed them to 
liability for the notes already issued without registration.169 Even if the 
P2P notes could be more coherently characterized as borrower-issued, 
the SEC would have found it unattractive to impose on thousands of 
cash-strapped consumers the burdens and liabilities usually reserved 
for large companies.170 No doubt realizing the absurdity of this result, 
the SEC’s Order does not ask whether the borrower is an issuer. 
Instead, it only makes the weaker case that the platform is an issuer. 
The SEC also argued that platforms issued securities under the Reves 
analysis.171 The Securities Act defines “any note” to be a security,172 
“unless the context otherwise requires.”173 Reves provides insight into 
“context” where a note might not also be a security. Reves specifically 
enumerates five nonsecurity notes and provides a “family 
resemblance” test to exclude some unspecified notes.174 The SEC 
 
http://com.ohio.gov/secu/docs/Conference2010/MarkHeuermanP2P.pdf; Rob Garcia, Is 
Lending Club Available in My State?, LENDING CLUB BLOG, (July 6, 2011) 
http://blog.lendingclub.com/2011/06/10/is-lending-club-available-in-my-state/, June 10, 
2011 (explaining why P2P fails to satisfy Ohio securities laws). See generally Is Lending 
Club Available in My State?, LENDING CLUB BLOG (June 10, 2011, 7:31 AM), 
http://blog.lendingclub.com/2011/06/10/is-lending-club-available-in-my-state/ (providing 
maps to indicate which states allow residents to use Lending Club services); Stefan 
Padfield, Peer-to-Peer Lending: Who is the Issuer?, BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (June 16, 
2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2011/06/peer-to-peer-lending-
who-is-the-issuer.html (stating that P2P business model still does not satisfy securities 
laws of several states). 
 169 See Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8984, supra note 138, 
at *1; Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424/b/3) 76 (July 13, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000141626509000034/ 
prosper_s-1a6d7d13d2009.htm (discussing Prosper’s liability for pre-registration note 
sales).  
 170 Of course P2P borrowers are not unique in knowing that their notes will be 
restructured and resold, with investors relying on their repayment. Commercial, 
consumer, and mortgage loans also rarely come to rest with the initial lender. Any 
argument that P2P borrowers are issuers would have introduced many other types of 
borrowers into the ambit of securities regulations — a result not contemplated in the 
the Securities Act of 1933. See Jonathan Macey et al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets, 
34 J. CORP. L. 789, 809-10 (2009) (arguing that subprime mortgages could be 
regulated as securities). Although they conceived of borrowers as securities buyers, we 
could just as easily conceive of them as security issuers where they know that the 
originating bank will not hold their mortgage. 
 171 See Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8984, supra note 138, 
at *1. 
 172 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). 
 173 Id.  
 174 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66-67 (1990) (“[T]he version of the 
‘family resemblance’ test that we have articulated here: A note is presumed to be a 
‘security,’ and that presumption may be rebutted only by a showing that the note bears 
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argued that P2P notes fail Reves’ family resemblance test and, 
therefore, constitute a security. However, the SEC analysis incorrectly 
applies Reves. The analysis did not consider whether P2P notes fall 
within the enumerated exclusion. The family resemblance test does 
not apply if P2P notes are simply consumer financing notes, which 
Reves enumerates as excluded from the Securities Acts. The SEC thus 
ignored one of the platforms’ best arguments and misconstrued the 
Reves holding. 
Reves excludes “note[s] delivered in consumer financing” from the 
definition of a security.175 This exclusion is consistent with the 
Securities Acts, which does not contemplate that consumers “issue a 
note” when they borrow for consumption.176 Ordinary consumer 
lending does not create a security, but rather creates a note given in 
consumer financing.177 While the resulting note is a salable asset, the 
lender is not an investor in securities and no one is an issuer. This 
remains true even if the lender assigns her payment right to a 
purchaser; the lender does not become an issuer upon assignment, nor 
does the note become a security. P2P borrowers are individuals 
borrowing for household and consumer purposes. If P2P notes were to 
come to rest with Prosper, there would be no question that this was an 
ordinary lending transaction with no securities involved. Thus, P2P 
 
a strong resemblance (in terms of the four factors we have identified) to one of the 
enumerated categories of instrument. If an instrument is not sufficiently similar to an 
item on the list, the decision whether another category should be added is to be made 
by examining the same factors.”)).  
 175 Reves, 494 U.S. at 65; see also Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Promissory Notes 
as Securities Under § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 and § 3(a)(10) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 39 A.L.R. FED. 357, Part.II, § 3[a] (1978) (“ ‘[G]arden-variety’ 
common-law promissory notes, especially those issued by individuals in conjunction 
with consumer transactions, have been held not to be within the purview of the 
[Securities] Acts.”). 
 176 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1020 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “consumer loan” as “a 
loan that is given to an individual for family, household, personal, or agricultural 
purposes and that is generally governed by truth-in-lending statutes and regulations”).  
 177 It may be erroneously assumed that “consumer financing” refers only to lending 
arranged by the seller of consumer goods to facilitate the sale. This is certainly one 
common type of consumer financing. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 
F.2d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that enhanced automobile receivables, car 
loans resold from automobile dealers, are not securities). However, there is no 
indication that the Reves court intended to limit the existing meaning of this term, 
which includes loans from financial institutions to consumers for non-business 
purposes. See, e.g., SEC v. Arkansas Loan & Thrift Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 
(D.C. Ark. 1969) (noting that Arkansas Loan & Thrift “was organized in 1964 as an 
Arkansas corporation for the purpose of engaging in consumer finance business” with 
no indication of intent to facilitate sales).  
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notes likely constitute notes delivered in consumer financing upon 
creation and, therefore, were not Reves securities.178 
Of course, even if P2P lending notes were consumer financing upon 
creation, the question must be whether any subsequent modification 
was sufficient for them to lose that exempt status. Consumer financing 
notes are frequently assigned without becoming securities but the SEC 
might have believed that the notes ceased to be notes given in 
consumer financing once Prosper assigned them to lenders, thus 
requiring family resemblance to avoid securities characterization. 
Nevertheless, if the SEC had applied the family resemblance test 
evenhandedly, it would have seen that the results were not clear, and 
therefore, the agency’s intervention could not be compelled on legal 
grounds alone. 
The family resemblance test contains four parts.179 The first Reves 
factor considers the motivations of the buyer and seller.180 For buyers, 
a profit motive makes an instrument more likely to be a security.181 An 
investor buying a corporate bond is more likely to show a profit 
motive than a zero-interest loan from a parent to a child. The SEC 
argued that the “buyers” (the individuals who think of themselves as 
lenders) possess a profit motive. The SEC then summarily concluded 
that P2P notes fail the first factor of the Reves test.182 
 
 178 See Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (“[A] bank’s unsecured short-term personal loan to an individual, [is] the 
very archetype of what the securities laws were not intended to cover.”); C.N.S. 
Enter., Inc. v. G. & G. Enters., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir. 1975) (“In one sense 
every lender of money is an investor since he places his money at risk in anticipation 
of a profit in the form of interest. Also in a broad sense every investor lends his money 
to a borrower . . . . [B]uying shares of the common stock . . . where the impetus for 
the transaction comes from the person with the money, is an investment; borrowing 
money . . . to finance the purchase of an automobile, where the impetus for the 
transaction comes from the person who needs the money, is a loan.”).  
 179 The SEC contended that all four factors leaned away from resemblance. See 
Prosper Marketplace, Inc., supra note 138, at *5-6. 
 180 Reves, 494 U.S. at 66 (“If the seller’s purpose is to raise money for the general 
use of a business enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is 
interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument is 
likely to be a ‘security.’ ”). However, “If the note is exchanged to facilitate the 
purchase and sale of a minor asset or consumer good, to correct for the seller’s cash-
flow difficulties, or to advance some other commercial or consumer purpose, the note 
is less sensibly described as a security.” Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 The SEC acknowledged that some lenders lend for social reasons. See MICHAEL 
K. HULME, SOC. FUTURES OBSERVATORY, INTERNET BASED SOCIAL LENDING: PAST, PRESENT 
AND FUTURE 10 (2006). However, it found that compatible with a general profit 
motive. Id. 
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The SEC’s analysis, however, is blinkered because it does not so 
much as mention the motivation of the “seller.” Both parties’ motives 
are important in determining security status. The Reves court 
considered borrower purposes, asking whether sellers raise money for 
general business use or to finance investments, as opposed to “some 
other commercial or consumer purpose.”183 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone further highlights the importance of 
the SEC’s omission.184 There, a company called PAC bought auto 
dealer-to-customer loans, packaging them into “enhanced automobile 
receivables” (“EARs”) for resale. PAC serviced the loans and provided 
some enhancements and guarantees. The question was whether EARs 
had a strong family resemblance to nonsecurity notes, given PAC’s 
bundled services and enhancements. In finding that the “motivations” 
factor did not indicate a security, the court stated: 
PAC was not selling the EARs to raise money for general 
investments in PAC; rather, it was selling its stock-in-
trade . . . . Although the buyers obviously hoped to profit from 
the inherent value of the product purchased, that expected 
profit was not tied to the profitability of PAC.185 
PAC’s motive in selling the loans was not to raise money to expand its 
business. Rather, selling loans was PAC’s business, and buyers knew 
that. Thus PAC’s EARs did not implicate the first family resemblance 
factor. Like PAC, Prosper issued notes to serve as its stock-in-trade, 
rather than to finance business expansion. While Prosper lenders 
hoped to profit from the inherent value of the borrower notes, that 
profit was not tied to Prosper’s profitability any more than the EARs 
were to PACs. The SEC’s two sentence treatment of the first Reves 
factor did not even consider seller’s motives, let alone consider cases 
like Resolution Trust, and was plainly inadequate.186 
The second Reves factor inquires into the lenders’ plan of 
distribution. Reves’ plan of distribution factor examines whether there 
is “common trading for speculation or investment.”187 Common 
trading for speculation of investment, or offering notes to the general 
 
 183 Reves, 494 U.S. at 66. 
 184 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1539 (10th Cir. 1993).  
 185 Id. 
 186 It could be argued that the “seller” is not Prosper, but rather the underlying 
borrower. After all, she is the debtor on the note that is then sold and resold. In that 
case, the “motivations” prong is even stronger, as the borrower’s objective is obviously 
a consumer purpose.  
 187 Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.  
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public and allowing secondary sales, often indicates securities 
characterization. For example, bank certificates of deposit ordinarily 
are not securities,188 but they can become securities when the issuer 
sells them with a promise to maintain a secondary market for 
otherwise illiquid assets.189 Prosper’s P2P notes were not eligible for 
resale at the time of the Order, which tends against the common 
trading factor. 
Although the Reves court clarified that “common trading” can occur 
without trading on exchanges, it did not recognize common trading 
where there is no trading at all. Each of the Court’s examples specifies 
only the lack of exchange trading, rather than the lack of trading in 
general.190 The Court did not consider the possibility of an asset 
incapable of any resale or redemption at all. P2P notes, however, are 
quite different from the typical security, where value fluctuates in part 
with its potential sale price. Lack of a secondary market tends to imply 
family resemblance because it makes the note less of a typcal security, 
so P2P platforms may not have had “common trading.” Although it is 
clear that the notes were initially offering to the broad public, it is not 
clear that P2P satisfied the Reves common trading prong.191 
The SEC may argue that it issued the Order shortly after Prosper 
announced its intention to develop the secondary market for P2P 
notes,192 and that the agency was only responding to the notes’ 
 
 188 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 189 Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
756 F.2d 230, 240 (1985).  
 190 Reves, 494 U.S. at 68 (referencing United States v. Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. 
681 (1985) to explain that “stock of closely held corporation not traded on any 
exchange held to be a ‘security’ ” because only need “offer[] and s[ale] to a broad 
segment of the public” to “establish ‘common trading’ in an instrument”) (emphasis 
added); id. (referencing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294-95, 298-300 
(1946) to explain that “units of citrus grove and maintenance contract ‘securities’ 
although not traded on exchange” was considered a security because only need “offer[] 
and s[ale] to a broad segment of the public” to “establish ‘common trading’ in an 
instrument” (emphasis added)); id. (referencing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 
389 (1967) to explain that “nonnegotiable but transferable ‘withdrawable capital 
shares’ in savings and loan association held to be a ‘security’ ” because only need 
“offer[] and s[ale] to a broad segment of the public” to “establish ‘common trading’ in 
an instrument”) (emphasis added); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 337 
(1967) (“[S]hares can be transferred ‘by written assignment accompanied by delivery 
of the appropriate certificate or account book.’ ”). Investors also had a limited right to 
withdraw their investments.  
 191 Cf. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 973 F.2d 51 (2d. Cir. 
1992) (noting lack of common trading in non-security loan participations).  
 192 Platforms operated without secondary trading during their early period, so 
notes were entirely illiquid, at the time.  
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imminent common trading. Certainly once the notes could be traded, 
they are more likely to constitute a security because they are more 
clearly commonly traded. Yet, the Order never expressed conern about 
secondary trading, but instead announced that Prosper had already 
been selling securities. 
The third and fourth Reves factors ask whether investors expect the 
protection of the securities regime, and whether there is some other 
regime to protect them.193 The SEC argued that the character of the 
platform’s advertisement promising a valuable return on invested 
funds and comparing them to money-markets194 demonstrates that the 
public would expect securities protection. While this is true, it is not 
obvious that lenders expected the distinctive protections of the SEC. If 
P2P lending consumers expected protection under the Securities Acts, 
they have been slow to invoke it. There have been no private securities 
actions against P2P platforms, before or after the Order, with the 
exception of one suit focusing on the sale of unregistered securities.195 
Prosper’s notes were also compared to depository products over 
which the SEC has no jurisdiction. P2P investors may have expected 
or preferred the protection of a bank regulator. As another alternative, 
some lenders likely regarded themselves as lenders, believed that real 
risks of P2P lending come from deadbeat borrowers, and expected that 
their protection would derive from bankruptcy laws and civil suits. 
Accordingly, lenders would expect justice to come from collections 
against the borrower, not disclosure and fraud actions against the 
platform. It may be that lenders expected protection, but outside of 
the securities regime. 
Although there are plausible arguments for applying the securities 
regime to P2P lending, the SEC ignored strong arguments against 
securities characterization. Detailed analysis of P2P lending reveals 
that the SEC overstated its case and reached an unnecessary 
 
 193 Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-67.  
 194 See VERSTEIN, supra note 142, at 27. Compare Goldsworthy v. SEC, No. 3-9339, 
2002 SEC LEXIS 1279, at *24 (noting purchasers may still reasonably expect the 
Securities Acts to protect them, where, among other things, promoter compares return 
to money market return), with David Futrelle, Help Strangers, Earn a Cool 15%, MONEY 
MAG. (Nov. 20, 2006), money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/ moneymag_archive/ 
2006/12/01/8395166/index.htm (stating that in answering the question of why anyone 
would want to lend money to strangers, Prosper CEO Larsen says, “You can earn more 
than you would in a money-market fund”). 
 195 Christian Hellum v. Breyer, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 806-08 (Ct. App. 2011). This 
claim for Securities Act of 1933 Section 12 liability for sale of unregistered securities 
(and related state and federal claims) was predicated on the SEC determination that 
platforms were selling unregistered securities. See id. at 806 . 
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conclusion in subjecting P2P lending to SEC regulation. Despite the 
SEC’s arguments,196 it likely knew that this was a borderline case 
calling for a more nuanced approach. Instead, the SEC likely thought 
securities regulation was appropriate for P2P lending and advanced 
arguments to support that proposition. To bring P2P notes under SEC 
regulation, the SEC first had to identify a party who could be deemed 
the issuer of P2P notes. Issued securities must have been issued by 
someone. P2P borrowers, however, make unattractive issuers, so the 
SEC resorted to denoting the platforms as issuers. This chain of logic 
succeeded in regulating P2P lending, but only by forcing it into the 
wrong regulatory overlay. The implications of this overreach are 
monumentally damaging. 
B. Perverse Consequences of SEC Regulation 
The Securities Acts, as enforced by the SEC, are an ill-fitting 
framework for the P2P industry. What the Securities Acts offer — 
formalistic registration requirements and extensive disclosure — P2P 
consumers do not need. What P2P consumers need are safe and clear 
returns and privacy, which the SEC, by virtue of its mission and 
culture, cannot provide. The P2P market differs dramatically from the 
traditional securities market. Therefore, SEC regulation is unlikely to 
fit P2P lending without causing adverse consequences. This section 
analyzes five problems that emerge from the SEC’s distinctive 
approach. 
1. Formalistic Registration 
Although there are many ways to run a business, there are only a 
few ways to register its securities. The SEC makes registration an 
elaborate process, for which every form is prescribed, in the hope of 
standardizing and controlling registration requests.197 The SEC regime 
intends to protect investors.198 The great irony is that SEC registration 
requirements put P2P lenders in a worse position than they started. 
 
 196 Indeed, the author himself has previously written about the possibility that P2P 
platforms might be made to register as issuers. See VERSTEIN, supra note 142, at 24-31.  
 197 See Securities and Exchange Commission Forms List, supra note 117. 
 198 See Important Information About EDGAR, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/ 
aboutedgar.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2010) (“EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval System, performs automated collection, validation, indexing, 
acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by companies and others who are required 
by law to file forms with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).”) 
(stating SEC’s mission).  
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The SEC strong-armed the P2P platforms out of transactional 
structures that provided superior protection for lenders. 
In the early days of Prosper and Lending Club, the platforms made 
loans to borrowers and assigned those notes to lender-investors.199 
Lenders experienced no credit risk with respect to the intermediary.200 
Now, both platforms use a borrower payment dependent note model 
in which lender-investors hold no ownership or security interest in the 
borrower notes on which the securities depend.201 While P2P lenders 
once had credit exposure only to the underlying borrower, they are 
now unsecured creditors of the intermediary platform. Consequently, 
these lenders now risk platform default, which could leave them vying 
for a share of the P2P notes against other, more senior, creditors. 
P2P investor-lenders’ unsecured status is cemented by Securities Act 
Rule 415. Currently, platforms cannot practicably improve the secured 
status of these investors because they rely on Rule 415’s continuous or 
“shelf” registration, which allows issuers to register a group of 
securities well in advance of their issuance.202 An issuer may anticipate 
needing capital in the future but prefer to register the securities now. 
Under Rule 415, the issuer can register securities now, but not actually 
sell them until later when they “take them off the shelf” on which they 
have been metaphorically waiting. Rule 415 also allows issuers to 
enjoy economies of scale in registration. It is much cheaper to register 
a bundle of securities and then take them off the shelf at intervals 
rather than to begin registration anew with each small security 
issuance. By allowing issuers to sell securities without a new 
 
 199 See, e.g., PROSPER MARKETPLACE, INC., LENDER REGISTRATION AGREEMENT § 5 
(2007), available at http://www.prospers.org/blogs/media/blogs/Fred93/prosper-
mid2007-lra.pdf (“Prosper agrees to sell and you agree to purchase, from time to time, 
without recourse, all Notes resulting from the matching of your bids with listings on 
the Prosper marketplace. . . . Although Prosper will retain the Servicing Rights to all 
loans, you will hold title to, and ownership of, the Notes . . . .”). 
 200 To be sure, lenders have always experienced counterparty risk with respect to 
the platform. That is, lenders would be harmed if the platform discontinued its 
business — they would have to find a new servicing party. But that is true of all 
contractual relationships. Part III, infra, proposes mitigating inconvenience for 
borrowers by requiring platforms to create a “living will.”  
 201 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424/b/3) 2 (July 26, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000141626510000317/ 
prosperprosupp7d26d10.htm (“The Notes are unsecured and holders of the Notes do 
not have a security interest in the corresponding borrower loans or the proceeds of 
those corresponding borrower loans. If Prosper were to become subject to a 
bankruptcy or similar proceeding, the holder of a Note would generally have a general 
unsecured claim against Prosper that may or may not be limited in recovery to such 
borrower payments.”). 
 202 17 C.F.R. 230.415 (2008).  
  
490 University of California, Davis [Vol. 45:445 
registration, Rule 415 makes securities regulation more flexible and 
less costly. 
For registered P2P platforms, shelf registration is absolutely 
essential. Platforms cannot simply sell borrower notes to lender-
investors because the SEC requires platforms to register notes prior to 
sale.203 Conducting a P2P business would be impossible if the platform 
must register each note, or even each set of notes, separately. 
Registration is costly and lengthy. For example, Prosper endured nine 
months to register its first notes.204 Because borrowers look to online 
platforms to obtain loans faster than through traditional bank lending, 
few would be willing to wait for the SEC to approve an individualized 
registration statement. Thus, pre-authorization for platforms is 
imperative to effectuate P2P transactions. 
Similarly, the cost of registering securities is enormous. Due to the 
typically small loan amounts in P2P lending, registration costs would 
dwarf the principal of any individual loan.205 Only by bundling the 
notes into one shelf registration, with a single issuer — the platform 
— using advanced registration can P2P lending remain economically 
feasible. 
The SEC made shelf registration essential to P2P platforms, and 
then leveraged this necessity to force changes in platform operations 
that disadvantage P2P lenders. In the earliest registration statements, 
Prosper intended to originate and sell notes to lenders, who would 
own the loans outright.206 The SEC responded that Prosper’s 
 
 203 See supra Part II.A.1.  
 204 Prosper’s registration statement was deemed effective on July 10, 2009. Prosper 
Marketplace, Inc., Notice of Effectiveness (Form S-1) (July 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/999999999509001898/xslEFFECTX01
/primary_doc.xml. Lending Club ceased its P2P operations for a shorter period — from 
April 2008 until October 2008. See Renaud Laplanche, Lending Club Completes $600 
Million SEC Registration and Offers New Alternative for Consumer Credit, LENDING CLUB 
BLOG (Oct. 14, 2008, 5:00 PM), http://blog.lendingclub.com/2008/10/14/lending-club-
sec-registration/ (stating end of quiet period). Compare LendingClub Corp., Prospectus, 
(Form 424/b/3) (Oct. 13 2008), available at http://www.lendingclub.com/ 
extdata/prospectus.pdf (providing example of early prospectus)Renaud Laplanche, 
Lending Club Goes Quiet, LENDING CLUB BLOG (Apr. 7, 2008, 11:15 PM), 
http://blog.lendingclub.com/2008/04/07/lending-club-goes-quiet/ (notifying community 
of Lending Club quiet period commencement), with Renaud Laplanche, Lending Club 
Goes Quiet, LENDING CLUB BLOG (Apr. 7, 2008, 11:15 PM), http://blog.lendingclub.com/ 
2008/04/07/lending-club-goes-quiet/ (notifying community of Lending Club quiet period 
commencement). 
 205 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 206 See e.g., Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 9 (Oct. 
30, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/ 
000110465907078072/a07-27421_1s1.htm (explaining that “Prosper collects the 
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registration statement failed in “numerous material respects.”207 As a 
result, Prosper had to fundamentally rework its structure, prompting 
the first of two reductions in lender legal status. Specifically, Prosper 
moved to a borrower dependent note model of origination.208 
Prosper sought a lending model that would allow it to shelf register 
notes, which meant using a sole issuer (Prosper) for all issued notes. 
Prosper thus inserted itself as an intermediary. As an intermediary, 
Prosper loaned to borrowers and remained their sole creditor. Prosper 
issued its own notes, for which only itself was liable, though it limited 
its liability to the extent that borrowers have paid. As a result, lenders 
are exposed to the credit risk of the borrower, but also to Prosper. 
Thus, if the platform defaults, it will impair the interests of lenders, 
who are now creditors of the intermediary. Under this new model, 
lenders do not have any special rights to the underlying notes, which 
the platform now owns. The platform could pledge borrower notes for 
debts or even sell them. Likewise, the borrowers could pay in full, but 
lenders may still lose money if Prosper accumulates other substantial 
debts. As a result of this this change, the platform became a credit risk 
to lenders, who are now essentially investors in Prosper, as well as in 
the underlying borrowers. Lenders now have to consider the 
management and financial wellbeing of Prosper for the first time. 
Consequently, Prosper attempted to protect lender interests in the 
underlying borrower notes by giving lenders the equivalent of a 
security interest in those notes. Prosper sought to do this without 
actually providing a traditional security interest. Rather, Prosper 
intended to indirectly provide security interest by giving the indenture 
trustee a security interest.209 This grant would work for the benefit of 
Prosper’s lenders, providing indirect access to a security interest.210 As 
 
Borrower’s payments on the Notes and forwards the payments received, minus any 
applicable fees, to the Lenders who own the Notes”).  
 207 SEC Reply to Prosper’s Registration Statement on Form S-1, SEC (Nov. 1, 2007), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000000000008004978/ 
filename1.pdf.  
 208 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form 
S-1) 2 (Dec. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Prosper Amendment No. 1], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000110465908074769/a08-29602_ 
1s1a.htm. 
 209 Indenture between Prosper Marketplace, Inc. and Wells Fargo Bank, SEC § 6.12 
(May 29, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/ 
000110465909035890/a08-29602_5ex4d2.htm (granting security interest to Wells 
Fargo as trustee); Del. UCC Filing No. 20092301817 (filed on July 17, 2009) 
(granting interest in accounts and proceeds and products in favor of Wells Fargo 
Bank).  
 210 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement (Form 
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such, if Prosper were to default, lenders would retain the right to their 
borrower income streams regardless of Prosper’s other debts. They 
might also retain some claim to their particular borrower notes, as 
against other lenders, rather than just a pro rata share of Prosper’s 
total assets.211 This response would largely mitigate the additional risks 
of intermediation. Lenders’ economic rights and legal protections 
would, thus, be similar to that under Propser’s original, 
disintermediated model. 
However, the SEC could not accept Prosper’s attempts to protect 
lenders. Although the SEC agreed that granting a security interest 
would improve investor protection,212 it remained uncomfortable 
allowing shelf registration where the Prosper notes would be “too 
closely [tied]” to the underlying borrower notes.213 Specifically, SEC 
officials expressed that Proper’s registration would more clearly fit into 
existing regulations and interpretations if Prosper eliminated the 
security interest altogether.214 In a related comment letter (“February 
Comment Letter”), the SEC characterized the notes-plus-security-
interest as “intended to be bankruptcy remote.”215 Although the 
partially secure notes would have been far from bankruptcy remote,216 
 
S-1) 6 (Jan. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Prosper Amendment No. 2], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000110465909002910/a08-29602_ 
1s1a.htm (specifying that “holders of the Notes do not directly have a security interest 
in the corresponding borrower loan,” but that Prosper would “grant the indenture 
trustee, for the benefit of the trustee and the holders of the Notes, a security interest in 
all present and future rights of Prosper to payment under the corresponding borrower 
loans and all moneys and property received by Prosper thereon” (emphasis added)). 
 211 Id. (using the phrase “series of Notes” to refer to the set of Prosper Note sold to 
investors that correspond to a given borrower loan); see also id. at 12 (“We will issue 
the Notes in a series, with each series of Notes dependent for payment on payments 
we receive in a specific borrower loan . . . .”). 
 212 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Letter Regarding Amendment No. 3 to Registration 
Statement (Form S-1) 9 (Apr. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Prosper Letter Regarding 
Amendment No. 3], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/ 
000110465909024058/filename14.htm.  
 213 Id. at 7 (quoting SEC). 
 214 Id. at 9.  
 215 Letter from Todd Schiffman, Assistant Director, SEC, to Edward Giedgowd, 
Esq., Chief Compliance Officer & Gen. Counsel, Prosper Marketplace, Inc., (Feb. 24, 
2009) [hereinafter February Comment Letter], at 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000000000009037656/filename1.pdf. If so, Prosper 
Lenders would have been insulated from Prosper’s credit risk.  
 216 See Prosper Letter Regarding Amendment No. 3, supra note 212, at 6-7, 30 
(arguing that Prosper notes would not be bankruptcy remote because, inter alia, they 
would be impaired or delayed by Prosper’s bankruptcy). One must wonder whether, 
in February 2009, the SEC’s Comment Letters may have been particularly sensitive to 
the attempt to create bankruptcy remote assets due to concern for securitized assets 
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the February Comment Letter concluded on that basis that “it is not 
clear how the offering is a continuous offering under Rule 415.”217 The 
message was clear: reduce lenders’ security interests, or lose essential 
shelf registration. Prosper acceded, disavowing bankruptcy remoteness 
and undermining lender protection.218 
Prosper’s subsequent amendments to its registration statement 
contained far weaker protections for lenders. Any mention of indirect 
security interests was struck.219 Later amendments also removed all 
suggestions that P2P lenders might have priority over other lenders to 
their corresponding borrower.220 Although Prosper and the indenture 
trustee may wish to treat each individual lender as the beneficial 
owner of their corresponding borrower debts,221 the indenture trustee 
may not have the legal power to respect the borrower-specificity of the 
borrower payment dependent notes.222 All lenders might have a pro-
rata interest in the pool of all borrower notes, rather than an interest 
in the borrowers they originally selected. This defies lender 
 
causing havoc elsewhere in the economy, such as the now infamous Collateralized 
Debt Obligations.  
 217 February Comment Letter, supra note 215, at 1.  
 218 See Prosper Letter Regarding Amendment No. 3, supra note 212, at 6, 32-34. 
 219 See Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Amendment No. 4 to Registration Statement 
(Form S-1) 5 (May 29, 2009) [hereinafter Prosper Amendment No. 4], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000110465909035890/a08-29602_ 
5s1a.htm. Cf. Prosper Amendment No. 2, supra note 210, at 2, 6 (“H]olders of the 
Notes do not directly have a security interest in the corresponding borrower loan or 
proceeds of that loan,” but that Prosper would “grant a security interest in all present 
and future rights of Prosper to payment under the corresponding borrower loans and 
all moneys.”) (emphasis added). Prosper struck this emphasized language, which 
invited the possibility of an indirect security interest, in acquiescence to the SEC’s 
wishes that they weaken lenders’ claims. Similarly, the January 16 Amendment 
provided that the trustee’s claim for a given set of lender-held notes would be limited 
to the corresponding borrower loan, not any other borrower loan. This language, too, 
will be struck in later Amendments because of SEC pressure, which provides no 
requirement that the trustee seek to match lender payments to the loans in which they 
believed they invested. See id. at 6. 
 220 Compare Prosper Amendment No. 2, supra note 210, at 19 (explaining that 
“Prosper intend[ed] to grant the indenture trustee a first-priority security interest in 
Prosper’s right to receive payments and in all payments Prosper has received under the 
corresponding borrower loan for that series of Notes.”) (emphasis added), with 
Prosper Amendment No. 4 supra note 219, at 5 (making no reference to the relation of 
a particular series on a corresponding borrower’s security interest). 
 221 Prosper Prospectus, supra note 115, at 86.  
 222 Id. at 83 (“In the event of a bankruptcy or similar proceeding of Prosper, the 
relative rights of the holder of a Note as compared to the holders of other unsecured 
indebtedness of Prosper with respect to payment from the proceeds of the borrower 
loan corresponding to that Note or other assets of Prosper is uncertain.”). 
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expectations and increases uncertainty. It also subsidizes lenders 
whose notes were underperforming at the expense of savvier lenders. 
Security interests matter most when insolvency looms. Currently 
Prosper’s financial status is precarious.223 Prosper’s loan origination 
rate hovers far below any sustainable level.224 Today, Prosper 
continues to suffer large losses each month.225 It also faces a class 
action lawsuit with respect to the sale of unregistered securities.226 
Damages from that suit could exceed $70 million,227 and Prosper’s 
insurance company denies coverage.228 While P2P lending is generally 
viable, Prosper has had to contend with cumbersome regulation and 
the fits and starts of being an innovative venture. 
While Lending Club’s financial prospects are relatively better than 
Prosper’s, it too posted substantial losses for each year of operation.229 
 
 223 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 5 (Sept. 30, 2010) 
[hereinafter Prosper Quarterly Report (Nov. 12, 2010)], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000141626510000490/p10q9d30d2
010.htm (“Prosper has incurred net losses and negative cash flows from operations 
since inception, and has an accumulated deficit of approximately $48.1 million as of 
September 30, 2010.”). 
 224 Prosper now originates about two million per month. Most insiders think that a 
platform requires at least ten times that figure to become viable. See, e.g., Peter 
Renton, Interview with Senior Management at Prosper, SOCIALLENDING NETWORK (Feb. 
8, 2011), http://www.sociallending.net/state-of-the-industry/interview-with-senior-
management-at-prosper/ (quoting Jim Catlin, Prosper Executive Vice President: “I 
think it is safe to say that it will need to be between $20 million and $30 million in 
loans per month depending on the different characteristics of the loans we are doing” 
in order to break even”). 
 225 Prosper Quarterly Report (Sept. 30, 2010), supra note 223, at 5 (“For the three 
and nine months ended September 30, 2010, the Company incurred a net loss of $2.2 
million and $7.5 million, respectively and the Company had negative cash flows from 
operations of $7.3 million.”). 
 226 See Complaint at 1-3, Hellum v. Prosper Marketplace, Inc., CGC-08-482329 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2011). 
 227 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 36 (Dec. 31, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000141626511000224/ 
prosper10k12312010.htm (showing $4.8 million outstanding principal and loans 
charged off of $45 million). Of course, a $49 million judgment would not be a total 
loss; Prosper would come to own the disputed notes. 
 228 See, e.g., Tentative Statement of Decision Regarding Phase I Trial on Duty to 
Defend, Prosper Marketplace, Inc. v. Greennwich Ins. Co., CGC 09-491736 (Cal. Dec. 
14, 2010) (finding exclusion ambiguous and requiring insurer to defend Prosper). The 
insurer’s denial was entirely a result of the SEC’s determination that platforms issue 
securities. Prosper’s coverage excluded actions arising under the 1933 Act. The court 
has since issued a Stipulated Final Judgment in Prosper’s favor, but Greennwhich 
Insurance is appealing.  
 229 Compare Lending Club Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 41 (Oct. 31, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000095012310105612/ 
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As of September 30, 2010, Lending Club earned almost $100 million 
in loans, but also accumulated a deficit of $35.6 million and a 
stockholders’ deficit of $31.5 million. Currently, non-borrower 
investor members continue to supply equity financing,230 
backstopping losses in the hopes of future gains.231 However, better 
financial prospects for the platform do not guarantee better prospects 
for the investor-lenders because Lending Club has not undertaken 
efforts to secure lenders. 
Unfortunately for P2P lenders, Lending Club did not follow 
Prosper’s efforts to secure its lenders by granting a security interest to 
the trustee. Instead, Lending Club retained the right to issue debt 
senior to the lender-investor obligations, secured by the same 
underlying notes.232 Lending Club grants security interests to these 
senior creditors, but not to its lender-investors.233 Likewise, in the 
event of default, Lending Club grants its creditors an irrevocable 
attorney-in-fact to sign the collateral over to themselves, to terminate 
adverse claims and security interests, and otherwise sign Lending 
Club’s name for matters involving the collateral.234 Lending Club 
 
c07844e10vq.htm (“Our net loss for the six months ended September 30, 2010 and 
2009, was $5.5 and $5.7 million, respectively. We have not been profitable since our 
inception, and we may not become profitable.”), with Prosper Quarterly Report supra 
note 223, at 26 (“We … have incurred net losses since our inception. Our net loss was 
$2,223,016 and $7,494,302 for the three and nine months ending September 30, 2010, 
respectively. The net loss for the three and nine months ending September 30, 2009 was 
$2,238,138 and $7,726,455, respectively.”). 
 230 See Renton, supra note 224. 
 231 And those gains may be forthcoming. Lending Club effectuated over $13 
million in loans in December 2010. See Lending Club Statistics, LENDING CLUB, 
https://www.lendingclub.com/info/statistics.action (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).  
 232 See LendingClub Corp., Loan and Security Agreement (Exhibit 10.1) 6 (May 
18, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/ 
000136231009008132/c86041exv10w1.htm; LendingClub Corp., Amended and 
Restated Loan and Security Agreement (Exhibit 10.3) 8 (Oct. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000095013408017739/f41480a3exv
10w3.htm.  
 233 Del. UCC Filing No. 20074115894 (filed on Oct. 30, 2007) (current through 
July 30, 2010) (documenting security interst in in favor offavor of Silicon Valley Bank, 
granting interest in, among other things, accounts, general intangibles, chattel paper, 
negotiable instruments, assets, accounts receivable, and proceeds thereof); Del. UCC 
Filing No. 20080625150 (filed on February 21, 2008 (favoring Gold Hill Venture 
Lending 03, granting interest in collateral including, but not limited to, accounts, 
negotiable instruments, chattel paper, general intangibles, assets, accounts receivable, 
and proceeds thereof; Del. UCC Filing No. 20082955985 (filed on August, 28, 2008) 
(current through July 30, 2010) (granting lien to Wanda Kraikit and eighteen others, 
collateral unspecified). 
 234 LENDING CLUB CORP., SECURED PROMISSORY NOTE NO. 102, at 1 (signed June 18, 
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lenders thus hold completely unsecured claims, and remain junior 
creditors to a rapidly leveraging company. If Lending Club were to 
default, borrower notes would first abate to satisfy senior creditor 
claims, decreasing funds available to repay individual lenders. Most 
lenders likely are unaware of these risks. The disconnect between 
borrower loans and lender interests defies the expectations of a P2P 
user community that sought to cut out the middleman. 
While platform prospectuses warn investors of potential losses from 
platform default, other facets of platform behavior obscure risks to 
lenders.235 Both Prosper and Lending Club estimate risk-adjusted 
returns for lenders, accounting for the probability of borrower default. 
However, neither platform includes the risk of its own default in their 
estimates. While both platforms use algorithms to estimate the loss 
rate from lending to a risky borrower, neither platform assigns any 
risk to lending through a P2P intermediary. Instead, Lenders are 
encouraged to factor the platform out of the equation, leaving lenders 
unaware of the risks associated with platform default. 
There is strong indication that lenders do not appreciate the risks 
involved in P2P lending. Lending Club borrowers with excellent credit 
scores can borrow for as little as 6.02% interest rate.236 After fees, 
lenders receive about 5.35% interest.237 While in some instances it may 
be rational to lend to a credit-worthy borrower at a 5.35% interest rate, 
few investors would agree to be a junior creditor of a web-startup on 
an unsecured basis for 5.35% interest. The risks of such a venture are 
too high for so small a reward. Yet P2P finance essentially asks lenders 
to lend to both the borrower and the startup, in the same note. The 
lender will not be repaid in full if either the borrower defaults or 
Lending Club becomes insolvent. As such, lenders endure the risk of 
borrower and platform default. Accordingly, we would expect P2P 
 
2009) (favoring Mr. Robert Sanderson).  
 235 There are reasons to doubt generally that retail investors benefit from 
disclosure. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 22 (2003) (“We doubt that disclosure is the optimal regulatory 
strategy if most investors suffer from cognitive biases.”). 
 236 Rates & Fees, LENDINGCLUB, http://www.lendingclub.com/public/rates-and-
fees.action (last visited Sept. 28, 2011) (stating that A1 borrowers pay 6.02%, 6.78%, 
or 7.30% APR). Lending Club reports that its average borrower APR is 11.4%. GAO-
11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 9.  
 237 LendingClub charges a 1% fee to lenders of all borrower payments. A 6.02% 
loan with a 1% fee pays the same interest and principal to lenders as a 5.35 % loan 
without any fee. See Fees, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/help/contextual/fees.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (describing calculation of fees lenders pay); How Does 
Lending Club Make Money?, LENDING CLUB, http://www.lendingclub.com/kb/ 
index.php?View=entry&EntryID=90 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).  
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interest rates to reflect both the credit risk on the borrower plus the 
risks of venture financing. In that case, lenders would charge as much 
interest as they would for an unsecured loan to a web startup. For 
example, Lending Club agreed to pay 8% for a three-year loan secured 
by the borrower notes.238 Because Lending Club lenders are exposed to 
vastly more risk than mere borrower default, they should charge 8% 
interest plus a premium for being an unsecured, junior creditor, plus 
whatever premium is appropriate for the underlying borrower. 
However, P2P lenders do not appear to understand these risks or 
impute them into the interest rates they require for use of their 
money.239 
P2P lending was designed to eliminate the middleman and allow 
lenders to transact with borrowers directly. By eliminating the 
middleman, P2P lending removed lender risks of intermediary default. 
SEC regulation, however, forced P2P platforms to act as an 
intermediary between P2P borrowers and P2P lenders. This new 
structure exposes lenders to riskier middlemen than they had in 
traditional banking, because their interests are subordinated to those 
of senior creditors. More surprisingly, SEC regulation may have made 
P2P illegal altogether. P2P lending’s new “borrower payment 
dependent notes” may have constituted illegal off-market, retail swaps 
under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) as a result of the SEC 
Order to Prosper. 240 
Though businesspeople and economists often think about swaps as 
derivatives in which cash flows are exchanged,241 the U.S. Commodity 
 
 238 LENDINGCLUB CORP., SECURED PROMISSORY NOTE NO. 102, supra note 234 at 2-3.  
 239 There is also indication that lenders have a strong preference for making loans 
to self-reported borrower-entrepreneurs. These loans should, at the margin, charge a 
higher interest rate still: lenders are exposed to the platform’s default risk, the 
borrower qua borrower risk, and the business risk. However, lenders are much more 
likely to lend to such borrowers, and at a lower rate. For example, on September 23, 
2010, I examined Prosper loans that were supposed to end in the next two days. I 
found that business loans were almost twice as likely to receive funding than non-
business loans for all categories. 
 240 See Verstein, supra note 200, at app. B (discussing treatment post-Dodd-Frank). 
Although the SEC’s actions may have caused P2P notes to be illegal under the CEA, 
subsequent changes, described later in this subpart, explain why that pernicious result 
is no longer operative. For thoughts and questions related to swaps, I am grateful to 
Kevin Davis and Lanny Schwartz.  
 241 See, e.g., Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L SWAPS & 
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#10 (last visited Sept. 28, 
2011) (“What is a swap? A swap is a bilateral agreement to exchange cash flows at 
specified intervals (payment dates) during the agreed-upon life of the transaction 
(maturity or tenor).”). For example, a firm with fixed income from an investment, and 
costs that vary with the market interest rate, faces a risk that costs might rise above 
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Future Trading Commission (“CFTC”) considers swaps to be 
economically similar to futures contracts and has often treated them 
equivalently,242 so that swaps are subject to the same oversight as 
futures. The CEA makes it unlawful to enter into a futures contract 
except through regulated contract market,243 unless some exemption is 
found. Swap contracts between sophisticated parties are exempt,244 as 
are some swaps involving retail investors.245 However, no general 
exemption is available for swaps involving retail investors, and all 
signs indicate that both Congress and the CFTC consider retail swaps 
subject to the general prohibition on off-exchange transactions.246 
Thus, if P2P notes were swaps, then they were almost certainly retail 
swaps executed off of an exchange, in contravention of the CEA. 
At the time of the SEC’s Order, neither the CEA nor CFTC 
regulations defined futures trading or swaps,247 so it remains uncertain 
 
their income. They might swap their fixed income stream for someone else’s variable 
interest stream, their counterparty happy to obtain fixed income to balance their own 
fixed obligations. They are swapping something in the most ordinary sense of the 
word.  
 242 Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30694-01 (July 
21, 1989) (“Other commenters have stressed that despite these distinctions in the 
manner of trading of swaps and exchange products, the economic reality of swaps 
nevertheless resembles that of futures contracts.”). A contract for A and B to swap 
income streams can be reformulated as a contract for A to deliver its future income 
and for B to deliver in kind. 
 243 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2006).  
 244 Swap agreements between “eligible contract participants,” or ECPs, are 
generally exempt from the CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 27(d)(1) (2006) (defining “covered swap 
agreement” as a swap entered into by ECPs); id. §27(e) (excluding covered swap 
agreements from CEA); id. § 27(f) (preserving enforcability of covered swap 
agreements). ECPs include well-heeled individuals and entities. Commodity Exchange 
Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936); 7 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2006) 
(defining ECP as, among others, individuals having assets exceeding $10 million or, if 
the swaps are executed in the ordinary course of business or risk management, just $1 
million). In addition to statutory exemptions, the CFTC exercised its authority by 
excluding a variety of swaps between “eligible swap participants,” a group that 
similarly excludes retail investors. 17 C.F.R. § 35 (2011). 
 245 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(1) (2006) (swaps involving government securities); id. 
§ 2(c)(2)(B) (swaps involving certain foreign currency futures and options).  
 246 The Commodity Futures Modernization Act required a report to consider the 
appropriate regulatory structure for retail swaps (“Report”). Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 105(c), 114 Stat. 2763. The 
subsequent Report implies that retail swaps are not exempt from the CEA. Rather, the 
Report concludes that, owing to a lack of interest in retail swaps, such retail swaps do 
not warrant legislative change. COMMODY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, SEC, TREASURY & 
FED. RESERVE, JOINT REPORT ON RETAIL SWAPS 1,7,9 (2001). The implication is clear: 
retail swaps are regulated, and demand is insufficient to liberalize the regime.  
 247 Under the swap definition added to the CEA by Dodd-Frank, borrower payment 
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whether P2P notes constituted swaps. However, the CEA did define 
“covered swap agreements”248 to include credit swaps and similar 
swaps based on debt instruments.249 This broad definition seems to 
cover P2P borrower payment dependent notes because P2P notes’ 
values are based on the underlying note. If the borrower does not pay 
the platform, the borrower payment dependent note does not pay the 
lender. It is as though the platform bought a credit default swap on the 
borrower note from the lenders. Consequently, P2P notes may have 
constituted “covered swap agreements” subject to regulation.250 
Because the borrower dependent notes likely constituted swaps, 
they likely were subject to the CEA’s prohibition against off-market 
trading. P2P lending platforms, however, offer notes outside of a 
regulated contract market. Therefore, SEC mandated changes may 
have pushed P2P platforms into non-compliance with the CEA 
following the Order. As a result, P2P platforms had to seek some kind 
 
dependent notes could clearly be called swaps. See Dodd-Frank § 721(a) (21) 
(defining “swap” as “any agreement, contract or transaction . . . that provides for . . . 
payment . . . that is dependent on the occurrence . . . of an event or contingency 
associated with a potential financial, economic or commercial consequence”). Similar 
definitions are found outside of the CEA, prior to Dodd-Frank. See, e.g., Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 § 301 (adding to Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A 
(a)(2) (1999)) (defining swap as agreement that “provides for . . . payment that is 
dependent on the occurrence, non-occurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an 
event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial 
consequence”). But see Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206(A)(b)(5) (1999) (excluding 
note that is security under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, or Section 
3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,). 
 248 7 U.S.C. § 27(d) (2006) (including a credit swap or similar swap based on a 
non-agricultural commodity. An “excluded commodity” is not an agricultural 
commodity). 
 249 Id. § 1a(13). 
 250 If it strikes one as odd that P2P instruments might be “swaps,” one need only 
reflect on the now notorious credit default swaps. 
 250 In these transactions, party A might wish to protect herself against the 
economic risk of default of a given debt instrument. She could pay party B a certain 
amount every period, and B would accept the liability to pay A a sum if the instrument 
were ever to default. B could even pay the default-price up front, for later return if the 
bond never defaults. That account of swap does not fit the lay understanding of swap, 
but financiers recognize it as a typical swap. 
P2P instruments have a meaningful resemblance to credit defaults swaps. The 
platform pays the lender a monthly sum, and the lender agrees to lose the principal 
balance on the underlying note, in the case of default. The only difference is that the 
lender pre-pays the contingent payment so that, in default, she merely loses her right 
to remaining payments. 
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of exemption251 or only offer notes only through a regulated contract 
market. 
These concerns are now historical: Dodd-Frank provides a blanket 
CEA exemption for securities.252 But for more than a year P2P lending 
was forced to operate with teniuous legality under the CEA. Bringing 
P2P platforms into the ambit of the CEA regulation and its 
requirement that futures be traded on a regulated contract market was 
likely an unintended result of SEC regulation. 
2. Mandatory Disclosures 
Advocates for the securities regime have long argued that many 
firms produce too little information for investors and that mandatory 
disclosure can solve an informational market failure.253 Whatever the 
merits of mandatory disclosure for large, publicly traded firms are, 
they do more harm than good in the P2P market. 
While most SEC filings report changes in earnings or executive 
officers, P2P platform filings are overflowing with hundreds of pleas 
for help, promises to be responsible, and kitchen-table financial 
planning.254 The SEC determined that P2P platforms must include all 
material borrower data in public filings. As a result, platforms must 
file these heartfelt or desperate pleas for P2P loans with the SEC. The 
SEC construes materiality broadly, requiring platforms to include all 
borrower information visible on the platform website, no matter how 
trivial.255 Accordingly, personal pleas and human requests appear on 
 
 251 Unless some other exemption were found. 7 U.S.C. § 2(f) (2006) excludes 
qualifying hybrid instruments, instruments with both swap and security qualities. As 
securities, borrower member dependent notes would seem to exhibit substantial 
security qualities. 17 C.F.R. § 34.2 (defining hybrid instruments); 17 C.F.R. § 34.3 
(2011) (excluding hybrid instruments).  
 252 7 U.S.C. § 1b(47)(B)(vii). Yet, at the time of this writing, this provision is still 
not effective, and so swap-related problems are not yet solved by Dodd-Frank. Pub.L. 
111-203, Title VII, §§ 721(a), 754. 
 253 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for Mandatory 
Disclosure, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984) (arguing for mandatory disclosure system). 
 254 Borrowers often attempt to demonstrate their ability to service a loan by 
providing details about their grocery and electricity bills, housing and utility costs, 
expected vacations and home improvements, and more. These lists often come with 
promises to be thrifty and hardworking.  
 255 Letter from Christian Windsor, Special Counsel, SEC, to Renaud Laplanche, 
CEO, LendingClub Corp. (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1409970/000000000008055622/filename1.pdf (“Although, in your August 
1, 2008 letter to the staff, you state that this “information should not be material to a 
lender member’s decision to invest in the notes,” and therefore you are not required to 
include it in your registration statement, your providing it to your members on the 
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the SEC’s EDGAR webpage.256 As an example from a recent filing, a 
borrower, called bonus-marauder0, shares that she needs a loan 
because: 
[F]amily expenses with my elderly mother and uncle have 
been sudden and unexpected . . . . I don’t have the immediate 
cash on hand therefore, I am seeking out this loan to help with 
the cost for the family so their needs to [sic] not go unmet, 
[sic] exspecially since they are both senior citizens and unable 
to adequately meet these expenses on their own.257 
In that same filing, we learn that another borrower, magnetic-
dedication3, pays $97 per month for his mobile phone,258 and that “a 
partner at a major national law firm” wishes to buy an engagement 
ring.259 Such “soft” information rarely appears in public filings. It is 
impossible that filing this information serves the important functions 
contemplated by a regime of periodic filing. 
Further, the requirement to file borrowers’ narrative and 
biographical data is repetitive because such information is already 
publicly available on the platform webpage. If these details really are 
material, lenders already have up-to-the-minute access.260 Lenders 
make extensive use of the platform’s information and the data analysis 
tools described above. By contrast, the SEC admits that few people use 
EDGAR to access information about P2P investments.261 
Moreover, SEC disclosure requirements are costly.262 Prosper spent 
about $2.8 million on professional services fees in 2009, largely 
 
Lending Club website implies to a lender member that it is material to a decision to 
invest in the notes.”); see also Letter from Christian Windsor, Special Counsel, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, to Edward Giedgowd, Chief Compliance Officer & Gen. Counsel, 
Prosper Marketplace, Inc. 2 (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000000000009037655/filename1.pdf. 
 256 Important Information About EDGAR, supra note 198.  
 257 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424/b/3) (Jan. 28, 2011), available 
at http://www.secinfo.com/d1B726.q2z.htm (Borrower Payment Dependent Notes 
Series 492101). 
 258 Id. (Borrower Payment Dependent Notes Series 492089). 
 259 Id. (Borrower Payment Dependent Notes Series 492131).  
 260 To be sure, it can be valuable to archive information. For example, it may be 
important for litigation to know what was said about a loan at the time it was sold. 
EDGAR serves this purpose. See GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 
15, at 26. However, there are other ways to accomplish this end. See Verstein, supra 
note 202, app. B. 
 261 See GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 26. 
 262 SEC disclosure requirements may also risk the borrower’s privacy. See infra Part 
II.B.4.  
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comprised of expenses related to registration.263 Now that their 
registration statements are effective, Prosper and Lending Club must 
still register each borrower loan request before they offer it to 
investors. As a practical matter, this means that the platforms file two 
to three times per business day.264 
The results are astonishing. Prosper tendered about 1700 separate 
filings to the SEC in the last four years — more than General 
Motors.265 Lending Club generated about 3200 filings, which is almost 
double Yahoo and Amazon combined!266 The platforms have largely 
automated this process, but compliance costs remain high. For 
example, a recent Prosper quarterly filing reported $700,000 in 
professional services expenses for a three-month period.267 
Are lenders getting their money’s worth from these costs? Likely 
not. First, as discussed above, lenders seem unable to integrate 
disclosed risks into their risk pricing. Instead, they lend to platforms 
at a rate that implies that they are not aware of platform credit risk.268 
Worse yet, disclosure can actually help firms to bury the truth or 
confuse those unaccustomed to reading capital markets documents. 
 
 263 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 66, 69 (Mar. 31, 2010), 
available at http://www.prosper.com/Downloads/Legal/prosper10k123109%20(3.31. 
2010%20final).pdf. (showing that Prosper spent about $2.8 million on professional 
services, up 37% from 2008, attributable to litigation and registration); see also Robert 
Schmidt & Jesse Westbrook, An Online Lender Takes on the SEC, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 10, 2010, 5:00 PM EST), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
magazine/content/10_25/b4183025376406.htm (“Prosper had spent $4 million, even 
shutting down for nine months, to comply with SEC rules. Larsen claims the company 
now spends more than $1 million annually on legal fees and audits, and makes more 
public disclosures—about two a day—than almost any other company.”). 
 264 See Prosper Marketplace Inc., Prospectus (Form 424/b/3), supra notes 257. 
 265 Compare Online search for Prosper Marketplace, Full-Text Search, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 30, 2011), http://searchwww.sec.gov/EDGARFSClient/jsp/ 
EDGAR_MainAccess.jsp (yielding about 1700 filings in the last four years), with 
Online search for General Motors, Full-Text Search, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 
30, 2011), http://searchwww.sec.gov/EDGARFSClient/jsp/EDGAR_MainAccess.jsp 
(yielding 1400 filings in the last four years). 
 266 Compare Online search for LendingClub, Full-Text Search, SEC (Jan. 30, 2011), 
http://searchwww.sec.gov/EDGARFSClient/jsp/EDGAR_MainAccess.jsp (yielding abou 
3200 filings in the last four years), with http://searchwww.sec.gov/EDGARFSClient/ 
jsp/EDGAR_MainAccess.jsp (yielding 900 filings in the last four years), and Online 
search for Amazon, Full-Text Search, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 30, 2011), 
http://searchwww.sec.gov/EDGARFSClient/jsp/EDGAR_MainAccess.jsp (yielding 900 
filings in the last four years). 
 267 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 2 (Nov. 12, 2010), 
available at http://www.prosper.com/Downloads/Legal/Q3%202010%2010-Q%209.30. 
2010.pdf. 
 268 See supra Part II.B.1. 
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Notwithstanding the SEC’s passion for disclosure, the Supreme Court 
remarked that “an avalanche of trivial information . . . is hardly 
conducive to informed decision making.”269 Mandated disclosure can 
also lend a veneer of regulatory legitimacy, defusing critical 
suspicions. Notwithstanding pronouncements to the contrary,270 many 
investors assume that the federal government has vetted SEC-
registered firms, or that firms’ claims have been proven true or safe.271 
When a P2P platform estimates a lender’s predicted returns and links 
the investor to a prospectus, the prospectus may not foster the 
intended cautionary effect. Rather, regulatory filings may serve to 
suggest that the estimate is accurate, official, and not misleading. 
Thus, SEC disclosure may give lenders false confidence in P2P 
platforms. 
Securities disclosure requirements concentrate on the interstice of 
government and security issuer. The SEC vets language in an issuer’s 
prospectus and registration registration. But, the SEC does not 
evaluate issuers’ everyday interactions with investors. While a 
prospectus requires “plain English,”272 there is no such requirement 
for platforms’ popup advertisements. Neither endorsements from 
affiliate-blogs nor optimistic promises on the company’s own webpage 
are likely to be noticed by the SEC, let alone trigger an enforcement 
action. 
Crucially the SEC disclosure regime does not provide guidance or 
standardization for platform claims regarding past and future P2P 
investor profits.273 Instead, platforms remain free to derive these 
figures however they please, so long as platforms adequately disclose 
their methods.274 The SEC requires disclosures of information that is 
of little use to lenders — lengthy prospectuses and EDGAR versions of 
“soft” borrower data that merely recite information available on the 
 
 269 TSC Indus. Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976).  
 270 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.501(b)(7) (2011) (“Neither the Securities and Exchange 
Commission nor any state securities commission has approved or disapproved of 
these securities or determined if this prospectus is truthful or complete. Any 
representation to the contrary is a criminal offense.”); Prosper Marketplace, Inc., 
Prospectus (Form 424/b/3) 1 (Feb. 16, 2011) http://www.prosper.com/downloads/ 
Legal/Prosper_Prospectus_2011-02-16.pdf.  
 271 Coolclay, Comment to Peer 2 Peer Lending?, FRIHOST.COM, http://www.frihost.com/ 
forums/vt-122748.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (“My biggest concern was that of the 
company dissolving, but they are registered with the SEC . . . .”). 
 272 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (a), (d) (2011).  
 273 See GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 47. 
 274 See id. (“The disclosure-based approach allows LendingClub and Prosper to 
report on loan performance and returns on investment differently.”). 
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platform’s web page. Nevertheless, the SEC has no formatting or 
clarity requirement for the information that could reveal costly errors, 
such as estimates of past returns.275 The disconnect between lender 
needs and SEC requirements strongly implies a regulatory mismatch 
and should prompt regulatory change. 
3. Difficulty of Private Enforcement 
Securities enforcement relies heavily on private enforcement, which 
is unlikely to be effective for problems with P2P lending. Assume that 
P2P platforms tempted lenders to invest by promising dizzying returns 
bolstered by vigilant underwriting and collections. If returns are poor 
and the platform fails to perform, will the Securities Acts be useful to 
lenders? Plaintiffs’ lawyers play a vital role in securities lawsuits by 
policing issuer compliance. Despite plaintiffs’ lawyers vigilance 
elsewhere, damages in securities lawsuits are likely too small in the 
P2P market to tempt plaintiffs or their attorneys to bear the costs of a 
lawsuit. 
This is true for two reasons. First, assembling a class of P2P lenders 
sufficient for a class action lawsuit would likely be difficult.276 
Questions of fact and law will differ, as will the interests of the class 
members. As P2P platforms adjust their business practices, plaintiffs 
with distinct complaints emerge. Note assignees from the unregistered 
years at Prosper could not be represented alongside a recent class, 
which would complain about some recent material misstatement. 
These parties would involve different arguments and interests, but 
would compete for the same limited funds of the platform. Without 
the power to form a large class, plaintiffs will struggle to secure a 
lawyer to represent the class for small per-plaintiff damages. 
Even where P2P lenders could establish a class, it is difficult to 
justify remedies of any tempting size. Punitive damages generally are 
not available in securities fraud lawsuits, so any damages must be 
compensatory. Moreover, plaintiffs must show actual damages that do 
not include lost profits.277 While many P2P investors feel that their 
 
 275 The SEC believes that it could provide guidance on how companies should 
report their performance, but it has expressed concerns about the cost of such 
requirements relateive to their benefits, as well as the cost to the SEC of proposing 
such rules. See id.  
 276 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (listing prerequisites necessary for class members to file 
suit). 
 277 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006); see also 
Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The measure 
of damages in a Rule 10b-5 case is limited to actual pecuniary loss suffered by the 
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returns are much lower than platforms promised, or that platforms did 
not honor the terms of their agreement, the majority of platform 
investors nevertheless experience positive returns.278 Most investors 
who lose principal do so at a trivial percentage.279 The minority who 
lose an appreciable percentage of their investment still lose a relatively 
small amount in absolute terms. 
Perhaps those difficulties in forming an effective class explain why 
the only lawsuits against P2P platforms concern the sale of 
unregistered securities.280 Such small losses may also explain why 
Prosper settled with state regulators for so little money.281 None of 
these lawsuits, however, charge the kinds of misdealing or fraud that 
some critics allege. The absence of such suits — even strike suits282 — 
implies that the securities laws cannot reduce present or future abuses. 
Thus, a better system would not rely on private plaintiffs to vindicate 
their interests in the P2P marketplace. Instead, platforms should 
appear before regulators, periodically or after consumer complaints, 
who could press for the welfare of all users.283 
 
defrauded party, and does not include any speculative loss of profits.”). 
 278 See, e.g., ERIC’S CREDIT COMMUNITY, http://www.ericscc.com/stats/lender-return-
distribution (last visited Aug. 7, 2011) (revealing Prosper investors’ return 
distribution).  
 279 See id. Even Prosper’s pre-registration days, when underwriting was much 
weaker, does not significantly weigh down the returns of investors. The average net 
annualized returns on Prosper from October 2008, to March 31, 2011, are negative 
3%. GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 9. That is quite poor, 
but an average loss of 3% of small portfolios is not a large absolute loss.  
 280 See, e.g., Christian Hellum v. Breyer, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(involving claim against Prosper for sale of unregistered securities in violation of 
Section 12 and Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933); Prosper Marketplace Inc. Enters 
Settlement with State Securities Regulators Over Sales of Unregistered Securities, N. AM. 
SEC. ADMIN. ASS’N (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.nasaa.org/5622/prosper-marketplace-
inc-enters-settlement-with-state-securities-regulators-over-sales-of-unregistered-
securities/ (describing state regulators suit).  
 281 See, e.g., News Release, Dep’t of Consumer & Bus. Servs., State Securities 
Regulators Settle with Prosper Marketplace over Unregistered Securities (Dec. 5, 
2008), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DCBS/docs/news_releases/2008/nr_12_5_ 
08_prosper.pdf?ga=t (announcing $1m settlement, total, for all participating states ). 
 282 Strike suits are largely meritless lawsuits brought with the intention of 
obtaining a settlement favorable to the plaintiff and their counsel rather than curing a 
wrong of the corporation. See, e.g., Rivera v. Clark Melvin Sec. Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 
280, 287 (D. P.R. 1999) (defining “strike suit”). 
 283 See infra Part III.  
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4. No Mandate to Help Borrowers 
The SEC sees its mandate as protecting retail investors and 
promoting capital formation.284 There is no mandate to protect 
borrowers. Typically, investees do not need protection from investors, 
but P2P borrowers are not ordinary investees.285 The SEC’s 
unidirectional focus on investors deprives platforms of the ability to 
balance their two constituencies — lenders and borrowers. 
As previously discussed, P2P lending contemplates tradeoffs 
between borrower privacy and lender information.286 P2P platforms 
may require borrowers to publicly share an unusual degree of personal 
and financial information as a function of the platforms’ marketing 
efforts. In providing this information, borrowers risk having their 
identity discovered or their information harvested by identity thieves. 
Some platforms even encourage borrowers to share information with 
their online network, leveraging social capital through community, in 
the search for credit. This information sharing increases the risks that 
stem from borrower-lender interaction, and warrants borrower 
protections. 
Rather than helping to calibrate protections between legitimate 
borrower and lender needs, the SEC ossifies a ruthlessly pro-lender 
bias for P2P disclosure. For example, imagine that a borrower 
provided personally identifying information in her listing.287 Borrower 
information available on the platform is now filed with the SEC and 
posted on EDGAR. When the listing appears on EDGAR, the platform 
has no power to amend or redact it — even if the borrower receives 
harassment on the basis of the disclosure. A commonsense solution 
would be to pull the filing from EDGAR, but retain records in case the 
 
 284 See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, “A QUESTION OF INTEGRITY: PROMOTING INVESTOR 
CONFIDENCE BY FIGHTING INSIDER TRADING” AT THE “S.E.C. SPEAKS” CONFERENCE, SEC 
(Feb. 27, 1998), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/ 
spch202.txt (“Investor protection is our legal mandate. Investor protection is our 
moral responsibility. Investor protection is my top personal priority.”); The Investor’s 
Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2011) (“The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate 
capital formation.”) . 
 285 The average amounts borrowed on Prosper and Lending Club were $5,886 and 
$9,980, respectively. GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 10. 
These are small borrowers with typical consumer borrowing needs. Id.  
 286 See supra Part I.C. 
 287 The GAO found cases where borrowers could be identified from information 
available on EDGAR, such as their employer, job title, or city. GAO-11-613 PERSON-
TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 31. 
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original text proves important in the future. Yet, there is no basis for 
doing this under the securities regime. In fact, the filing becomes a 
permanent public record. 
Rather than address nuanced privacy concerns, the SEC addresses 
borrowers only to the extent necessary to push P2P lending into the 
scope of federal securities fraud liability. In a comment letter regarding 
Lending Club’s registration statement, the SEC requested Lending 
Club’s opinion regarding potential borrower securities fraud liability 
for statements made in their listings. For example, borrowers might lie 
about their expenses, or their religious devotion, to make themselves a 
more attractive candidate. Would they be subject to liability under 
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which allows a 
private right of action under the securities laws, for such 
misstatements?288 Surprisingly, Lending Club acknowledges that the 
loan postings and borrower member information will be subject to 
rule 10b-5.289 The SEC accepted Lending Club’s response, requiring 
Lending Club to indicate in its prospectus that investors’ recourse 
against borrowers will be extremely limited.290 That is, the SEC 
required Lending Club to warn lenders that they might recover little in 
their lawsuits against borrowers, but the SEC did not require any 
warning to borrowers that they were subject to federal anti-fraud 
lawsuits for their representations. 
Though P2P lender recourse is limited under Rule 10b-5, the 
securities regime imposes further harms on borrowers. Borrower 
listings often include statements like “I intend to use this money to fix 
my roof,” or “I am an avid cyclist.” Despite the dissimilarity between 
P2P listing statements and traditionally filed information, the SEC 
categorically requires platforms to file these borrower statements.291 
 
 288 Letter from Christian Windsor, Special Counsel, SEC, to Renaud Laplanche, 
CEO, LendingClub Corp. 2 (July 18, 2008) available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000000000008052460/filename1.pdf. Rule 10b-5 makes 
it unlawful to make an untrue statement of material fact, or to omit such a fact, in 
connection with the sale of a security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 289 LendingClub Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 9 (Aug. 1, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000095013408013885/ 
filename16.htm. 
 290 See LendingClub Corp., Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-
1) 2 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/ 
000000000008052461/filename1.pdf. 
 291 Lending Club intended to not include soft borrower information because, it 
said, such information should not be material to a lender’s decision to invest in the 
notes. See LendingClub Corp., Registration Statement, supra note 289, at 15. The staff 
responded, “[Y]our providing it to your members on the Lending Club website 
implies to a lender member that it is material to a decision to invest in the notes.” See 
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Further, if the borrower is not really an avid cyclist, she may be liable 
under Rule 10b-5, like an executive who falsifies earnings in an annual 
filing. Accordingly, the SEC extended the federal fraud regime, with its 
onerous procedures and pro-plaintiff reliance standard, to include 
such soft informational misstatements. Borrowers do not benefit from 
this expanded jurisdiction; instead they gain new liabilities. Likewise, 
P2P platforms pass on some increased costs of registration to 
borrowers, who now pay higher interest rates and fees. Likewise, 
many more borrowers are now rejected for loan applications, 
particularly subprime borrowers who had difficulty attracting lenders. 
The SEC’s disregard for borrower needs frustrated the “open market 
loan” plan Prosper once intended to implement. Under that program, 
financial institutions with sympathetic background facts (e.g., a small 
credit union in a rural county) could have brought loans from their 
balance sheet to the P2P platform, where investors could bid for 
interests in them.292 This program would have brought liquidity to 
small lenders at a time when it was sorely lacking, and would have 
done so in a more transparent manner than the alternative, pooled-
asset securitizations. Lenders would have enjoyed a wider selection of 
investments, and borrowers from financial institutions would have 
found readier access to loans from newly liquid lenders. Open market 
loans, as Propser proposed them, would have presented meaningful 
risks as well as significant opportunities. 
Rather than weigh the risks against the opportunities, the SEC 
disallowed open market loans by terse formalism. In a Comment 
Letter to Prosper’s Amendment No. 1, the SEC asserted that financial 
institutions offering notes on Prosper are co-issuers or co-
registrants.293 As such, the SEC took the position that open market 
loans would constitute asset-backed securities. Regulation AB of the 
1933 Act and 1934 Act defines an “asset-backed security” as a 
“security that is primarily serviced by the cash flows of a discrete pool 
of receivables or other financial assets . . . that by their terms convert 
into cash within a finite time period . . . .”294 The SEC staff stated that 
the original loan, purchased by Prosper from another financial 
institution and then linked to borrower payment dependent notes, is 
“the pool.”295 The selling financial institution would be transferring 
 
Letter from Christian Windsor, Special Counsel, SEC, to Renaud Laplanche, CEO, 
supra note 255. 
 292 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Registration Statement, supra note 206, at 16. 
 293 SEC Reply to Prosper’s Registration Statement on Form S-1, supra note 208, at 2. 
 294 17 C.F.R. § 229.1101(c)(1) (2011).  
 295 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement, supra 
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assets to the pool and would, therefore, be deemed a co-issuer.296 
Thus, the selling financial institution would be an issuer of the 
borrower payment dependent notes. As such, the institution would be 
exposed to the registration costs and potential liability under the 
securities regime. 
Importantly, the SEC argued that open market offerings would not 
qualify for shelf registration (Rule 415 continuous offerings), meaning 
that each loan would require a unique registration and prospectus, 
which would add significant expenses to open market loans. No small 
bank partner would bear this cost in order to sell loans. As a result, 
Prosper soon gave up on open market loans altogether.297 
Prosper’s arguments for open market loans paralleled the idea that 
P2P notes are generally not securities, so it is not surprising that the 
SEC rejected them. The SEC’s rejection of open market loans 
precluded a potentially valuable activity through mechanical 
application of securities regulations. Ideally, a P2P lending regulator 
would have examined the needs and capacities of open market lending 
participants in deciding whether to allow novel transactions, subject to 
best-practices and oversight. The SEC does not evaluate investments 
based on their merits, and therefore was not in a position to consider 
those issues. Nor, if it were, would its mandate specifically urge the 
SEC to promote borrower welfare. The structure of the P2P market is 
not so much a function of the needs and capabilities of market 
participants as it is the needs and capabilities of the regulators. 
5. The Cliff Effect: Disperate Treatment for Similar Risks 
Regulation under the Securities Acts creates a cliff effect where some 
regulated firms face steep compliance burdens but relatively similar 
firms can avoid all SEC oversight.298 Firms that are not issuers face no 
 
note 210, at 2, 3-4. 
 296 17 C.F.R. § 230.191 of the Securities Act of 1933 (2006) (Providing that the 
depositor for the asset-backed securities will be considered an issuer for those asset-
backed securities, and incorporating the Item 1101 defintion of “depositor.”); 17 
C.F.R. § 229.1101(e) (“Depositor means the depositor who receives or purchases and 
transfers or sells the pool assets to the issuing entity.” (emphasis added)). 
 297 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Amendment No. 4 to Registration Statem, supra note 
221, at 10-12.  
 298 See Gelpern & Davis, supra note 21, at1253 (“The current regime also has a 
discontinuous structure that is prone both to over- and under-regulating hybrids. At 
the extreme, if a ‘peer funder’ collects just 1 percent interest, it may be entitled to the 
full range of costly disclosure, registration, and anti-fraud protections of the U.S. 
securities laws; in contrast, collecting no interest would make the transaction exempt. 
This is so even if, in both cases, the ultimate ‘peer borrower’ pays interest to its 
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registration requirements at all, even if they pose identical risks to 
investors’ finances. P2P lending gives a unique window into this 
discontinuity. On one hand, heartland P2P platforms face substantial 
compliance burdens similar to traditional public company issuers, 
despite posing different risks and having different needs than most 
issuers. On the other hand, however, Prosper and Lending Club are 
quite similar to Kiva, a P2P platform that need not comply with the 
securities laws. This analysis considers the ways in which the 
Securities regime treats unlike things alike, and like things differently. 
The SEC requires regulated P2P firms to comply with its 
requirements and obtain approval in the same manner as other 
regulated firms — yet P2P firms involve significantly distinct 
innovation and needs than other firms. Among regulated firms, 
formally equal treatment may not be equal in practice. Take the initial 
public offering (“IPO”) for example. SEC scrutiny of an IPO has no set 
deadline and can take months to complete.299 Most firms accept this 
delay because the IPO is once-in-a-lifetime for a firm, and its benefits 
are worth a one-time delay. Firms refrain from selling securities in the 
post-filing, pre-effective period.300 In the meantime, they can continue 
to operate their businesses. 
By contrast, P2P platforms are completely inert while they await 
registration effectiveness. P2P platforms sell notes that the SEC has 
deemed securities. Prior to registration, platforms cannot sell these 
notes,301 meaning that platforms cannot do business before 
registration. Thus, Prosper’s business came to a complete halt during 
the pre-effective periods following the Order. The delay lasted over 
eight months.302 During the prolonged SEC interrogation, Prosper, the 
market-leader, lost momentum, from which it may never recover.303 
 
intermediary at 20 percent, and each funder gets a legal and binding promise to repay 
the principal and a glossy brochure touting a history of over 95 percent repayment 
rates.”). 
 299 While it may appear that a registration statement becomes automatically 
effective a mere 20 days after filing under the Securities Act of 1933§ 8(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 77(h) et seq., (2006), the reality is more convoluted. See HAZEN, FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAWS 26 n.62 (2003).  
 300 See Securities Act of 1933 §5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1).  
 301 Id. 
 302 Compare Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Notice of Effectivness, CIK: 
0001416265 File No.: 333-147019 (July 13, 2009) available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1416265/999999999509001898/xslEFFECTX01/primary_doc.xml 
(indicating registration effective in July of 2009), with Prosper Marketplace, Inc., 
Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Dec. 5, 2008) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000110465908074769/a08-29602_ 
1s1a.htm (showing that first amended registration statement filed in December of 
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SEC regulation continues to present difficulties for P2P platforms 
even beyond the registration statement’s effective date. The securities 
laws require platforms to amend registration whenever their business 
substantially changes. Most small businesses, however, do not have to 
worry about such amendments. If an ordinary consumer lender wishes 
to halve or double its collections budget, it may do so without 
regulatory approval or advance public disclosure. This is true even if 
the consumer lender is a publicly held company.304 By contrast, a P2P 
platform would find itself selling securities with a prospectus that did 
not reflect the change. Governed by the securities regime, changes to 
securities require a new S-1 post-effective amendment before an issuer 
may employ a new business approach.305 As young, innovative 
businesses, P2P platforms must decide whether a marginal business 
improvement warrants the difficulties of completing an S-1 
amendment; thus, the SEC hampers the almost continual adjustment 
and experimentation that is vital to new businesses such as P2P 
platforms. 
Once a platform files an amendment to report a contemplated 
change, the plan becomes available in the public domain for others to 
adopt or criticize. Seasoned issuers are accustomed to some degree of 
intrusiveness, but smaller companies usually have the freedom to 
experiment with business models before revealing their plans to the 
world at large. Only P2P firms are called to register with the SEC at 
such a premature stage. Moreover, even traditional public company 
lenders need not disclose details of their underwriting standards. P2P 
platforms, however, must explain exactly what comprises each interest 
rate assessment to comply with disclosure requirements regarding 
estimates and ratings methodology. While such transparency may 
 
2008). 
 303 Prior to registration, Prosper originated about $5 million in loans per month, 
and is only now returning to those levels. GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, 
supra note 15, at 7. By contrast, Lending Club moved more swiftly through 
registration and now originates about $20 million per month. LENDINGSTATS.COM, 
http://www.lendstats.com/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).  
 304 A large enough change, such as a bylaw amendment to discontinue collections, 
would require a reporting issuer to file a Form 8-K. See SEC Current Report (Form 8-
K), Item 5.03, at 16-17, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (last 
visted Nov. 11, 2011). However, budgeting for loan recovery should not arise to that 
level.  
 305 See, e.g., Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Post-Effective Amendment No. 5 (Form S-
1) (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/ 
000141626511000131/prosperposam52d15d11.htm (listing “Changes in our interest 
rates” as the only purpose for which a Post-Effective Amendment was filed).  
  
512 University of California, Davis [Vol. 45:445 
benefit investors, it both tempts borrowers to manipulate the system 
and invites free-riding by competitors.306 
The costs and delays from SEC regulation of P2P lending resulted in 
a substantial reduction in the number of P2P platforms. The United 
Kingdom’s leading P2P platform abandoned its efforts to grow into the 
United States after the SEC issued its Order to Prosper.307 Several other 
American P2P platforms folded,308 or at least ceased P2P operations,309 
including several platforms that intended to assist with student 
loans.310 At a time when P2P companies are multiplying in the United 
Kingdom and around the world,311 the US market remains 
conspicuously barren.312 The SEC treated P2P platforms equally to all 
 
 306 A borrower seeking a loan can see precisely what details affect the success of 
prior applicants, and she can design her request accordingly. Some borrowers may use 
this information to perpetrate more successful fraud. A competitor firm can also read 
deeply into the platform’s strategy. Though investors may find the prospectus difficult 
to navigate, to a competitor, the platform’s filings read like a road map to the P2P 
business. Disclosing loan information and underwriting criteria provides benchmarks 
to competitors and lower barriers to entry into the market. 
 307 Zopa closed its U.S. operations in October 2008. Savaroony, Zopa U.S., ZOPA 
BLOG (Oct. 9, 2008, 12:13 PM), http://blog.zopa.com/archives/2008/10/09/zopa-us/ 
(explaining that “the US has been adversely affected in a way that just couldn’t have 
been predicted when we launched int he [sic] US and is no way the fault of our 
partners” and that “[f]or us, a real shame is that we weren’t able to launch the original 
model over there for regulatory reasons”). 
 308 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 144. 
 309 See, e.g., IOU Central, Inc., Request for Withdrawal of Registration (Form S-1) 
(Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1463888/ 
000119312510065910/drw.htm (requesting withdrawl of registration). 
 310 See, e.g., Larry Chiang, Profile, FOUND READ, http://startitup.indieword.com/ 
person/4091-larrychiang (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (stating that Duck9 provides P2P 
loans to students); Duck9, http://www.duck9.com/register.html (last visited Nov. 11, 
20111) (links to information about P2P loan no longer lead to P2P information, they 
lead to main site); Fynanz Halts P2P Lending: Markets Student Loan Platform to Credit 
Unions, PROSPER LENDING REV. (Jan. 3, 2009), available at http://prosperlending. 
blogspot.com (“[T]the first peer-to-peer lender focused exclusively on students, has 
halted all peer-to-peer lending.”); P2P Lending to Students With Duck9: Heard of It?, 
PERSONAL LOAN PORTFOLIO (Feb. 3, 2008), http://www.personalloanportfolio.com/ 
67/p2p-lending-to-students-with-duck9-heard-of-it/ (inquiring about Duck9 providing 
P2P loans to students).  
 311 See, e.g., RATESETTER, http://www.ratesetter.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) 
(providing P2P services in UK); QUACKLE (UK) www.quakle.co.uk/home.do (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2011) (same); YES-SECURE, http://www.yes-secure.com/ (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2011) (same). 
 312 See, e.g., Tom Abate, State Lets Prosper.com Resume Lending Money, SFGATE.COM 
(Apr. 28, 2009), http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-28/business/17193540_1_peer-to-
peer-lending-lending-club-chief-executive-renaud-laplanche (noting that Jim Bruene, 
publisher of Online Banking Report and expert internet banking expert says, 
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traditional issuers, imposing no greater burden than for other types of 
firms. However, the SEC ignored the nuances of P2P’s innovative and 
peculiar structure. In this climate, many P2P platforms have found it 
difficult to compete and grow. 
While the travails of securities regulation fall heavily on the 
regulated P2P platforms, not all P2P firms must comply. P2P firms 
that avoid issuer characterization avoid all meaningful oversight, even 
though they pose risks similar to the regulated platforms. Consider the 
case of Kiva.313 
More than any other platform, Kiva has inspired millions.314 For as 
little as $25, lenders can make a difference in the life of an 
entrepreneur in the developing world.315 Lenders can sort by gender, 
industry and country. They may discover a women’s cooperative 
grocery store in Paraguay hoping to buy their stock for the season,316 a 
Palestinian street performer in need of a new musical instrument,317 or 
a Mongolian taxi driver who needs about $400 to buy parts.318 Each 
borrower profile page includes a compelling story and a terrific 
photograph, prepared by Kiva’s field partners. As an instant media 
darling,319 Kiva has been endorsed by Oprah, Adrian Grenier, and Bill 
Clinton.320 
 
“Assuming all these regulatory woes get behind us it could grow into a multibillion 
(dollar) industry but it’s still a niche”); Ronald Ingram, The P2P Lending Landscape, 
GPLUS (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.glgroup.com/News/The-P2P-Lending-Landscape-
51458.html (“The US presents one of the most challenging regulatory environments. 
The constraints of U.S. regulation are stifling financial innovation. Bureaucracy and 
regulatory complexity have forced P2P lenders in Canada and especially the US to 
invest prodigiously in legal research, restrict availability to select customers and to 
compromise the integrity of their business models by trying to squeeze them into 
narrow outdated regulatory confines.”). 
 313 See Davis & Gelpern, supra note 298, at 1241, 1253. 
 314 Indeed, while this section uses Kiva to illustrate the blindspots in our regulatory 
regime, there is no intent to downplay the tremendous good Kiva appears to have 
done.  
 315 Sometimes the “developing world” is one’s own backyard. Kiva now makes 
loans to the U.S. gulf coast.  
 316 San Isidro Group, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/lend/272061 (last visited Nov. 3, 
2011). 
 317 Abdallah, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/lend/272204 (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
 318 Enh-Amgalan, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/lend/272130 (last visited Nov. 3, 
2011). 
 319 See, e.g., 40 Under 40: Business’s Hottest Rising Stars, CNNMONEY.COM (Nov. 9, 
2009), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/40under40/2009/full_list/ (including 
Premal Shah, president, and Matthew Flannery, founder); 50 Best Websites 2009: Kiva, 
TIME, Aug. 24, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/ 
article/0,28804,1918031_1918016_1917950,00.html (ranking KIVA 27th out of the 
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Kiva users are not making a donation. Like Prosper and Lending 
Club, and unlike charitable organizations, Kiva strives to return 
lenders’ money. Unlike Prosper and Lending Club, however, Kiva’s 
efforts are unregulated by the SEC under the Howey and Reves tests.321 
Under Howey, Kiva lenders know they are not purchasing a security, 
because they are paid no interest. Kiva notes also are not investment 
contracts because, although they invest money, they have no 
expectation of profits.322 Kiva lenders’ philanthropic motivations also 
suggest that its loans do not constitute notes under the Reves family 
resemblance test. Reves’s first factor is “motivation,” under which 
Kiva’s lack of interest payment strongly increases family 
resemblance.323 Therefore, Kiva offers neither notes nor investment 
contracts to lenders, nor any other security for the purposes of the 
securities laws. Thus, Kiva is not required to make SEC disclosures or 
warnings of the sort incumbent upon Prosper and Lending Club.324 
 
top 50 websites of 2009); Alice Rawsthorn, Winning Ways of Making a Better World, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/31/fashion/31iht-
designweb.html (showing that Kiva won design prize from Danish government).  
 320 A Conversation with Bill Clinton, (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2007), 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21020060/page/2/; Bill Clinton, Oprah, and 
Kiva – Changing the World One Loan at a Time, ECORAZZI (Sept. 4, 2007, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.ecorazzi.com/?p=3803.  
 321 Cf. Letter from Mark F. Vilardo, Special Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., to 
Popologix, LLC (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/ 
2010/poplogix110510-2a1.htm (stating that the Division of Corporate Finance will 
not recommend enforcement action against Poplogix LLC, which provides a P2P 
service similar to Kiva); see also Letter from Edwin T. Markham, Attorney 
Representing Popologix, LLP, to Office of Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., 2 (Oct. 1, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/ 
poplogix110510-2a1-incoming.pdf (stating that Poplogix will help lenders to make 
loans to artists, for which lenders will be paid no interest). 
 322 See SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).  
 323 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66 (1990). Reves’s third factor asks 
whether investors expect the protection of the securities laws, and Kiva lenders are 
perhaps less likely to harbor such expectations. They may conceive of their Kiva loans 
as largely unlike corporate bonds. The fourth factor asks whether there is another 
regulatory scheme, which is more difficult to apply here. On the one hand, state 
attorneys general and the IRS both take an interest in non-profits. On the other hand, 
they do not specialize in addressing the kinds of risks Kiva lenders face. Moreover, it 
is conceivable that Kiva would structure itself to even avoid those regulators. See infra 
note 336. 
 324 Nor can the FTC enforce section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices. The agency lacks authority to to challenge an a corporation 
that does not operate for its profit or the profits of its members. 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 
45(a)(2) (2006); GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 41.  
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Without regulatory oversight, Kiva can encourage misconceptions 
about its business. Some of these misconceptions are of the sort that 
were once associated with needy child sponsorship organizations,325 
only updated for a Web 2.0 world. One commentator neatly 
summarized most of the misconceptions Kiva allows: 
Just today, for example, Kiva listed a loan fepor[sic] Phong 
Mut in Cambodia and at this writing only $25 of the needed 
$800 has been raised. But you needn’t worry about whether 
Phong Mut will get the loan because it was disbursed last 
month. And if she defaults, you might not hear about it: the 
intermediating micro-lender MAXIMA might cover for her in 
order to keep its Kiva-listed repayment rate high.326 
Other misconceptions abound. Although lenders receive no interest 
for Kiva loans, the ultimate borrowers pay interest, sometimes 
disturbingly high, on the loans that Kiva facilitates. These interest 
payments are not always used to cover Kiva’s costs or to reinvest in 
loans. Rather, these payments often come to rest in for-profit firms, 
the network of partner firms Kiva uses to find and vet its borrowers.327 
This sleight of hand also obscures borrower default rates, which are 
misrepresented to be astonishingly low.328 Kiva or its partners may 
repay a lender even if a borrower defaults, without ever telling the 
lender, in order to maintain its good reputation. Kiva’s padded default 
rates give users a sense of financial security and encourage the 
perception that novel microfinance techniques make borrowers happy 
to repay Kiva.329 At its worst, Kiva’s accounting exposes investors to 
the risk of a Ponzi scheme where a microfinance institution (“MFI”) 
uses one loan to patch up another. At some point, however, the MFI 
bubble could burst, resulting in a sudden write-down of Kiva’s loans. 
Kiva investors rarely are aware of intermediary credit risks. Kiva 
obscures that investors may lose investments for reasons independent 
 
 325 Stephanie Storm, Confusion Over Where Money Lent on Kiva Goes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/business/global/09kiva.html. 
 326 David Roodman, Kiva Is Not Quite What it Seems, DAVID ROODMAN’S 
MICROFINANCE OPEN BOOK BLOG (Oct. 2, 2009), http://blogs.cgdev.org/open_book/ 
2009/10/kiva-is-not-quite-what-it-seems.php.  
 327 New York Times Article on Microfinance Interest Rates and Profits, KIVA (Apr. 15, 
2010), http://www.kiva.org/updates/kiva/2010/04/15/new-york-times-article-on-
microfinance.html (noting that 20% of Kiva MFI partners are for-profit, though many 
have a strong social mission).  
 328 Latest Statistics, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/facts (last visited Nov. 3, 
2011) (“Current repayment rate (all partners): 98.90%.”). 
 329 See Verstein, supra note 200, at app. A. 
  
516 University of California, Davis [Vol. 45:445 
of the MFI or borrower. Kiva’s “Risk and Due Diligence” disclosure 
previously listed and explained only three risks: entrepreneur risk, 
field partner risk, and country risk.330 It did not list any risks 
associated with the platform itself. As with Prosper and Lending Club, 
all Kiva investments are obligations of Kiva itself, so lenders risk the 
possibility that Kiva may default. A tort judgment against Kiva, or a 
rise in administrative costs, could result in Kiva lenders losing money 
— even if all MFIs and borrowers pay in full. Unlike other P2P firms 
such as Prosper and Lending Club, Kiva is not subject to SEC 
regulation and is free to market its services as it pleases. 
The obvious potential victims of the Kiva cliff effect are the lenders, 
who encounter risks and philanthropy very differently than they might 
expect.331 Although Kiva benefits from this cliff effect, Kiva too might 
prefer regulation, albeit under a more gradual and rational regulatory 
regime than that of the SEC.332 The cliff effect distorts incentives for 
platforms, causing them to adopt business models that they might 
otherwise consider inefficient or incompatible simply to obtain 
regulatory freedom.333 In particular, Kiva’s founders admit that they 
initially hoped to be able to reward lenders with some return, but were 
deterred by the legal obstacles of the securities regime.334 Interest 
 
 330 Risks and Due Diligence, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/risk (last visited Oct. 
3, 2010). Note that Kiva has recently added a fourth risk, Kiva Related risk. As 
recently as April, 2011, no such warnings existed. 
 331 See generally Kevin E. Davis and Anna Gelpern, Peer-to-Peer Financing for 
Development: Regulating the Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. INT’L L. & POL. 1209, 1253-54 
(2010) (Discussing the potential consequences of the cliff effect on lenders). 
Philanthropic lenders’ risks should not be written off just because they are charitable. 
Some choose to lend through Kiva rather than donate because they actually count on 
getting the principal back, and they need it. They might lend less if they have to 
consider it a donation. Others are ideologically or psychologically opposed to 
donations but enjoy benevolent lending. These individuals’ contributions will dry up 
if they are made donors instead of creditors, to the detriment of deserving borrowers. 
 332 Kiva might be able to attract more lenders if it offered a small amount of 
interest. It might be happy to accept a small amount of regulation to grow its base 
substantially. For now, it only has the binary choice of freedom to pay any interest 
rate, but with securities regulation, or no freedom to pay any interest, but with no 
securities regulation.  
 333 Only the Kiva cliff effect is discussed, but others could be considered. See, e.g., 
Frequently Asked Questions: From Babylon to Babyloan, BABYLOAN.ORG, 
http://www.babyloan.org/fr/FAQ.html#div1 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (noting that 
Babyloan, which wanted to offer 1-3% interest to its borrowers, but was disallowed by 
French law).  
 334 Matt Flannery, Kiva and the Birth of Person-to-Person Microfinance, 2 
INNOVATIONS 31, 37-39 (2007). 
  
2011] The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending 517 
payments to lenders would incentivize more Kiva investment, but the 
cost of regulation would overwhelm the benefit of a larger user base.335 
Just as interest paying P2P platforms deserve regulation that allows 
them operate in an innovative fashion, rather than being subject to 
formulaic registration treatment, Kiva demonstrates that principal-
only platforms should not be completely free from regulation.336 
C. Understanding Misregulation 
Why did the SEC choose to take a hard line with P2P lending? 
Presumably the SEC feared that P2P lending was largely unregulated. 
It may have feared P2P lending’s potential to bring investment 
products into the hands of retail investors. These concerns, however, 
do not answer all the questions associated with the SEC’s usurpation 
of P2P lending. But why did the SEC turn to P2P lending in November 
of 2008, amid a growing financial crisis, when its resources could have 
been used elsewhere?337 And why did the SEC choose to operate in a 
manner that harmed the very lenders it sought to protect? 
 
 335 Another way to increase interest in the platforms, and appropriate in any case, 
is to grant below-market interest loans through Kiva a charitable tax deduction. See 
Sarah Lawsky, Money for Nothing: Charitable Deductions for Microfinance Lenders, 61 
SMU L. REV. 1525, 1527 (2008). 
 336 Non-profit platforms are regulated by state attorneys general and the IRS. 
However, it is unlikely that these regulators are attuned to the special risks in P2P. 
They deal with charities funded by donations, in which donors do not expect to be 
repaid, and they have no apparatus to control nonprofits’ risk disclosures. They are 
not in the business of scrutinizing the managing and presentation of credit risk, and 
some may even find it antithetical to their mandate — absent some public disaster, 
who can imagine a state AG punishing on behalf of their creditors, be they a bank or 
retail lenders? 
Moreover it is not obvious that some future Kiva copycat must choose between SEC 
oversight and the oversight traditionally associated with nonprofits. A platform could 
be a for-profit corporation, and exempt from non-profit oversight. The same platform 
could issue borrower payment dependent notes with 0% interest payments. Investors 
would not be due securities laws protection since the note is not a security. These 
lenders would get no protection as either donors or investors, and a for-profit firm 
could operate with great freedom and a high profit margin. 
We may doubt that many investors would be interested in such a transaction, but 
the Internet allows all kinds of investors to be contacted and taken in. Without 
disclosure regulation, the platform could be less than forthright in explaining its 
nature and the relevant risks. See, e.g. supra note 325 (GlobalGiving neglected to tell 
0% interest lenders that they were lending to a for-profit firm). This would be an easy 
case for affinity fraud to take some people in. See sources cited supra note 98. 
 337 Cf. David Voreacos & David Glovin, Madoff Confessed $50 Billion Fraud Before FBI 
Arrest (Update3), BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2008, 3:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aYzclQY1HkVE (highlighting the contemporaneous $50 
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The SEC’s action may result from of an agency culture that is 
inherently insensitive to the risks of misregulating emerging 
industries. Large organizations, such as the SEC, tend to develop 
certain cultures and understandings of how to operate. Professor 
Pritchard and other scholars argue that the SEC suffers from 
groupthink and confirmation bias, among other vices.338 As an opinion 
forms within the agency, dissenting views may disappear, even in the 
presence of negative outcomes. The SEC oversees thousands of issuers 
and likely hears many pleas seeking flexible treatment and complaints 
regarding the intrusiveness of SEC regulation. It seems likely that the 
SEC would have been inintially skeptical of P2P lending’s new 
business model. The SEC likely intervened to prevent potential risks 
that P2P lending might someday pose; this action, however, ignores 
the risks of its own regulation.339 
This sort of agency insensitivity leaves the SEC with a long history 
of trying to fit new pegs into old holes, fundamentally 
misunderstanding financial innovations in order to apply old 
frameworks. For example, Professor Romano catalogued the agency’s 
failure of comprehension to futures margin requirements.340 Stocks 
and stock index futures differ dramatically in their risk profile and the 
rationale for margin. The margin account for stocks constitutes a 
down payment on the loan one used to obtain the stocks. The margin 
account on a stock index future is put up in good faith to protect the 
counterparty against default. Because the purposes and risks are 
different for stocks and stock index futures, industry norms demand 
different margin requirements.341 Nevertheless, the SEC fought hard to 
raise stock index futures margins to those of stock margins.342 This 
example demonstrates the SEC’s inability to address the intricacies of 
innovative transactions. Either the SEC intentionally misregulates 
 
million fraud committed by Bernard Madoff).  
 338 See generally A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement? 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1073 (2005) (discussing groupthink in the SEC). Groupthink is the 
tendency for members of a group to defer to the group’s consensus, narrowing the 
range of hypotheses considered in addressing a problem. Confirmation bias is the 
tendancy to evaluate and acknowledge evidence in light of prior actions or beliefs. 
 339 See generally WILLIAM FIELDING OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE WITH RESPECT TO 
CULTURE AND ORIGINAL NATURE (1922) (noting lagging responses to innovations).  
 340 Roberta Romano, Regulation of Derivative Securities, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 19 
(1996). 
 341 Id. (stating that industry norms called for 50% margin for stocks and 10% to 
15% for futures).  
 342 Id. at 19 n.42 (explaining an SEC-led political fight to raise margin 
requirements under the first Bush administration that lasted two years). 
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because of hostility to innovative transactions, or it is unaware of the 
unique needs of new transaction models. 
Alternatively, perhaps the SEC acted rationaly according what it 
perceived to be its own interests. Public choice theory portrays 
government actors pursuing their own interests, as they perceive 
them.343 These government actors assume regulatory authority or defer 
to others as their various pressures dictate.344 In deeming P2P notes 
securities, the SEC likely assumed that it would be blamed if a scandal 
were to emerge in an unregulated P2P lending market. Regulatory 
costs are born by consumers and industry, not the regulatory agency. 
As such, the agency rationally over-regulates as a form of externalizing 
insurance. At a time when the SEC received criticism for its handling 
of the financial crisis, it likely wished to appear tough by being firm 
with providers of largely subprime consumer credit, like P2P 
platforms.345 Accordingly, P2P lending may be a mere victim of the 
SEC’s institutional needs. 
For many bureaucracies, self-interest means growing and preserving 
the size of the agency and its budget.346 As more individuals access the 
market through intermediaries like mutual funds, the SEC’s 
wheelhouse of protecting retail investment in securities narrows. The 
SEC may have chosen to regulate P2P lending in order to grab turf in 
the event the P2P lending industry grows.347 Alternatively, the SEC 
may have wished to ensure that P2P lending did not grow, imposing 
regulatory hurdles to protect existing intermediaries such as banks. 
 
 343 See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 36-42 (1971) (stating that bureaucrats try to maximize budget and 
power); Jonathon R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic 
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 
265 (applying public choice to federalism). 
 344 See generally Macey, supra note 287 (describing why the federal government 
chooses to defer to state regulation).  
 345 This Article is not the first public choice account of P2P. There is good reason 
to suspect rent seeking when Bangladesh’s bank regulators announced that the Nobel 
laureate Mohammid Yunis must step down as head of Grameen Bank because of a 
mandatory retirement age law. There is reason to think that the government wishes to 
increase its control over the successful microfinance group for political purposes. 
Ruth Davis, Nobel Winner Faces Calls for Ouster From Grameen Over Age, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 1, 2011, 7:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-01/nobel-winner-
yunus-faces-calls-for-ouster-from-grameen-over-age.html. 
 346 See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO 
AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989) (describing bureaucratic behavior). 
 347 See generally Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Regulation, 
14 YALE J. ON REG. 279 (1997) (describing jurisdictional battle between SEC and 
CFTC). 
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P2P lending’s growth comes at the cost of traditional consumer credit 
firms.348 Big investment banks help consumer lenders to securitize 
loans. From Visa to General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
(“GMAC”), consumer credit rarely comes to rest in the hands of the 
lender; rather, it is securitized, serviced, held, or sold by major 
financial institutions. P2P borrowers primarily borrow to refinance 
existing consumer credit. If P2P lending has a bright future, it comes 
almost entirely out of the existing consumer credit business model, 
much of which is under the SEC’s watch. Either to defend its 
perceived interests or because it has been captured by incumbent 
financial institutions,349 the SEC may have wanted to protect its 
traditional constituents from innovative competition.350 
The SEC’s traditional constituents are also Congress’s constituents. 
Just as the SEC may wish to protect its favored companies, Congress 
may also wish to protect the firms that support its congressional 
members. Money talks, and, to be sure, incumbant financial 
institutions are not afraid to exert influence. Essentially, Goldman 
Sachs has more important friends in Congress than does any P2P 
company, and thus may better voice its desires.351 Moreover, P2P 
lending represents a trend of stark disintermediation to which some 
self-interested government actors may feel special hostility. 
Intermediaries provide a level of opacity in government action. If 
policymakers wish to favor allies, they may lean on intermediaries to 
do so. The Community Reinvestment Act,352 which directs banks to 
lend to borrowers in their communities, allows the government to 
direct funds to favored constituents without using government loans 
or grants. While it may be unfeasible for politicians to directly reward 
 
 348 See ZOPA, supra note 53. 
 349 Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31, 42 (1991) (discussing capture and collecting literature). 
 350 See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION, at ix (1980) (“One 
cannot mention regulatory agencies without adding the observation that, of course, 
such agencies are likely to be “captured’ by the interests they are supposed to regulate. 
To suggest that matters are any different from this is to mark oneself as hopelessly 
naive, or even disingenuous.”). 
 351 Prosper’s lobbying won it the support of San Francisco Congresswomen Jackie 
Speier. See Silla Brush, Online Lender Lobbies Congress for Industry Consumer Regulator, 
THE HILL (June 9, 2010, 7:23 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/102323-
online-lender-lobbies-congress-for-industry-consumer-regulator; see also Eric 
Lichtblau & Eric Dash, Goldman and its Lobbyists Spurned in Fight on Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 10, 2010, at B1 (“[Goldman’s] lobbyists and outside lawyers include Washington 
luminaries like Richard A. Gephardt, the former House majority leader, and Ken 
Duberstein, the former Reagan administration official….”). 
 352 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (2006). 
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influential supporters, a lending mandate may force banks to provide 
credit to the same supporters. Similar stories may be told about federal 
support for subprime housing subsidies more broadly; generous 
subsidies encouraged intermediaries to loosen their underwriting 
standards for important constituencies.353 Intermediation also benefits 
political actors by obscuring blame when things go awry. Where 
imprudent loans threaten systemic stability, government agents can 
defuse criticism by using the intermediary as a scapegoat. Politicians 
may lose elections when opportunistic behavior leads to visible waste 
or disaster, but not if they can place blame on the “profiteering” 
intermediary.354 When finance is decentralized and disintermediated, 
however, politicians will find it more difficult to hide behind pet 
intermediaries. 
Ultimately the SEC’s motives remain inscrutable. Its six-page Order 
to Prosper remains the agency’s only public comment on P2P 
lending.355 Further, the Order consists of merely a hasty legal 
conclusion divorced from practical policy considerations. The SEC 
points to no actual or anticipated abuses that regulation could solve, 
nor signals any consideration of the risks it poses in regulating P2P 
platforms.356 This silence may be the SEC’s most important 
indictment. 
In a rapidly disintermediating world, market participants will 
demand openness. Web 2.0 consumers are characterized by a high 
level of participation, and they deserve a modern regulator capable of 
publicly tackling perceived threats. With evolving market 
disintermediation, consumers will likely demand explanations for 
regulatory actions, and they will become frustrated with any regulator 
that does not deign to explain its policy objectives. 
 
 353 PETER J. WALLISON, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION: DISSENTING STATEMENT 
444 (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/ 
fcic_final_report_wallison_dissent.pdf (calling U.S. government support for subprime 
and other risky loans the sine qua non of the financial crisis).  
 354 See, e.g., Lauren Tara LaCapra, Wall Street Whispers: Will Obama Slay the Fannie 
and Freddie Beast?, THE STREET (July 22, 2010, 5:25 PM), http://www.thestreet.com/ 
story/10814735/1/will-obama-slay-the-fannie-and-freddie-beast.html (“Dodd and 
Frank have long been champions of Fannie and Freddie, pushing them deeper into 
subprime to achieve affordable-housing goals. . . . ‘They were clearly mismanaged, 
their CEOs were making something like $30 million a year and they were basically 
running themselves like a Wall Street bank with taxpayer dollars.’ ”); see also J.W. 
Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice Lens: Government-Controlled Corporations 
as a Mechanism for Rent Transfer, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1521, 1550 (2010).  
 355 However, the SEC has issued a no-action letter to one P2P firm that provides 
lenders no interest payments. See sources cited supra 321. 
 356 See Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8984, supra note 138. 
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III. REFORM PROPOSAL: P2P LENDING UNDER THE CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
This Part sketches an alternative regulatory proposal, designed to 
better accommodate consumer needs in P2P lending. P2P notes 
should be removed from the scope of the Securities Acts and 
transferred to the control of the new Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”). Prior to the the Dodd-Frank Act, Prosper lobbied 
extensively to gain exemption from the Securities Acts.357 Prosper, 
instead, hoped for regulation under the CFPB, which Dodd-Frank 
established as a new the federal agency charged with oversight of 
consumer financial transactions.358 
Prosper’s lobbying efforts359 succeeded in achieving a statutory 
exemption in the House of Representatives version of the bill that 
would become Dodd-Frank.360 This exemption would have amended 
Section 3(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 to exclude “any consumer 
 
 357 See Brush, supra note 351 (stating that “Prosper has had hundreds of meetings 
on Capitol Hill, and Larsen founded a related association, the Coalition for New 
Credit Models, which has spent $150,000 on lobbying with Podesta”); Lobbying: 
Prosper Marketplace, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ 
clientsum.php?lname=Prosper+Marketplace&year=2010 (last visited July 25, 2010) 
(noting that lobbying amounts were substantially greater in 2009 due to passage of 
Dodd-Frank Act); see also Financial Start-Ups Form “Coalition for New Credit Models,” 
PROGRESO FINANCIERO, http://www.progressfin.com/en/press_releases/financial_start-
ups_form_coalition_for_new_credit_models/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2010) (stating that 
the Coalition for New Credit Models recommends that Congress “[a]dopt legislation 
classifying person-to-person lending as a consumer banking service, not a securities 
offering”). But see Brush, supra note 351 (“We understand that this is an expensive 
process, but at the same time [it] provides a level of transparency and provides 
certainty to both borrowers and lenders,” said Jason Altieri, Lending Club’s general 
counsel. ”Currently we’re fine with the regulation by the SEC. We think they are the 
appropriate group to manage this nascent industry. They have been very accessible 
and accommodating. We have been happy with them.”). 
 358 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§1001-1100H, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 359 Concerns about the undue influence of special interesst and their lobbyists are 
increased by the reality of a revolving door between government, industry, and 
lobbying firms. For example, the former director of Prosper who initiated Prosper’s 
lobbying efforts, is now joining the CFPB. See Edward Wyatt, Advisor to Consumer 
Agency Had Role in Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2010, at B1. But see Zach Carter, Raj 
Date is the Best Thing to Happen to Consumers Since Elizabeth Warren, ALTERNET (Oct. 
27, 2010, 9:42 PM), http://blogs.alternet.org/speakeasy/2010/10/27/raj-date-is-the-
best-thing-to-happen-to-consumers-since-elizabeth-warren/ (praising Raj’s pro-
consumer work).  
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loan, and any note representing a whole or fractional interest in any 
such loan, funded or sold through a person-to-person lending 
platform.”361 With some exceptions, the new consumer protection 
agency would govern P2P lending and related notes.362 However, 
Congress did not pass Prosper’s proposal. Nevertheless, the GAO 
report lists a similar provision as one of the two regulatory options 
available for P2P lending going forward. The first option provides a 
continuation of a bifurcated regulatory regime somewhat like that 
which currently overlays P2P lending, in which lenders are primarily 
protected by securities regulators, and borrowers are primarily 
protected by financial services regulators, including the CFPB.363 The 
second option would consolidate the protection of lenders and 
borrowers into a single federal regulator, most likely the CFPB.364 The 
GAO was unable to provide an overall recommendation as which 
option Congress should adopt. On the one hand, it cited concerns that 
the bifurcated regulatory system might be inflexible and inefficient. 
On the other hand, the GAO acknowledged risks of using a new 
regulator that is, itself, in its formative stages. Moreover, the GAO 
highlighted the changing nature of the P2P lending industry as reason 
for caution and skepticism regarding the government’s ability to 
design a regime today that will meet the industry needs of 
tomorrow.365 
The GAO correctly asserts that neither the character of the CFPB 
nor the future of P2P lending is ascertainable in the present. 
Nevertheless, a unified regulator remains the best available solution. 
CFPB regulation would be superior to SEC regulation for P2P lending. 
Part II.B showed how the current regulatory scheme creates costs 
without protections, fundamentally misunderstanding P2P lending. 
The SEC lacks the understanding, motive, or power to properly 
regulate P2P lending. The CFPB does not suffer these deficiencies. 
CFPB regulation would have comparative advantages in four key areas 
of reform: disclosure, oversight and enforcement, prudential 
regulation, and borrowers. While the CFPB or the future of P2P 
lending may hold uncertainties, we should not allow it to paralyze 
 
 361 H.R. 4173. 
 362 Transactions involving multiple loans would remain under the SEC’s purview, 
presumably to prevent large-scale securitization from eluding the securities regulator. 
Id. 
 363 GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 42.  
 364 Id.  
 365 Id.  
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regulation. Unified regulation under the CFPB would be a substantial 
improvement to the treatment of this innovative P2P market. 
An ideal regulator would allow P2P lenders to obtain dependable 
estimates of risk and return. Although there is no single “right” way to 
calculate future profits from past defaults in a new market, P2P 
lenders require sufficient information to compare platforms and 
understand the risks associated with P2P lending. The SEC failed to 
meet this need because it lacks the mandate to police web pages and 
set substantive advertising standards. Even if the SEC held such 
authority, it would lack the expertise to engage in such oversight. The 
SEC generally permits issuers to define terms as they wish, as long as 
the issuer is explicit about its terminology, thus allowing various and 
misleading return statistics for P2P lending. Instead, the SEC provides 
information through thick prospectuses and lengthy, unnecessary 
disclosures, which contain information are already publicly 
available.366 By contrast, the CFPB would have authority to craft 
disclosure rules that address misleading advertising and disclosure.367 
The CFPB could draw on its experience regulating communications 
with borrowers to ensure that lenders, too, are given offers that they 
can understand. 
The CFPB can also create safe harbor disclosure formats, which are 
non-binding but ensure the regulator’s presumptive approval. These 
disclosure requirements would provide consumers with an accurate 
understanding of the risks they face, including the past performance of 
P2P transactions. As P2P firms opt for these safe harbors, inter-
platform comparison will become easier. The GAO acknowledged the 
difficulties P2P lenders currently face in comparing risk and returns 
among platforms.368 The SEC told the GAO that it currently does not 
attempt to improve inter-platform comparability, and that doing so 
would strain the SEC’s limited staff.369 The CFPB would have the staff 
and expertise to take on the standardizing task that the SEC would 
not, thereby overcoming the SEC’s hurdles to adopting a more ideal 
regulatory framework. 
 
 366 Even my most critical interview subjects wished for platforms to make clearer 
statements as to returns and to better honor the policies they promised (particularly 
with respect to collections and fraud-protection). These are not demands for deeper 
and greater disclosure. See Pritchard, supra note 338, at 1088 (“Disclosure is the tool 
of choice largely because that is what Congress has given the SEC.”). 
 367 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1032, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 368 GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 47.  
 369 Id.  
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To satisfy financial protection objectives in this wired economy, the 
CFPB will soon develop competence evaluating online financial 
product advertisements. It could potentially leverage this expertise to 
adopt rules governing the payment of affiliate fees for references, 
which would reduce the existence of exaggerated praise of P2P by 
compensated bloggers. The CFPB could respond to consumer notices 
of deceptive platform advertising, and sanction the platforms on an 
ongoing basis.370 
In addition to misrepresentation, P2P lending presents unique 
challenges that an ideal regulator would address. P2P loans are small 
enough that consumers will not fully protect their own interests. 
Currently, SEC enforcement actions are extremely rare and ill fit to 
remedy P2P lending claims. Traditional private plaintiffs enforce the 
Securities Acts through class action lawsuits, but small P2P loans, with 
disappointing but generally non-negative gains, will be unlikely to 
procure plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
The CFPB, on the contrary, is designed to respond to consumer 
complaints,371 and holds tremendous enforcement capabilities. The 
CFPB’s responsiveness to consumer complaints would allow it to 
evaluate platforms on an ongoing basis and provide consumer 
enforcement.372 The CFPB would not be limited to ex post loss 
litigation, but could concern itself with P2P lending’s opportunity 
costs, unfair practices, and prospective modifications. Furthermore, 
the CFPB can and should meet with industry representatives and users 
to anticipate and avoid problems before they escalate. The CFPB can 
be proactive in suggesting or requiring industry changes to make the 
market safer and more efficient. By contrast, the SEC told the GAO 
that its role was not to suggest changes but instead to respond to 
them.373 As it develops, the CFPB will already have authority to define 
what constitutes unfair, deceptive or abusive practices with respect to 
borrowers.374 A unified approach under the CFPB also would allow 
consideration of practices that might be unfair to lenders. 
 
 370 12 U.S.C. § 5534 (2006) (stating that CFPB will establish a database for 
collecting and responding to consumer complaints). 
 371 Dodd-Frank Act § 1034.  
 372 See 12 U.S.C. § 5534 (identifying responsibility of CFPB regarding 
“[r]esponse[s] to consumer complaints and inquiries). 
 373 GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 49. Industry 
participants and the SEC both acknowledge improving responsiveness to suggested 
changes, but the SEC has hardly done well in responding to and understanding 
difficulties with the market before this time. See id.  
 374 12 U.S.C. § 5532 (2006). 
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Protecting lenders requires a measure of prudential regulation, 
requiring some minimum regard for the security of lender interests. 
The SEC is ill suited to oversee this project due to its role as a 
disclosure regulator.375 SEC interests in disclosure often cause it to 
overlook non-disclosure effects of regulation on issuers or investors. 
As a result, the SEC failed to consider both the cost of disclosure on 
P2P platforms, as well as the increased risks to lenders from 
conditioning shelf registration on lenders holding unsecured interests. 
Instead, the SEC pushed platforms into riskier, more complex lending 
structures to the detriment of all parties. 
If Congress removes SEC authority by clarifying that P2P notes do 
not constitute securities, P2P platforms would be able to operate 
without interposing themselves as an intermediary credit risk to their 
users. Likewise, P2P lenders will be able to directly hold notes, or at 
least hold a fully secured interest in borrower notes. These changes 
will greatly reduce risk to lenders, who would no longer suffer a loss if 
the platform defaults. Removing the risk of intermediary default, 
however, does not remove all risks associated with platform failure. 
P2P lenders would still face significant inconvenience if the platform 
goes out of business. Lenders’ fractional interests are small. Though 
they would have the right to, lenders could not practicably service 
their loans. For this reason, ideal regulation would require all P2P 
platforms to develop a plan for a possible failure. These requirements 
already exist under Dodd-Frank for certain financial institutions, 
which are required to make resolution plans, or “living wills.”376 P2P 
platforms should have an analogous responsibility. P2P platforms are 
less complex than larger holding companies, so their resolution plans 
would be more basic. A simple solution would be for P2P platforms to 
contract with another P2P platform to take over servicing the loans if 
the platform were to fail. 
The steps proposed here would serve as a marked improvement 
from the bifurcated regulatory regime of the SEC. The SEC currently 
 
 375 See GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 48; The 
Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2011).  
 376 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 112(a)(2)(I), 115(b)(1)(D), 115(d)(1). Scholars continue 
to debate whether these plans will have a salutary effect on systemic risk. See Jeffrey 
N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers 
and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 195 
(2011); David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 127-29 (2010). However, 
we are not greatly concerned with systematic risk in the P2P area.  
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does not take steps to help secure P2P lenders.377 Nor does it want to 
accept such a task.378 Instead, prescribing steps “to protect lenders in 
the case of [a] bankruptcy would be inconsistent with the [SEC’s] 
role” as a disclosure regulator.379 If the SEC sees these operations as 
inconsistent with its mission, it must fall to another regulator to 
protect P2P lenders. A unified approach, with the CFPB at the helm, 
could implement these policies for a more effective, prudential 
regulation of P2P lending. 
P2P lending is as much about borrowing as it is about lending. The 
SEC does not consider helping borrowers to be a part of its mission, 
and the results of its P2P lending regulation reflect this prioritization. 
Borrowers experience less privacy, less access to capital, and a less 
nuanced approach since the SEC Order. However, P2P borrowers are 
consumers too, and the promise of P2P lending should not leave them 
behind. 
The CFPB, unlike the SEC, has the authority to balance the risks 
and concerns inherent in lender/borrower relationships. The CFPB has 
broad rulemaking authority over federal consumer financial laws.380 It 
also has supervisory authority over persons providing consumer 
financial products or services.381 Likewise, the CFPB has exclusive 
authority to enforce federal consumer financial law.382 It, therefore, 
has wide discretion to balance the concerns of borrowers and lenders. 
Furthermore, no agency will be better positioned than the new CFPB 
to imagine new ways in which borrowers and lenders might interact to 
mutual benefit. 
A call for CFPB involvement may revive familiar worries: will the 
agency be excessively populist or paternalistic — a “supernanny”?383 
The CFPB might pursue immediate consumer benefits that create 
 
 377 Indeed, we have seen that the SEC has caused lenders to have far less security 
than before.  
 378 GAO-11-613 PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 15, at 48 (“[S]taff from 
SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance said that prescribing steps that a person-to-
person lending company should take to protect lenders in case of a bankrupttcy would 
be inconsistent with the role of securities regulation — a role that is intended to 
ensure adequate disclosures for investors rather than to regulate companies’ 
operations.”). 
 379 See id. 
 380 Dodd-Frank Act, § 1022. 
 381 Id. § 1002(6)(A) (defining “covered person”); § 1024(a) (stating supervision of 
nondepository covered persons). 
 382 Id. § 1024(c)(1).  
 383 David S. Evans and & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 277, 280-
81 (2010). 
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burdens to the businesses they regulate, causing harms that the 
business will externalize by passing costs on to consumers. As a result 
skeptics might argue that P2P consumers will find fewer credit-
providers, higher prices, and fewer choices under CFPB regulation. 
To the contrary, the experience of regulating P2P would allow the 
CFPB to consider the tradeoffs of a proposed regulation in consumer 
welfare terms on both sides of the transaction. For example before the 
CFPB decides that a given type of borrower late fee is unfair, it would 
have to weigh the fairness in denying that fee to a consumer-lender. As 
such, the CFPB will be a more nuanced and reasonable regulator of 
P2P lending than many may expect. Moreover, this regulatory 
experience would better prepare the CFPB for addressing new 
products outside of the P2P lending domain. A likely resulting 
perception that the CFPB takes account of the unique needs of P2P 
users would improve its relationship with regulatees and Congress.384 
Not only is the CFPB better situated to understand the tradeoffs of 
protecting borrowers and lenders, but it is also better equipped to 
consider P2P lending in the broader context of consumer finance as 
well. The CFPB should, and no doubt will, hire staff that is technically 
competent and technologically current. It can leverage its 
understanding of other consumer financial products to understand the 
trends that affect consumers. Containing this wide range of regulatory 
duties under a unified system allows an intra-agency synergy that can 
adapt to the changing needs of P2P lending. 
Unlike the seventy-five year old SEC, the new CFPB approaches P2P 
lending with a clean slate.385 As a new entity, the CFPB is not 
entrenched in an institutional culture that would prevent a better 
tailored regulatory approach. Instead, the CFPB could grow alongside 
the P2P industry, adapting as the market changes. The CFPB’s 
objectives are to provide consumers with understandable information, 
protect consumers from unfair practices, address unduly burdensome 
regulations, enforce consumer financial law to improve competition, 
and ensure efficient and transparent markets for consumer financial 
products.386 These objectives, alongside the CFPB’s specific authority 
 
 384 This perception will also improve CFPB officer prestige. Cf. Nicholas L. 
Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career and Recognition Judiciary, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 205, 217-18 (2000) (stating prestige feedback effect in judicial hiring).  
 385 Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group 
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (1994) 
(explaining that the SEC is a modern administrative agency that “presents problems of 
obsolescence and irrelevance”). 
 386 Dodd-Frank Act § 1021(b). 
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to monitor consumer financial transactions, provide a good start 
towards addressing the unique needs P2P lending presents.387 
CONCLUSION 
Disintermediated transactions such as P2P loans create a new core 
economic function that warrants preserving. Despite the promise of 
this new industry, regulators have hamstrung it with misguided 
applications of the Securities Acts. To preserve P2P lending, 
appropriate legal treatment must sustain and discipline this nascent 
market. P2P loans are disintermediated financial transactions on a 
small scale — but with grand ambitions. If properly freed from 
confines of the Securities Acts, this grand experiment may provide a 
transparent, consumer-benefiting product where opaque, costly 
products now dominate. 
The economics of the P2P lending industry is capable of delivering 
efficient and needed service to some of its users, most of whom are 
retail investors and borrowers. P2P lending is a creative, innovative 
mode of finance worth preserving, but not without addressing risks 
and harms endemic to this model of financial transaction. The current 
regulatory system is a poor match for the needs of consumers and the 
platforms that connect them. The applicability of the securities laws to 
P2P lending is debatable. The SEC was not required to assert 
regulatory control over P2P lending because P2P loans arguably do 
not constitute securities. Nevertheless, the SEC imposed securities 
regulation on the P2P lending market, threatening its very existence 
and increasing risks to both lenders and borrowers. SEC regulation is 
inflexible and imposes significant costs on P2P platforms, leading to a 
surprising increase in lender risks. The securities regime is fixated 
upon formalistic disclosure rather than addressing lender needs. 
Moreover, it focuses on investors at the expense of borrowers. The 
SEC’s binary approach to regulation means that some firms are almost 
entirely unregulated, even as their peers are overregulated. Further, 
private litigation, a staple of the traditional securities regime, is 
 
 387 This treatment of the CFPB only sketches some of the benefits of the new 
regulators’ involvement. Far more detailed questions must be answered in order to 
operationalize this suggestion. For example, what shall be the outer boundaries of this 
regulated field? Does it include any securitized asset marketed to consumers, such as 
miniature mortgage backed securities? Does it include any non-intermediated finance 
scheme, such as loan sharks? Also, what sorts of regulations should the CFPB pursue, 
and how should it interact with other regulators? These questions are beyond the 
scope of this Article, but interested readers will find answers in Appendix B. See 
Verstein, supra note 200, app. B. 
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ineffective in policing abuses within the P2P market due to the small-
scale loans inherent to P2P lending. 
A new, unified regulatory approach to P2P lending can address the 
specific needs of P2P users in a way that the SEC has failed to do. The 
CFPB is better situated to provide lenders and borrowers the 
protections they need while letting the industry evolve and grow. 
There are unknowns in such an approach, since the industry is new 
and the regulator is even newer. Yet, no reform comes without some 
uncertainty. The best we can hope is a plan that meets current needs 
and can better adapt to unanticipated changes in the evolution of 
disintermediation through P2P lending. The CFPB can fulfill that hope 
for better regulation of P2P lending. 
